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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A defining feature of modern economic behavior is that individual business 
organizations must increasingly rely upon associations with cooperative business 
partners.  For example, in the computer technology industry alone, over 2,200 alliances 
were created between 2001 and 2005 (Barney & Hesterly, 2008).  Furthermore, future 
expectations hold that these cooperative structures will be increasingly widespread.  In 
spite of the recent economic downturn that has resulted in fewer capital investments and 
decreased merger and acquisition activity, almost one third of the consumer products 
companies plan to forge new strategic alliances in the next twelve months.1  In addition, 
PricewaterhouseCoopers predicts that the entertainment and media industry alone will 
grow by $2.2 trillion by the year 2012 and that this growth would be largely structured 
through strategic alliances.2
These cooperative business associations can be structured as joint ventures, joint 
promotions, co-branding, alliances, associations, franchises, coalitions, and many other 
similar forms.  These cooperative structures require business firms to learn how to 
manage their tangible and intangible assets in light of these arrangements.  Managers, as 
they cope with an environment that often requires the implementation of the conflicting 
strategies of flexibility
   
 
3 and specialization4, require tools to govern the exchanges 
involved in these important relationships.  While many exchanges correspond to the spot 
transactions described by neoclassical economics5
Interest in these contractual relationships is not limited to business practitioners 
attempting to develop beneficial, long-term relationships in the market place.  
, the marketplace often requires repeat 
transactions and even long-term relationships to develop.  These long-term relationships 
are always guided and governed by the use of some form of contract and it is those 
contracts that are the focus of this study.   
 
                                                   
1 This information comes from a PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP December 4, 2008 report concerning the 
consumer products industry.  The   information was retrieved from senior executives and their surveyed 
responses to questions regarding their expectations of the next twelve months.  
2 This information comes from a PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP, June 24, 2008 report concerning the global 
entertainment and media industry.   The report is a prediction by PriceWaterhouseCoopers LLP analysts.  The 
growth is described as largely structured through strategic alliances stating the industry is faced with a 
“collaborative imperative”. 
3 Strategic flexibility is a concept suggesting that managers are willing to override existing investment criteria 
and avoid capital investments in an effort to deal with market uncertainty and thus maintain a level of 
investment discretion for the future (Donaldson & Lorsch, 1983).  This effort to maintain flexibility is the 
basis behind the real option models of strategic management. 
4 Specialization allows firms to focus their investments “deeper in their domain of core competence”(Tiwana 
& Keil, 2007).  By limiting the scope of the investment choices, the firm has a higher probability of developing 
capabilities that become increasingly valuable.  Such specialization, however, requires firms to rely on outside 
firms for complementary expertise and skills (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004).  Where specialization encourages 
investment by reducing and focusing the investment choices, flexibility discourages new investments due to 
market uncertainty and the lack of information concerning investment opportunities. 
5 Neoclassical economics has defined the spot transaction between suppliers and buyers to exist in time at the 
point of the transaction.  Abstracting from the realities of many market transactions, the transacting parties 
conduct their exchange with no emergence of a social relationship and no expectation of a future set of 
transactions that would require the development of any social relationship or social norms. 
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Academics have enormous interest to understand these cooperative efforts and the 
governance mechanisms they employ, such as formal contracts.  Ronald Coase (1992) 
states that, “the main obstacle faced by researchers in industrial organization is the lack 
of available data on contracts and the activities of firms.”  Coase continues by urging 
that we “study the world of positive transaction costs”, that while doing so, what 
“becomes immediately clear is the crucial importance of the legal system”.  The legal 
system’s impact can rarely have a more important and practical influence on business 
practices than does the law of contracts and the legal guidelines developed to facilitate 
private agreements between business partners. 
 
The term “contract” is specified as a device acting as a governing mechanism to 
guide and implement anticipated economic transactions.6  Zhou et. al. (2003) explains 
that “without the anticipated economic exchanges, there is no need for contracts to 
establish and maintain such bilateral relationships between firms.”  In addition to 
describing the economic exchange, these mechanisms can also impose legal sanctions 
for parties not in compliance with the agreement.  Macneil (1981) suggested that from a 
neoclassical economic perspective, a contract is “nothing more than a sale with a time 
lag”.  Karl Llewellyn took exception to this and described a contract as a relationship 
framework explaining the “major importance of legal contract is to provide… a 
framework which never accurately reflects real working relation, but provide a rough 
indication around which such relations vary… 7
The art of contract; the ability to develop, commit and effectuate contracts is the 
foundation of building cooperative business relationships (Bagley, 2008).  Increased 
specialization has amplified the need for firms to coordinate with other firms in order to 
achieve organizational goals.   Recently, Poppo and Zenger (2002) made a unique call 
for research into the types of clauses that managers use in their contracts, specifically in 
the context of cooperative relationships.  Typically, the management, economic and 
strategy literatures have implied contracts to be homogeneous, with little discussion 
concerning the vast differences that can exist between any particular set of contracts.  
Reuer and Arino (2007) made a unique contribution to this research by emphasizing 
contract complexity and the vast heterogeneity of contractual supports for inter-firm 
relationships.  Both these studies imply that managers, making strategic decisions 
concerning cooperative relationships, have enormous discretion over the structure and 
design of inter-firm agreements (Reuer and Arino, 2007, James, 2000; Gulati 1995). 
  Oliver Williamson (2005) further 
describes the simple purpose of a legal contract as “not to be legalistic, but to get the job 
done”.  However, Bagley (2008) recognizes that it is that “legalistic” nature of contracts, 
of which are enforced by courts, which allows market players to agree to their own 
private rules. 
 
                                                   
6 Macaulay (1963) describes contracts as “devices for conducting exchanges”.  Macaulay further describes 
contracts as having two distinct elements: “a) rational planning of the transaction with careful provision for as 
many future contingencies as can be foreseen, and (b) the existence or use of actual or potential legal sanction 
to induce performance of the exchange or to compensate for non-performance.  Zhou et. al. (2003) defines 
contractual relationships as being all the formal and informal agreements between firms. 
7 Karl Llewellyn is distinguished as being a member of the first set of legal scholars to work and develop the 
Uniform Commercial Code, which was first presented to the States for adoption in 1952. 
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Based upon the limited research of such an important component of the cooperative 
relationship, this area poses an open field of research potential. 
 
Therefore, as a conceptual counterpart, trust is often characterized as the 
preferred alternative to the development of formal contracts.  Ranjay Gulati (1995) 
states, in his important study of alliances and networks, that: “A detailed contract is one 
mechanism for making behavior predictable, and the other is trust… As a result, where 
there is trust appropriation concerns are likely to be mitigated, and organizations may 
not choose to rely on detailed contracts to ensure predictability”
A.  Statement of the Problem. 
 
Currently, there exist deficiencies in our understanding of contracts within inter-
organizational relationships.  With so little research directly focused upon contracts, we 
know little about the development and maintenance of these formal agreements and the 
actions and motivations of those that develop these contractual relationships.  Early 
research in this area may have developed assumptions about contracts that have later 
proven to be difficult when trying to reconcile academic theory with practical 
application.  For example, several researchers have suggested that the use of contracts 
may create difficulties when attempting to develop successful, long-term relationships.  
Generally, practitioners would find this conclusion bizarre.  However, with conclusions 
such as that previously mentioned, it is no wonder why so little research is being done to 
understand contractual components.  Even if we were to recognize the importance of 
contracts, common misunderstandings of contract law do not allow us to consider some 
of the risks of implied obligations when the parties work together to create cooperative 
inter-organizational relationships.  Each one of these problems will be reviewed briefly. 
 
One of the most important studies conducted concerning inter-firm contracting 
practices was published by Stewart Macaulay in the American Sociological Review in 
1963.  This particular study, which will be described in greater detail later, offered the 
conclusion that inter-firm business transactions are often completed without the use of 
formal contracts.  In fact, businessmen and engineers took affirmative steps to avoid 
having to develop formal contracts for transactions.  In interviews, Macaulay recorded 
that one businessman said, “You can settle any dispute if keep the lawyers and 
accountants out of it.  They just do not understand the give-and-take needed in 
business.”  Macaulay’s study, and subsequent others, collectively developed a 
perspective that inter-firm relationships rely upon trust as opposed to contracts between 
trading partners.  This trust between firms refers to the level of confidence one possesses 
that a partner will not attempt to exploit the vulnerabilities of the other (Barney & 
Hansen, 1994).  Often citing the Macaulay study, much of the current literature argues 
that the development of trust reduces transactional costs and lessens the necessity to 
formally contract and develop formal safeguards. 
 
8
                                                   
8 Gulati (1995) creates this substitute argument between the use of contracts and trust as a relational 
governance mechanism.  Gulati relates how he found that “firms select contractual forms for their alliances 
not only on the basis of their activities they include and the related appropriation concerns they anticipate at 
the outset”… but also base the nature of the contract on the “social network of alliances in which the partners 
  Again, the conclusion 
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is that the existence of trust reduces the need to develop formal contracts (Dyer & Singh, 
1998).  In addition, research focusing upon cooperative business relationships has 
pushed another step further concerning the substitution effect of trust in the place of 
contracts.  Malhotra and Murnighan (2002) experimented with an individual’s sense of 
trust while changing the contract relationships.  The study noted that increasingly 
binding contracts with stricter monitoring systems actually reduced trust.  Ghoshal and 
Moran (1996) argued that the use of formal contracts in relationships requiring the 
existence of trust is counterproductive.  This implies that the combined use of formal 
contracts and relationships built upon trust become problematic since they are 
conceptually, mutually exclusive.  From this perspective, a successful cooperative 
relationship is based upon trust and since formal contracts are an indication of a lack of 
trust, the contracts themselves are counterproductive to the relationship.  
 
It has also been acknowledged that there has been little study of how firms learn 
to manage their inter-firm cooperative relationships through the use of contracts (Mayer 
& Argyes, 2004).   While transaction cost economics has generally been the theoretical 
foundation explaining why contracts are used as opposed to other governance 
structures9
Another problem stems from a general misunderstanding of the law.  Modern 
legal theory offers many instances in which legal obligations are imposed upon parties 
regardless of whether the parties themselves agreed to the specifics.  If the parties act as 
if there is an agreement, they may incur legal obligations relative to their partners 
regardless of whether there exist a formalized agreement on the matter.  Many of these 
obligations can be altered or clarified through formal contractual agreements, charters, 
etc.  In other words, regardless of the commercial transaction, there is most likely a body 
of law affecting the governance mechanisms that will in turn impose implied terms and 
obligations to parties that fail to develop their own explicit contracts, charters, etc.  This 
perspective calls into question the legal acumen of those parties that opt to rely upon 
“trust” alone to govern their relationships.  While the cost of developing more complex 
contracts is high, the risks associated with allowing unmodified legal obligations to be 
, this theoretical approach does not involve itself in the nature of those 
contracts or how firms learn to utilize them.   The management research that draws more 
upon sociology and follows the conclusions generated by Macaulay (1963) generally 
advocates the avoidance of formal contracts in favor of using trust as a basis for these 
relationships.  Therefore from this perspective, the study of inter-firm relations receives 
little attention relative to the nature and use of contracts.  So while the frequency of 
cooperative business relations is increasing, the focus on contracts as a governance 
mechanism has generally been neglected.  This neglect is especially unfortunate in that 
cooperative inter-firm business relationships create a very productive context in which to 
study the development and maintenance of contractual governance structures between 
firms.   
 
                                                                                                                                                      
may be embedded”.  This finding does suggest that trust modifies the formal contractual agreement, but it 
does not suggest a substitution effect between trust and contracts, as asserted by Gulati. 
9 Williamson (2005) states that “governance is predominantly concerned with ongoing contractual relations 
for which continuity of the relationship is a source of value… continuity can and will benefit from a spirit of 
cooperation…”  
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applied to the parties may often times be higher.  Both the management and strategy 
research has generally avoided any recognition of the costs associated to implied legal 
obligations.  The usually pragmatic approach of a legal perspective would include the 
costs/risk of implied obligations and argue for increased emphasis upon using formal 
contracts in cooperative, often times complex, business relationships in order to govern 
numerous transactions. 
 
The assertion in this study, contrary to Macaulay, is that firms consistently 
advocate and use formal contracts in their inter-firm cooperative relationships.  
Suggestions that firms use trust as a substitute for formal contracts are misleading with 
regard to current business practices and tend not to consider the risks and costs 
associated with implied obligations to the parties.  All contracts are by practical 
definition “incomplete” and there will always be gaps in which there is need for 
interpretation of the parties’ obligations.
B.  Purpose and Contribution. 
10
The first phase of this study will be to evaluate firms that have had experience in 
developing and implementing cooperative business relationships.  The primary question 
of this first analysis is whether the conclusions of the Macaulay (1963) analysis still 
hold.  This phase will use a case study in order to assess the question of whether 
business professionals use formal contracts as a means to guide their repetitive business 
transactions with cooperative partners, or do business professionals seek to use 
alternative methods other than formal contracts to govern relationships as was concluded 
by Macaulay.  Case studies offer researchers the opportunity to ask in-depth questions 
concerning complex relationships in various interconnected levels of analysis.
  As clauses are added to formal contracts, 
implied and formal obligations are modified as contingencies and contracting hazards 
are recognized.  This implies that managing longer-term relationships requires frequent 
evaluation of existing contracts.  These evaluations are designed to ensure adherence to 
existing agreements and to adjust existing contracts or new contracts with provisions 
that take into account new modifications for issues not previously addressed.  The 
purpose of this study is to ask whether cooperative business relationships consistently 
use formal contracts in governing their inter-firm relationships; and assuming these 
contracts are utilized, how are these relationships modified through the use of 
contractual clauses as specific investments change or hazards are discovered. 
 
11
                                                   
10 Scott (2003) argues that “All contracts are incomplete. There are infinite states of the world and the 
capacities of contracting parties… are finite.” Scott does, however, differentiate between those contracts that 
are incomplete because of the parties’ lack of capacity to predict uncertain futures as opposed to those 
contracts that are deliberately incomplete by a party unwilling to specify future performance.  
11 Research making contributions to the management literature concerning the use of case studies within 
research include: Eisenhardt, K. M., Building theories from case study research, Academy of Management 
Review, 14: 532-550,(1989); Eisenhardt, K. M. and M. E. Graebner, Theory building from cases, Academy of 
Management Journal, 50: 25-32,(2007).  Both of these studies provide information concerning the benefits of 
case studies to provide in-depth information necessary for the development of theory. 
  These 
studies can become the building blocks to formulate theory and up to now, have been the 
most prominent means to study these cooperative interfirm relationships.  Similar to 
Macaulay (1963), the perspective of both lawyers and business professionals will be 
sought.   This case study will provide the context in which to understand the interactions 
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and complex relationships between lawyers and business professionals in the 
development and implementation of inter-firm transactions. 
 
As previously discussed, Poppo and Zenger (2002) urged management 
researchers to investigate individual contract provisions.   In response to this, the second 
phase of this study will attempt to develop and test constructs attempting to represent 
categories of contractual provisions.   The first step will be to define these constructs.  
The second step will be to create external variables which will necessitate changes or 
enhancements to the contractual agreement.  Often, newly discovered hazards and 
contingencies create disturbances in the otherwise programmed responses of the firm 
(Williamson, 1991).  Transaction cost economics has identified several “disturbances” 
that require adjustment to any governance structure.12  Executives, with the help of 
attorneys, are tasked with the responsibility to make modifications in existing formal 
contracts in order to address these undiscovered hazards or to make modifications to 
otherwise implied obligations.  Referred to as the “engineers of transaction costs”, 
lawyers will be used as primary informants on a survey that will attempt to assess their 
selection of contractual provisions in response to external conditions presented in the 
survey.13
The contribution of this study will ultimately depend upon the results of the data.  
If the case study demonstrates that the Macaulay perspective does correctly describe 
cooperative business relationships, then more research should be developed to 
  If contracts are assumed to be incomplete, increased information and external 
events will provide opportunities for modifications to existing contracts within long-
term cooperative relationships.  The last step will incorporate a statistical test that will 
help to make general observations regarding what types of contractual clauses are 
favored in given circumstances.  
 
A primary argument presented in this study is that contracts, and the many 
components derived from classical contract theory, are still in place to organize the 
many business cooperative relationships.  At best, socially complex interactions, which 
are conceptualized to develop trust, act as a modifier to these contractual relations, not 
as a substitute governance mechanism.   As described by Williamson (1993), “trust… 
often requires added effort and is warranted only for very special personal relations…. 
Commercial relations do not qualify.”  Organizational effectiveness, relative to 
cooperative relations with other firms, is achieved when the proper contract clauses are 
emphasized relative to the circumstance and the potential hazards that exist (Williamson, 
1991).  The contribution of this study will be to increase our understanding of contracts 
used in cooperative business relationships and to make additions to an emerging 
research agenda that is attempting to investigate contractual components.   
 
                                                   
12 “Disturbances”, according to Williamson (2005, 1971), are those instances in which the firm is forced to 
make “un-programmed adaptations” in response to changes.  Williamson also states that the main costs of 
governance are based on a mal-adaptation to these disturbances.  The “hazards” referred to in transaction cost 
economics are the result of opportunism, uncertainties and performance measurement difficulties. 
13 Ronald Gilson (1984) original coined the phrase “transaction cost engineers” of which Williamson cites and 
appears to advocate the elevated status of those who design transactions.  (Gilson, Ronald.  1984. “Value 
creation by business lawyers: Legal skills and asset pricing,” Law and Economics Program Working Paper No. 
18, Stanford University, Stanford, CA.) 
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understand the tools necessary to expand more effective “relational” contract 
agreements.14
 Cross-disciplinary studies have often been used to uncover new insights into 
distinct fields of study.  Rarely have fields of study demonstrated so many important 
intersections and commonalities of interest than the study of business, economics and 
law.  This is especially true relative to the study of contracts and as Macaulay (1963) 
would suggest, “each discipline has an incomplete view of this kind of conduct.”
  If this is the case, then the survey questions to attorneys should focus on 
the unique contribution of trust in the contracting experience, even though this is in 
opposition to the position taken by Williamson regarding trust.   If the case study 
demonstrates that the Macaulay perspective does not correctly describe modern 
cooperative business relationships, then more research should focus on the contractual 
tools to develop more effective formal contracts taking into account implied obligation 
of the parties. 
 
 
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
15
The contributions of cross-disciplinary studies has been recognized from the 
likes of Justice Richard A. Posner, Judge of the United States Court of Appeals and 
Senior lecturer at the University of Chicago Law School who writes that “economics is a 
powerful tool for analyzing a vast range of legal questions” (Posner, 2007).  After the 
1960’s, Posner describes that
  
Cooperative inter-firm business relationships create a particularly dynamic context in 
which to study the development and maintenance of governance structures between 
firms.  Economic and management research have greatly contributed to our 
understanding of these governance structures.  As has been done in other areas of the 
law, this study will attempt to glean from a legal perspective concerning contracts in 
order to enhance our understanding of these cooperative business relationships. 
 
16
                                                   
14 Macneil (1978) describes “relational contracting” agreements to mean contractual relationships in which 
there is a marked void in contract discreteness, creating the most flexibility and a “minisociety with a vast 
array of norms” to deal with and govern changes.  This perspective discourages the use of formal contracts in 
favor of social norms and reputation as governance mechanisms. 
15 Macaulay (1963) published his study in a sociology journal, suggesting that he well understood the 
importance of trying to develop cross-disciplinary studies in this area.    Evans (1963), commenting on the 
important of the Macaulay study, praised its contribution as a sociological study and suggested it would add to 
the “understanding of the relationship between legal and non-legal norms in society” as well as “the 
relationships among formal organizations”.   
16 Posner (2007) writes that until the 1960’s, the bulk of economic analysis used within the law came from 
anti-trust law. 
, “the application of economics to the legal system (is) 
across the board: to common fields such as torts, contracts, restitution and property; to 
statutory fields such as environmental regulation and intellectual property; to the theory 
and practice of punishment; to civil, criminal, and administrative procedure; to the 
theory of legislation and regulation; to law enforcement and judicial administration; and 
even to constitutional law, primitive law, admiralty law, family law, and jurisprudence.”  
In fact, Justice Posner and the Chicago Law School are well recognized for their 
application of economics to deal with theoretical legal issues (Posner, 2007).  
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In addition, the field of economics has recognized the importance of the legal 
perspective to understand economic systems.  For example, John R. Commons urged the 
understanding of legal systems in order to enhance our understanding of the concepts 
and institutions underlying our economic system.  Commons states that: “…transactions 
are the economic units and working rules are the principles on which the Supreme Court 
of the United States has been working over its theories of property, sovereignty and 
value, and … that court occupies the unique position of the first authoritative faculty of 
the political economy… begin(ning) with the court’s theory of property, liberty and 
value.”  Along this same trend, Williamson (1985), before describing governance 
systems in business to business relationships, reviews contract law based upon classical, 
neoclassical, and what is later referred to as relational contracting regimes.17  These 
cross-disciplinary studies have all recognized the contribution of research outside of 
their traditional, theoretical boundaries. 
 
The understanding of contractual business relationships and the current need for 
a legal perspective requires a review of the contributing literatures.  Many assumptions 
of the management and strategy literatures have their theoretical roots in economics and 
sociology.  Therefore, a first review will describe the contributions from the economic 
literature as it applies to inter-firm contracting.  Next, the pertinent contributions from 
sociology, which have also greatly affected the management and strategy literatures in 
this area, will be reviewed.  Business management and business strategy literatures are 
often difficult to distinguish from one another, but will be reviewed consecutively.  This 
review will then describe the legal perspective to contracts, as well as cover other areas 
of law that demonstrate a tendency to enforce implied obligations of parties.  Finally, an 
attempt will be made to bring all these perspectives together and to justify the 
importance of this research. 
 
Economists have recognized the need for societies to develop implicit and 
explicit agreements from which societal members take on obligations.  While these 
agreements and obligations take on important meaning as individuals develop societal 
ties, these agreements become especially important to economic actors willing to 
cooperate and align their interests.  Kenneth Arrow stated that “Societies in their 
evolution have developed implicit agreements to certain kinds of regard for others, 
agreements which are essential to the survival of the society or at least contribute to the 
efficiency of its working” (Arrow, 1974).  John R. Commons (1924) describes reciprocal 
“promises and threats, express or implied, of man to man which determine the limits of 
human behavior in its social and economic transaction… their unit of observation 
A.  Economics: Providing a Foundation. 
 
                                                   
17 Williamson (1985) attributes these categories to Macneil’s (1978) distinctions between classical, neoclassical 
and relational legal regimes.  Classical contract systems are characterized enhanced discreteness and 
presentiation, contracting parties irrelevant, formal aspects of contracts govern, third party adjudication 
discouraged…self liquidation.  Neo classical contract systems are longer-term contracts characterized by 
“existence of gaps in their planning and the presence of a range of processes used to… create flexibility.  
Relational contracting is characterized with the full displacement of discreteness “as the relation takes on the 
properties of a mini-society with vast array of norms beyond those centered on the exchange”. 
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becomes a transaction between two or more persons looking towards the future”.  In 
turn, economic systems also create governance systems from which to guide and direct 
the most important economic activity; the transaction. 
 
The concept of governance emanated from John R. Commons as he argued the 
basic unit of analysis to be the “transaction”.18  In recognizing the importance of 
economic transactions, Commons described that this “ultimate unit… must contain in 
itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality, and order.”  This new approach diverted 
attention away from the traditional price mechanism of neoclassical economics.  In 
1937, Ronald Coase published his work on transaction costs.  The most important 
contribution of Coase’s work was the introduction of transactions costs19
Steven Chueng (1998) related that is was not until Ronald Coase published his 
work on social cost, of which both Chueng and Coase agreed should have been called 
‘economic cost’, that the transaction cost perspective began to take hold.  Coase (1960) 
writes that: “…it would hardly be surprising if the emergence of a firm or the extension 
of the activities of an existing firm was not the solution adopted on many occasions… 
This solution would be adopted whenever the administrative costs of the firm were less 
than the costs of the markets transactions that it supersedes and the gains which would 
result from the rearrangement of activities greater than the firm’s costs of organizing 
them.”  While Ronald Coase first developed the transaction dichotomy describing the 
rational boundaries of the firm and the nature of economic transactions, Oliver 
Williamson’s scholarship has been the most influential in bringing transaction cost 
economics to its current prominence as a theoretical foundation (Carroll & Teece, 1999).  
 and an implied 
assumption that economic systems work to economize those costs (Coase, 1992).  From 
there, Coase developed a dichotomy of economic transactions (Coase, 1937).  He stated 
that, “Outside the firm, price movements direct production, which is co-ordinated 
through a series of exchange transactions on the market.  Within a firm, these market 
transactions are eliminated and in place of the complicated market structure with 
exchange transactions is substituted the entrepreneur-co-ordinator, who directs 
production.  It is clear that these are alternative methods of co-ordinating production.”  
This dichotomy positioned all transactions being governed by either the structure of the 
firm, or placed in the market, designated as the alternative to the firm.  While the market 
systems was surprising flexible to adapt to market information, the firm “consciously 
coordinated” their adaptations through the use of a management structure within the firm 
(Barnard, 1938).  The comparative analysis between market transactions and these 
activities governed within the firm hierarchy is known as transaction cost economics. 
 
1.  Transaction Cost Economics. 
                                                   
18 Commons (1950) later urged that “theories of economics center on transactions and working rules, on 
problems of organization, and on… the organization of activity is… stabilized.”  Commons (1932) wrote that 
the “ultimate unit if activity… must contain in itself the three principles of conflict, mutuality, and order”. 
19 The study of economics often develops models with the assumption of costless transactions.  This is true 
today as it was when Coase first developed his theories. 
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As of the year 2000, it has been noted that there has been over 600 published articles 
using transaction cost economics as a theoretical foundation (Williamson, 2005).20
Transaction cost economics, as developed by Williamson, attempts to describe 
how trading partners to exchanges protect themselves from the hazards associated to 
transactions (Williamson, 1975, 1985, 1995).  These transactions substantially differ in a 
variety of ways: the degree of idiosyncratic assets
   
  
21 that are involved, the uncertainty 
involved in both the economic future and intentions of transacting parties, the 
complexity involved in the trading arrangement, and the frequency of the transactions 
between the trading partners (Shelanski & Klien, 1999).  The most important of these 
hazards is the real possibility of opportunistic behavior22
 
          Hybrids 
 
 after capital investments in 
specific investments are made (Williamson, 1975).  The governance structures that are 
designed to respond to the variations in transaction characteristics can best be described 
along a spectrum.  The cost effective choice of organizational form will vary 
“systematically with the attributes of the transaction” (Williamson, 1991) 
 
At one end of the spectrum lies the pure, spot market of which occur simple 
market transactions (Shelanski & Klien, 1999). These market based transactions are 
characterized as discrete, short-term relationships between parties, in which the 
transacting parties maintain their autonomous conditions.  These transactions are 
typically governed by contracts which, due to the short-term of the transaction, properly 
and easily define many if not all aspects of the transaction.  Conflicts are enforced by the 
state through the explicit clauses found in the contract and implied obligations generated 
by the norms of the industry and application of the legal system.  Market participants 
that use these structures have the ability to adapt quickly to changes in the marketplace. 
 
Hierarchical Governed      Market Governed 
Transactions        Transactions 
In contrast, transactions within hierarchies are guided by organizational 
authority.  Longer-term continual transactions, due to added uncertainties and potential 
hazards, may be guided more efficiently within an organizational structure (Williamson, 
1975, 1985).   Within the hierarchy, parties to the transaction are not autonomous, but 
conduct activities based upon the dictates of the firm’s management as parties to the 
transactions are integrated under a unified ownership and control, called hierarchies.  
                                                   
20 In describing the number of studies done within the theoretical foundation of transaction cost economics, 
Williamson (2005) cites an unpublished study done by Boerner, C. & Macher, J. 2002. Transaction cost 
economics: An assessment of empirical research on the social sciences. Unpublished manuscript, University of 
California – Berkeley. 
21 Williamson (1985) attributes the concept of “idiosyncratic assets” to Alfred Marshall (1948) as Marshal 
describes trained employees “to be of no value save to the business in which he already is”.  Williamson 
describes these assets as “durable, transaction-specific assets” that in turn “experience lock-in effects” in that 
the value of the asset and the ability to extract rents is unique to its placement within the transaction. 
22 Williamson (1985) explains that “By opportunism I mean self-interest seeking with guile… More generally, 
opportunism refers to the incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated efforts to 
mislead, distort, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse.” 
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The costs associated to opportunism in the market force parties to consider more 
efficient relationships under a hierarchical structure.  Hierarchies offer increased 
protection for idiosyncratic investments and provide a “relatively efficient mechanism 
for responding to change where coordinated adaptation is necessary” (Shelanski & 
Klien, 1999).  Regardless of which governance mechanism is used, implied in 
transaction cost is the concept that efficiency will be sought out by the parties to the 
transactions in that governance structures will attempt to “economize transaction costs 
(Shelanski & Klien, 1999).  Zaheer & Venkatraman (1995) pointed out that the 
endpoints are theoretical in nature and that “even the most fundamental model of 
discrete exchange includes some relational elements” enjoyed by the hierarchy.  In 
addition, they argue that a transaction can neither be “completely hierarchical, as long as 
exit is an option”.   
 
However, between the endpoints of hierarchy and market governed transactions 
are cooperative structures described by Williamson (1985) as “hybrids”.  The 
importance of these hybrid arrangements to economics is voiced by Buchanan (2001) in 
that the “mutuality of advantage from voluntary exchange is, of course, the most 
fundamental of all understandings in economics”.   These cooperative structures 
describe all those transactions and arrangements not governed within a hierarchy and 
those not completely governed by the simple price mechanisms of the market.  As 
mentioned previously, these arrangements include joint ventures, joint promotions, co-
branding, alliances, associations, franchises, coalitions, equity linkages, and similar 
structures of which most all are typically governed by longer-term contracts or at least 
interactions with the expectation of developing longer-term contractual relationships.  
Williamson (1985) later admitted that these hybrids occur in business settings “more 
frequently than previously thought”.   
 
The primary behavioral assumptions with which transaction cost economics is 
based are “opportunism and bounded rationality” (Williamson, 1993).  Williamson 
(1975) defines opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile”.  This behavior is 
chiefly expected within transactions conducted through simple markets; however, 
opportunism becomes especially problematic within hybrid structures after transaction 
specific investments are made.23
                                                   
23 Transaction specific investments are those capital investments that are irreversible in that the only real value 
of the asset is contingent upon the continuation of the cooperative relationship.  For example, a trucking 
depot that is especially designed for the transfer of product between two cooperating business firms will cease 
to maintain its value if the cooperative relationships ceased to exist.  Williamson (1985) describes “specific 
investments” as “investments that are undertaken in support of particular transactions, the opportunity cost of 
which investments is much lower in best alternative uses or by alternative users should the original transaction 
be prematurely terminated, and… the specific identity of the parties to a transaction plainly matters… 
Transaction-specific assets experience lock-in effects”. 
  Contracts, as a governance mechanism, are formulated 
in an effort to reduce the threat of opportunistic behavior.  The “completeness” of the 
contract is limited by the cognitive abilities of the parties.  Bounded rationality is an 
assumption concerning the cognitive aptitudes of contracting partners in that each party 
is “intendedly rational, but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1957).   Based upon the parties’ 
cognitive limitations, contracts are limited in their ability to cover every detail or 
contingency.  Therefore, as previously stated, all contracts are incomplete.   The 
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development of incomplete contracts allows the potential for opportunism during 
economic transactions, especially within longer term relations. 
 
2.  Hybrid Structures. 
Hybrids are distinguished from hierarchies in that the boundaries of the 
cooperating firms stay intact and each firm maintains its own identity.  Hybrids are 
distinguished from market transactions because of the use of longer-term contracts.  The 
value of the hybrid structure hinges upon the ability of the contracting parties to make 
transaction specific investments.  Transaction specific investments increase the value of 
the business relationship relative to mere market transactions by increasing efficiency 
and reducing the threat of opportunistic behavior.  Transaction specific investments 
made by all parties to the contract reduce the cost and risk to any one firm.  These cost 
and risk reductions increase the value of the relationship relative to transaction 
conducted under hierarchical governance.  Williamson (2005) states with regard to the 
hybrid form of governance, “The viability of the hybrid turns crucially on the efficacy of 
credible commitments...” Deficiencies in the completeness of the contract can 
undermine the effort to make credible commitments. 
 
Primarily from a transaction cost approach, the study of economics has made 
extensive studies into many different topics relative to the study of contractual 
relationships between cooperative business firms.  Studies have looked at the 
“completeness” of contracts and issues of renegotiation.  Other studies have looked at 
the “hold-up” problem that exists when parties to the contract make suboptimal 
investments in transaction specific assets in an attempt to coerce favorable terms.  Still 
other economic studies have looked at the contractual remedies provided for breach as a 
means to increase the motivation to adhere to formally agreed upon obligations.  While 
most studies within economics have appeared to commit itself to the transaction cost 
economic model, some have attempted to understand more “relational” factors between 
the parties and how these affect the governance of inter-firm contractual relationship 
through self-enforcing contracts.  Each of these contributions should be reviewed 
briefly. 
 
Economic research into inter-firm contracts continues to cover topics related to 
the completeness of contracts.  A contract would be considered “complete” if the design 
of the contract, as a governance mechanism, would be such as to perfectly accomplish 
two conflicting goals (Al-Najjar, 1995).  First, a complete contract must eliminate the 
possibility that the parties to the contract behave opportunistically.  Second, the 
complete contract must be able to be flexible enough to respond efficiently to 
contingencies that arise in the course of the relationship.24
                                                   
24 Al-Najjar (1995) recognizes the impossibilities of “complete contracts” suggesting that “even small drafting 
costs can make this flexibility prohibitively costly, thus forcing the contract to be incomplete”.  Al-Najjar also 
recognizes that the efforts by parties to deal with incomplete contract are inconsistent and that contracts, used 
as governance mechanisms, will be largely heterogeneous. 
  The concept of the “complete 
contract”, due to the costs associated in creating such an agreement, makes its practical 
existence impossible (Scott, 2003).  Parties using contracts must govern their 
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relationships using incomplete contracts; less than optimal conditions, to discourage 
opportunism and reduced flexibility to deal with contingencies.   
 
Since the value of the cooperative relation hinges upon the ability of the 
partnership to make specific investments, the largest problem recognized is that the use 
of incomplete contracts has the tendency to induce contract partners to “under-invest”, 
or to make suboptimal investments, and therefore diminish the possibilities for optimal 
returns (Guriev & Kvasov, 2005).  Specific investments are described as “sunk and 
irreversible” (Chung, 1995).  It is the “specific” nature of these investments between 
cooperative partners that increases the investment risk to each of the investing parties.  
However, once specific investments are made, there develops a high propensity to want 
longer-term contracts in place to govern the relationship (Joskow, 1988).25
The reduction of incentives to invest, or under-invest, in the cooperative 
relationship is referred to as the “hold-up” problem (Guriev & Kvasov, 2005)
  The irony 
here is that specific investments increase the demand for long-term contracts.  The long-
term contract is incomplete, even more so relative to short-term contracts, which in turn 
reduces the incentive to make continued specific investments.  Ultimately, the 
governance system that is successful and able to overcome the problem of incomplete 
contracts will approach increasingly optimal investments. 
 
26
It has also been recognized that parties to contracts purposely use incomplete 
contracts, which do not have listed every potential contingency, which in turn, leaves the 
parties open to the possibility of hold-ups (Klien, Crawford & Alchian, 1978; Klien, 
1996).
.  The 
concept of the hold-up has received considerable attention in the research (Williamson, 
1975, 1985).  Literature concerning hold-ups suggests that, based upon the fact that 
contracting parties cannot develop “complete” contracts; specific investments must be 
made before an acceptable level of uncertainty is resolved.  Therefore, based upon this 
investment requirement and in light of the limited protections of incomplete contracts, a 
party of the agreement will tend to under-invest in specific assets (Edlin & Reichelstein, 
1996).   
 
27  Crawford (1988) even proposed the use of sequential short-term contracts to 
govern longer term relationships.28
                                                   
25 Masten & Crocker (1985), Goldberg & Erickson (1987), and Crocker and Masten (1988) also demonstrate 
that investment specificity is one of the determinants of the duration of the contract.  Increased level of 
investment specificity is correlated to longer-term contracts being developed. 
26 Goldberg (1976) is attributed to have coined the phrase “hold-up” but applied its initial meaning to 
government contracts. 
27 Klien, Crawford and Alchian (1978) introduced one of the most famous cases of a “hold-up” that existed 
within the contractual relationship between Fisher Body and General Motors in 1919.  These firms developed 
a contract that was incomplete, in that it did not prevent a hold-up situation for General Motors.  General 
Motors threatened Fisher to reduce its demand unless Fisher reduced its prices.  Fisher responded by pointing 
to a contractual clause that guaranteed Fisher of General Motors sustained demand of their product for ten 
years.  The knowledge that General Motors was on the hook for ten years reduced the incentive for Fisher to 
make any new investments in capital expenditures relative to their economic relationship.  This lack of 
incentive to invest by Fisher is the “hold-up”, which substantially increased the cost of inputs to General 
Motors. 
  These short-term contracts would be increasing able 
28 Crawford (1988) initially suggested that most contractual relationships outlive the contracts used to govern 
them; therefore long-term relationships could effectively be governed by a sequence of short-term contracts.  
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to consider the details and contingencies of the longer-term relationship.  Along this 
argument, other research suggests that the best solution to overcome the hold-up 
problem would be to “require perpetual renegotiation of the fixed-term contract allowing 
parties to re-establish the efficiency needed to induce the parties to make continued 
specific investments…”(Guriev & Kvasov, 2005).  Ultimately Crawford concluded that 
“short-term contracting tends to yield too little sunk-cost investment”.  In other words, 
the success of the cooperative relationship is dependent upon long-term specific capital 
investments and short-term contracts, even if developed sequentially, will not induce the 
necessary investments.  
 
Economic research has also investigated the use of contractual remedies 
designed to be carried out in the event of contractual breach by one or more of the 
parties.  Schelling (1960) shows that a threat… can be made credible by entering into 
“advanced commitments” which by the nature of the commitment “make its fulfillment 
optimal or even necessary”.  Parties to a contract have an incentive to create high 
penalties placed against those who breach contractual commitments (Aghion & Bolton, 
1987).  The use of stipulated damages or other negative consequences outlined by 
contract are an effort to enforce inter-firm commitments designed in the original 
agreement.  These legal remedies can counter the negative effects of the hold-up 
problem and attempt to compensate parties that are victims of breach (Edlin & 
Reichelstein, 1996).   
 
However, the penalty of breach is only as effective as one’s ability to carry 
through with the negative consequence.  Often, courts are reluctance to carry out 
stipulated damages that are considered by the court to be too high (Chueng, 1995).29
                                                                                                                                                      
Crawford differentiates between two types of specific investments: reversible investments and sunk cost 
investments.  Reversible investment, investments that could be reallocated if the inter-firm relationship 
terminated, were found to be efficiently governed through the use of short-term contracts.  Sunk cost 
investments, which creates capital investments that could not be reallocated or withdrawn, were not found to 
be efficiently governed by short-term contract but necessitated the use of longer-term contracts. 
29 Masten & Snyder (1989) recognized the limits of the court to enforce “stipulated damages” of which they 
consider too excessive.  They recognized this as the “penalty doctrine” and point out that this doctrine 
undermines the efforts of parties to make and enforce penalties through contractual clauses in an effort to 
make contractual compliance the optimal course of action by any one of the parties.  This in turn requires the 
parties to renegotiate, reducing the commitment power of the original contract. 
  
Therefore contractual threats often do not create the commitment necessary to carry out 
long-term relationships.  This motivates parties to use other commitment devices that 
encourage compliance.  Chueng (1995) advocated that firms use investment into specific 
assets, assets that are sunk costs and irreversible in that the value of the asset is only 
maintained when utilized within the partnership, as commitment devices to motivate 
parties to fulfill their agreements and remain within the cooperative relationship.  This in 
turn reduces the ability of any of the parties to renegotiate the initial contract.  The irony 
here, as Chueng demonstrated, the existence of contractual remedies for stipulated 
damages is not effective in securing the necessary commitment.   Chueng demonstrated 
that specific investments are necessary to develop the necessary commitment.  In turn, 
the necessary commitment is required to in order to induce contracting parties to make 
continued specific investments. 
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Economics has investigated other governance mechanisms to employ outside of 
the exclusive use of contracts; contracts which are known to be incomplete.  However, 
the importance of these relational governance mechanisms is still debated.  Some 
authors argue that “repeat transactions” which in turn reference an increased use of 
relational governance mechanisms30
Economics has studied other strategies used by contracting parties to increase the 
flexibility of the contract to deal with problems associated to the bounded rationality of 
the parties.  As stated previously, a complete contract must eliminate opportunism and 
increase flexibility enough to respond efficiently to contingencies that arise.  For 
example, a strategy to increase flexibility is to supplement the incomplete contract with 
other governance instruments “such as reputation, conventions, property rights over 
physical assets, or the legal system” (Al-Najjar, 1995).  Further strategies attempt to 
increase flexibility by introducing ambiguity in the terms of the contract (Al-Najjar, 
1995).  Bernheim & Whinston (1998) argued that parties often prefer to leave some 
aspects of the explicit contract ambiguous in order to allow discretion and flexibility in 
the relationship.
 developed within the hybrid region, are substitutes 
to contracts (Corts & Singh, 2004).  These repeated transactions encouraged firms 
within the off-shore drilling industry to reduce the number of formal, price fixing 
contracts.  However, Kalnins & Mayer (2004) found that repeated transactions, 
developing relational mechanisms, were found to be compliments.  Repeated 
transactions between U.S. information technology firms increased the usage of 
contractual agreements.   
31   However, it is countered that the existence of more flexible 
alternative methods of governance will make “initially incomplete contracts even more 
incomplete” and therefore further complicate efforts to induce specific capital 
investment (Al-Najjar & Nabil, 1995). 
 
                                                   
30 Relational governance mechanisms and relational contracts are informal agreements and unwritten codes 
that affect the behavior of individuals.  Baker et. al. (2002) describes these mechanisms as very flexible and 
based upon “detailed knowledge of their specific situation… For the same reasons, however, relational 
contracts cannot be enforced by third party and so must be self-enforcing”. 
31 The effort to avoid writing specifics into the contracts appears to be desirable if “some aspects of 
performance are non-verifiable”, thereby motivating parties to leave even verifiable performance ambiguous.  
This is referred to as “strategic ambiguity (Bernheim & Whinston, 1998). 
B.  Sociology and its Contribution. 
 
Sociology has greatly contributed to our understanding of the inter-firm 
relationships and the sociological literature has publ ished some of the most influential 
works in this area.  Even Emile Durkheim, often considered the father of sociology, 
extensively wrote concerning the important impact that private contracts have on the 
social structure in that “men’s wills can not agree to contract obligations if these 
obligations do not arise from a status in law already acquired, whether of things or of 
persons; it can only be a matter of modifying the status and of superimposing new 
relations on those already existing.  The contract, then, is a source of variations which 
presupposes a primary basis in law, but one that has a different origin”. (Durkheim, 
p.194)   
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From a sociological perspective, the significance of the inter-firm “contractual 
relationship” is that they are some of “the most crystallized economic relations common 
in the marketplace” (Zhou, 2003).32
Zhou et. al. (2003) recognized Macaulay’s contribution as the beginning of the 
“social-relation based” approach to inter-firm contracting.   The article written by 
Stewart Macaulay, intended to be the first in a series of like studies, was one of the first 
attempts to study the use of contracts from a “behavioral approach” and points to the 
application of contract law as a “sociological significant area” important for continued 
study.
   These influential works have recognized that 
longer term economic relationships are deeply embedded within social relations and 
social institutions.  This particular approach develops explanations for organizational 
behavior beyond the traditional transaction cost economics.  Zhou et. al. (2003) details 
three distinct “mechanisms” by which firms conduct their inter-firms relationships.  The 
study lists the three mechanisms as: transaction costs, social networks and institutional 
links.  The first mechanism is covered by traditional economics.  The latter two, social 
networks and institutional links, represent the major contributions of sociology to these 
relationships.  Social networks are represented by the very influential study published by 
Stewart Macaulay in 1963.  Mark Granovetter’s work covered the influence of both 
social networks and institutional links, published in 1985. 
 
33
Macaulay describes that, “Businessmen often prefer to rely on a man’s word in a 
brief letter, a handshake, or common honesty and decency – even when the transaction 
involves exposure to serious risk… (Lawyers) complained that businessmen desire to 
keep it simple and avoid red tape even where large amounts of money and significant 
risks are involved.”  A lawyer himself, Macaulay described situations in which the 
details of the contract were often left in a “vague state”.   One lawyer complained to him 
that “he was sick of being told, ‘We can trust old Max’, when the problem is not one of 
  Macaulay’s study suggested that business decision makers often rely upon 
other mechanisms than the use of contracts to guide inter-firm relationships.  Macaulay 
notes that businessmen often times do “plan” their transactions in great detail, but 
mentions that “not all exchanges are neatly rationalized”.  While he does not explain the 
term “rationalized”, he does mention “rational planning” to include a “provision for as 
many future contingencies as can be foreseen”.   
 
                                                   
32 Zhou et. al. (2003) defines contractual relationships as being all the formal and informal agreements 
between firms.  In this study, three mechanisms of governing inter-firm relationships are compared when they 
considered the economic relationships between various firms in China.  These three mechanisms were: social-
relation based, institution-based and transaction cost-based.  The study compares 877 contracts from 620 
firms in 2 Chinese cities, Beijing and Guanzhou.  The weak judicial structure, relative to contracts, would most 
likely demonstrate these firms having to rely upon more socially embedded mechanisms, a result that might be 
different if studied in the United States, having a relatively strong judicial structure.  Granovetter (1985) 
predicts that these social “patterns may be more easily noted in other countries (than the United States) where 
they are supposedly explained by cultural peculiarities. 
33 Macaulay’s study was conducted through interviews of “68 businessman and lawyers representing 43 
companies and 6 law firms”.  All but two of the firms were located, or had locations, within the state of 
Wisconsin.  17 of the firms were machine manufacturers and he often uses these types of interactions to 
discuss very detailed work done between firms.  Macaulay recognized the potential for bias in his sample and 
mentioned that the “existing knowledge has been inadequate to permit more rigorous procedures – as yet one 
cannot formulate many precise questions to be asked a systematically selected sample…”    
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honesty but one of reaching an agreement that both sides understand”. The use of 
contracts, within Macaulay’s study, demonstrated that the participants often relied upon 
“other” mechanisms to guide their transactions and that little practical use was made of 
formal contracts. 
   
Macaulay asserted that in most of the transactions he observed, contracts were 
not needed and that there were efforts to rely upon the “customs of their industry…”  He 
stated that “these customs can fill gaps in the express agreements of the parties”.  It is 
interesting to note that Macaulay often described businessmen engaging in transactions 
with “orders” which took no thought of any legal sanction for potential contingencies.  
These “orders” may, based upon a more modern legal approach, have been legally 
binding contracts.  This may suggest that the application of the law has changed to a 
point in which what was not considered a contract in the early1960’s, may be considered 
a valid contract today.  Therefore, the reader of Macaulay’s study must bear in mind that 
when he considered businessmen engaging in transactions without the use of contracts, 
those same transactions may be considered contractually sufficient within modern 
standards.   Therefore, it might be supposed that fewer transactions were conducted 
without contracts than was suggested by Macaulay.  Published comments by William M. 
Evans (1963) recognized the several deficiencies of the Macaulay paper, but in the end, 
recognized its contribution to the study of societal norms within inter-firm 
relationships.34
Zhao et. al. (2003) recognized Granovetter (1985) as the beginning of the 
“institutional links based” approach to inter-firm contracting.   Mark Granovetter’s 
contribution offers a critical assessment of the “undersocialized concepts of human 
action” as developed by traditional economic thought.
   
 
35
                                                   
34 Evans (1963) characterized Macaulay’s study as “preliminary findings”.  He recognized the need to further 
study the “relative bargaining power of the parties”.  His argument was that parties with relative “power” 
would have different incentives, relative to the use of contracts.  This would suggest that the use or non-use of 
contracts was guided by the parties’ ability to create sanctions against their non-compliant, transaction 
partners without the use of formal contracts.  Any emphasis upon power structures by Macaulay would most 
likely make his work indistinguishable from that of Granovetter. 
35 Granovetter (1985) describes the economist’s view of the social relations that may influence economic 
actors as “a frictional drag that impedes competitive markets”.  Quoting Adam Smith: “people of the same 
trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy 
against the public, or in some contrivance to raise prices”.  Quoting Williamson (1975): Economic man… is 
thus a more subtle and devious creature than the usual self-interest seeking assumption reveals. 
  This position is similar to other 
studies focusing on individual ties and their effects on inter-organizational structural 
attachments (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).  Critical of the Williamson approach to 
governing mechanisms based upon transaction cost economics, Granovetter stated that: 
“social relationships between firms are more important, and authority within firms less 
so, in bringing order to economic life than is supposed in the markets and hierarchies 
line of thought.  A balanced and symmetrical argument requires attention to power in 
‘market’ relations and social connection within firms.”  Granovetter wrote concerning 
the relationships developed between firms as “so intimately bound up with networks of 
personal relations that any perspective that considers these relations peripheral will fail 
to see clearly what organizational form has been affected” (Granovetter, 1985).  He 
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urged that research “pay careful and systematic attention to the actual patterns of 
personal relations by which economic transactions are carried out”.    
 
Granovetter (1985), in great detail, makes extensive use of Macaulay’s study to 
support his assertion that sociological forces have to be considered when attempting to 
understand the mechanisms by which firm organize their transactions.  Most of 
Granovetter’s assertions are made relative to the transaction cost approach to 
understanding the use of governance structures between hierarchies and markets.  
However, little distinction is made between the Granovetter study and that done by 
Macaulay, which might suggest that there is little difference between the social networks 
and institutional links presented by Zhou et. al. (2003).  Granovetter does point to 
“concrete patterns of social relations” or “networks” which may distinguish its 
perspective from simple observations of social interactions.  It appears as if Zhou et. al. 
distinguishes these two by relating social networks to simple social interactions while 
relating institutional links to include that relationship between the firm and government 
organizations having power over the firm.36
Studies within the sociological literature that have attempted to demonstrate the 
importance of social networks to predict inter-firm relationships have been extensive.  
For example, Uzzi (1996) argues that the importance of organizational networks 
improves economic performance until the network begins to “seal off” member firms 
from access to new information and opportunities outside of the network.
   
 
37  Baker et. al 
(1998) studied the effects of competition and institutional forces as 
stabilizing/destabilizing forces relative to inter-firm relationships.  Lin (1999) studied 
the use of social business networks and the advantages associated with status.  Later, 
Uzzi (1999) makes a similar argument relative to the networks of banks and their access 
to capital as well as its cost.38  While many of these studies attempt to argue the 
importance of social relationships that develop between firms, they tend to avoid 
discussions of the use contracts between firms.  While the contributions of sociology to 
understanding inter-firm business relationships started with an acute observation relative 
to the use of contracts, the study has later utilized the Granovetter approach and studied 
the use of networks as evidence of “embeddedness” as opposed to how they are 
organized and formally structured.  Zhou et. al. (2003) is a noted exception.  Only 
Macaulay seems to make particular note of the use of contracts within these 
relationships. 
 
                                                   
36 Zuken and DiMaggio (1990) classify embeddedness in four forms: 1) structural, 2) cognitive (mental 
processes), 3) cultural (shared beliefs and values), and, 4) political (institutional limits on economic power and 
incentives). 
37 Uzzi (1996) studies 23 apparel firms and argues that firms within social networks have a higher chance of 
survival as opposed to firms that conduct transactions within “arms-length market relationships”.  This 
pattern persists until at some point the network begins to have a negative effect on the firm’s performance. 
38 Uzzi (1999) uses interviews to study how mid-sized banks work within social networks to receive affordable 
capital.  
C.  Strategy/Management Research. 
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Research conclusions, from the management literature, have been mixed relative 
to its general assessment of governance structures for cooperative interactions.39  
Research that follows the transaction cost economic logic has concluded that appropriate 
structural decisions, made to successfully overcome opportunistic behavior, result in 
relationship success (Williamson, 2005, 1991; Hennart, 2006, 1988).  Other research has 
concluded that trust is the alternative driving force used to avoid the costs associated to 
monitoring against opportunistic behavior thereby resulting in relationship success.  In 
addition, many scholars, within the management literature, are often critical of the 
transaction cost approach (Colombo, 2003).40  For example, possibly taking their hints 
from Granovetter (1985),41 management researchers have argued that the basic 
assumption of “opportunism”, in transaction cost economics, is exaggerated and a 
problematic assumption for practitioners (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996; Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Hill, 1990).42
In an effort to differentiate the strategy perspective, Michael Porter (1991) stated 
that: “The reason why firms succeed or fail is perhaps the central question in strategy”.  
The primary focus of strategic analysis is the business unit (Prahalad & Hamel, 1994).  
The distinction between the management literature and that of strategy is strategy’s 
focus upon the development, maintenance and enhancement of the firm’s competitive 
advantage.  In order to achieve competitive advantages in the marketplace, firms must be 
able to organize assets and capabilities in such a way as to be able to extract economic 
rents from firm activities (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney 1991).  Relational rents
    
 
43
                                                   
39 Realistically, the general management literature, including organizational theorists, has favored the relational 
governance mechanisms with emphasis upon building trust as opposed to the transaction cost economic 
approach.  Some research has attempted to merge these approaches to intertwine trust within the transaction 
cost model (Zaheer & Venkatraman 1995; Doz, 1996; Poppo & Zenger).  Most all of the research focused 
upon cooperative business relationships makes mention of both approaches suggesting trust and formal 
monitoring mechanisms are employed in these interactions although most research favors trust (Bagley, 2008; 
Luo, 2008). 
40 Colombo (2003) contends that the major weakness in the transaction cost approach is that it 
“overemphasizes individual parties’ minimization of transaction costs, while holding other factors constant.” 
41 Granovetter (1985) was specifically critical of the under-socialized approach of Williamson, even using the 
research conducted by Macaulay to enhance his argument. 
42 Hill (1990) argues that the market “weeds out habitual opportunism.  In fact, the very threat of internal 
organization helps reduce opportunistic behavior in market transactions”.  On the other side of the TCE 
spectrum, Hill (1990) argues that the use of “hierarchy involves additional bureaucratic costs that do not have 
to be borne by actors who tacitly agree to cooperate and trust each other”.  Dyer and Singh (1998) offer a 
“relational view” of the firm, similar to the resource based view developed by Jay Barney; which focuses its 
efforts to explain the value of relationships outside the firm boundaries as firm assets and capabilities. 
43 The term “relational rents” should not be confused with the term “relational approach” discussed later.  
Relational rents are those economic profits achieved through inter-firm cooperative efforts, regardless of the 
governance mechanism in place.  The relational approach describes a governance mechanism primarily 
implemented through the use of trust. 
 
are those economic rents generated from inter-firm activities that are beyond those rents 
create by the firms in isolation (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  The governance of the hybrid 
relationship will play a vital role in the creation of relational rents.  The governance 
mechanisms designed for the inter-firm relationship, in order to be effective in fostering 
economic rents, will need to reduce transaction costs as well as encourage the firms to 
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engage in value creating cooperative activities, both of which will develop, maintain and 
enhance competitive advantages.44
An overview of this research must begin with a review of the importance of the 
cooperative business relationship.  In addition, governance structures have been 
conveniently categorized into two perspectives: structural and relational (Faems et. al. 
2008).
   
 
Much of the interest in the hybrid governance structure comes from the literature 
on joint ventures, strategic alliances and more recently, networks.  Transactions between 
cooperating firms have traditionally been viewed within the transaction cost economic 
dichotomy (Ring and Van de Ven, 1992).  While most of this research includes a 
description of the theoretical foundation of the transaction cost economic perspective, 
much of the research expands the topic to include trust as an important, if not the most 
important, component of the hybrid experience.  Research regarding contracts and 
contract components has been a relatively recent interest of the management and 
strategy literatures.  Contracts are considered the costly monitoring devices used to 
overcome the opportunistic behavior of the market, as argued by transaction cost 
economics (Williamson 1975, 1985, 2005).  It is understandable that this interest in 
contracts is relatively recent due to researcher’s otherwise focused attention on relational 
mechanisms such as trust.    
 
45
Developing cooperative business relationships offer several advantages that have 
been noted in the management and strategy research literatures.  Dyer and Singh (1998) 
stressed the importance of cooperative inter-firm relations for accessing resources and 
creating competitive advantages.  Firms engaged in alliances can enjoy the potential 
effects of increased reputation and legitimacy (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990).   Firms can 
also obtain important resources and social support through associations that provide 
  The structural perspective follows the theoretical foundations of transaction 
cost economics and relies upon the use of formal agreements such as contracts.   The 
relational perspective relies heavily upon the use of trust as an alternative governance 
mechanism.  Each will be reviewed consecutively.  Management and strategy 
researchers have done extensive research in organizational learning.  Learning will be 
reviewed as a potential alternative to the explanation of trust as an inter-firm governance 
mechanism.  Finally, the recent literature on contracts will be reviewed in order to 
clarify the expected contribution of this study.  The literatures from management and 
strategy are so intertwined so as to make it difficult, and in most cases, unnecessary to 
distinguish their differences unless a unique perspective emerges, of which will then be 
noted.  
 
1.  Value from the Hybrid. 
                                                   
44 Colombo (2003) asserts that cooperative ventures are started, not only as an effort to reduce costs as is the 
case in transaction costs economics, but also an effort to “joint value maximize” return.  Cooperative efforts 
are created when the “net present value of the payoff partners expect from the collaboration-that is, the 
difference between the revenues and the production and transaction costs of the collaboration-exceeds that of 
proceeding alone.” 
45 Faems et. al. (2008) conducted their study relative to alliances.  However, the arguments and application of 
theory appear to include most all of the structures between the hierarchies and market transactions.  The 
portion covering contracts makes mention of marketing agreements and associations and even joint ventures. 
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institutional linkages Baum and Oliver, 1991).  Relationships with higher status firms 
will generate increased visibility, helping the firm to distinguish it from competitors, and 
help signal the firm’s increased stature to important stakeholders (Eisenhardt and 
Schoonhoven, 1996; Stuart, 2000).  These signals can be an important means to acquire 
important resources such as needed capital46
While it can be argued that the success of the hybrid structure is determined by 
the ability of the cooperative firm to make transaction specific investments (Dyer, 1996), 
this is not the entire story.  Controls must be introduced to insure that investments are 
equally shared, in order to avoid extremely asymmetrical levels of investment creating 
instability in the relationship (Hennart, 1988).   Recent research by Luo (2008) suggests 
that the investment in specific assets is only part of the problem.   Even if investments 
are made, cooperative firms must also involve themselves in a level of “economic 
integration”.
 (Levitas & McFadyen, 2009; Uzzi, 1999).   
 
47  Economic integration involves the level at which resources are 
“effectively combined in an alliance’s value chain” and “operationally utilize and exploit 
integrated resources” (Luo, 2008).  Therefore the successful governance structure must 
properly control, for the benefit and inducement of specific investments, and coordinate, 
for the benefit of proper integration to be able to exploit the combination of specific 
investments.48
The structural perspective is based on transaction cost economics, discussed 
earlier, and contains the assumption that cooperative partners have the propensity to 
engage in “opportunistic behavior” (Williamson, 1985).  Heavy emphasis is placed upon 
the initial structure, being one of the few aspects managers can truly have an effect upon 
(Hennart, 2006).  The structural design is developed in an effort to reduce the probability 
that the cooperating partner will act opportunistically.  However, attempts will be made 
to “economize” the framework offering the necessary protection at the lowest cost 
(Shelanski & Klien, 1999).  The objective is to motivate specific investment of which 
will create its own safety mechanism.  “Non-recoverable investments reduce a partners 
gains from cheating” and encourage more specific investments to be made (Schelling, 
1960).  The larger the potential loss from opportunistic behavior, the higher probability 
 
 
2.  Governance: Structural Perspective. 
                                                   
46 Firm seeking external capital often have difficulties demonstrating the value of the management and 
organization ready to exploit the new opportunity, sometimes referred to as the “lemons problem” (Akerlof, 
1970).  Papaioannou et. al. (1992) recognized this problem and suggested that this difficulty is the reason 
small, high tech firms often hold relatively large amount of cash.  Levitas & McFadyen (2009) reason that 
alliances can be used to increase opportunities to access external capital based upon the firm’s association to 
firms with a higher public status. 
47 Luo (2008) defines economic integration as “interdependence between exchange members with respect to 
resources pooled by these members and the subsequent operations utilizing these resources.  Interdependence 
refers to the degree to which alliance members interact to determine an outcome jointly”.  This research 
compares what the integration aspects of trust, governance and justice have on alliance stability and 
profitability.  Luo concludes that integration has a positive effect on stability, but a diminished effect on 
profitability.  The diminished profitability may be due to reduce levels of flexibility as the firms become more 
integrated.  
48 Control and coordination will be a consistent theme relative to proper governance structures.  Control 
makes reference to the ability of the partnering firms to protect their investments in specific assets in light of 
an uncertain environment (Hennart, 1988).  Coordination refers to the partner’s ability to extract value from 
the integration of these specific assets (Luo, 2002).  
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an alliance partner will resort to creating “ex post remedies in the form of a tight legal 
document that incorporates strong safeguards” (Parke, 1993).  Heide and John (1988) 
found that “financial performance was improved… provided specific investments were 
relatively high”.  Schelling (1960) made special note that “trust alone does not induce 
specific investment.   
 
These contracts act as “safeguarding devices” which include clauses that are 
uniquely specified in detail so as to outline as many contingencies as economically 
possible (Faems et. al. 2005; Parke, 1993).  Contracts are also recognized as 
“coordinating mechanisms” as they work to describe the “precise division of labor 
between partners and providing procedures for the integration of dispersed activities, 
simplify decision making and prevent disputes on how to achieve task” objectives 
(Faems et. al. 2005; Reuer & Arino, 2007).  High commitment in non-recoverable 
investments induces parties to resolve problems and have a tendency to create “stable, 
high performers” (Parke, 1993).  At the least, Larson (1992) suggested that formal 
contracts are necessary early in cooperative relationships in order to promote success in 
cooperative performance and to create the foundation for further contracts.   
 
3.  Governance: Relational Perspective. 
The relational perspective attempts to stress the use of trust49
The relational perspective assumes partners tend to act in a trustworthy fashion 
(Faems et. al. 2008).  The result of this is that the “perception of opportunistic behavior 
is likely to be limited, reducing the need for costly and inflexible formal safeguarding 
mechanisms such as complex contracts (Faems et. al., 2008; Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
 as the primary 
means to govern and coordinate cooperative efforts.  This perspective falls in line with 
the contribution of Granovetter and is sometimes described as “sociological” (Zaheer & 
Venkatraman, 1995).  Macneil (1980) initially recognized the relational nature of 
contracting in that the “relational exchange is… largely represented by trust”.  The 
“modern relations… require solidarity and hence a degree of trust, or faith in others, to 
work successfully (Macneil, 1980).   In addition, Hill (1990) determined that “the 
construction of a long-term relationship based around cooperation and trust is optimal” 
and then advocated for research to identify ways in which trust could be established.  
The relational perspective criticizes the traditional approach to cooperative relationship 
by insisting that the “empirical work informed by transaction cost economics precludes 
the possibility that an important economic and social context may alter the formal 
structure of those alliances and the transaction costs associated with them” (Gulati, 
1995).  It is argued that the undersocialized view of transaction cost economics tends to 
neglect the important social context found in cooperative interactions (Granovetter, 
1985).  Trust provides assurances that the assets and information provided by each 
partner will be used for the mutual benefit (Jones & George, 1998).   
 
                                                   
49 Trust generally refers to “positive expectations regarding the other party in a risky situation” (Lewicki et. al., 
2006).   Zucker (1986), a sociologist, identified three forms of trust: “characteristic-based trust”, trust formed 
from group identification; “process-based trust”, trust resulting from past and future exchanges; and 
“institutional-based trust”, trust derived from embedded social practices.  Lewis & Weigert, (1985) argue that 
trust is a “leap” beyond the expectations that reason and experience would warrant. 
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Larson, 1992).  Granovetter (1985) describes this as a “strong expectation of trust and 
abstention from opportunism”.  Because trust induces joint efforts, it thereby reduces the 
need for time-consuming and costly monitoring (Ring and Van de Ven, 1994).  As a 
control mechanism, trust facilitates high quality information and tacit knowledge which 
are critical to innovation (Uzzi 1996).  Trust is described as an “organizing principle” 
which “represents a way of solving the problem of interdependence and uncertainty”50 
(McEvily et. al., 2003)    Coordination within the relational approach is achieved by 
mutual adjustment and not through contractual systems (Faems et. al. 2008).  “Trust 
facilitates the exchange of resources that are difficult to put a price on, but that increase 
a firm’s ability to solve problems…” (Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez, 2009).     
These are often referred to as “self-enforcement” agreements51
Trust has often been portrayed as a substitute governance mechanism to take the 
place of complex contracts within the realm of the hybrid structure (Granovetter 1985; 
Gulati, 1995; Uzzi, 1997; Dyer & Singh, 1998; Adler, 2001
 (Dyer and Singh, 1998; 
Telser, 1980).    
 
However, the overwhelming enthusiasm over trust may have its limitations.  
Williamson (1993) stated that “trust should be concentrated on those personal relations 
in which it really matters… and is reserved for very special relations between family, 
friends and lovers… Commercial relations do not qualify”.  Recent research has 
demonstrated that there may be negative effects of trust in cooperative relationships.  
Molina-Morales & Martinez-Fernandez (2009) demonstrated that the value of trust can 
be described as an inverted U-shaped curve.  Initial development of trust may be helpful, 
however, at some point, the cost of time and effort to maintain trusting relationships may 
have a negative effect on firm performance.  The existence of a “trusting relationship” 
may induce partners to be more reluctant to monitor the relationship.   Therefore, less 
monitoring may be a contributing factor decreasing firm performance (Langfred, 2004).  
This is in line with earlier research which argues that trust’s “success can prove 
dysfunctional” (Adler, 2001).  Contrary to advocates of the trust mechanism, achieving 
trust or “trust worthiness” is not costless (Parke, 1993).  Not only does the reputation of 
being trust worthy require “deliberate strategies of forbearance”, costs are also incurred 
when firms attempt to search for partners exhibiting trustworthy behavior.  “It is costly 
to sort out those who are opportunistic from those who are not” (Williamson & Ouchi, 
1981).  These perspectives would suggest that trust is not costless and that there are 
important boundaries to the benefits of trust, assuming it even necessary.   
 
4.  Trust vs. Contracts. 
52
                                                   
50 McEvily et. al. (2003) describe trust as “a positive assumption about the motives ad intentions of another 
party, it allows people to economize on information processing and safeguarding behaviors.  They go on to 
describe trust as an “expectation” or an “intention”.  Mayer, et. al. (1995) associated trust expectations with 
“notions of ability, benevolence and integrity”. 
51 supra 
52 Adler (2001) does not specifically make the comparison between contracts and trust, but does refer to the 
trust mechanism as the primary governance mechanism to cover the theoretical region between hierarchies 
and spot market transactions.  
).  Trust would operate as a 
self-enforcing mechanism to guide and direct interfirm activities.  However, some 
researchers have even gone as far as to suggest that the existence of contracts is 
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detrimental to the interfirm relationship (Malhorta & Murnighan, 2002; Lyons & Mehta, 
1997; Ghosal & Moran, 1996, Dyer and Singh, 1998, Macaulay, 1963).  Formal 
contracts have been considered to undermine the effectiveness of trust and encourage 
opportunistic behavior (Ghoshal and Moran 1996; Macaulay, 1963).   Malhorta & 
Murnigham (2002) argued that “Although contracts may be necessary as stakes increase, 
cooperation can be achieved without them… Trust increases cooperation in strategic 
interactions… Trust can also reduce uncertainty and lead to more efficient negotiated 
agreements”.  Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that “self-enforcement agreements” offer 
greater assurances that firms will be rewarded for their involvement in “value creation 
initiatives, such as sharing fine-grained tacit knowledge, exchanging resources that are 
difficult to price or offering innovations not explicitly called for in the contract.53
Some sociologist have backed away from the notion of trust as an effective 
governance system citing the difficulties of creating trust, often taking long periods of 
time, and relative ease in terms of its destruction (Adler, 2001).  Other research suggests 
that cooperative partners only “incrementally signal” their willingness to engage in 
further relationships (Larson, 1992).  Partners are slow to commit because they 
understand that trust mechanisms alone can be problematic in that “it makes betrayal 
  “Self-
enforcement agreements” provide greater value in that they are much more difficult to 
imitate by competitors, securing a more sustainable competitive advantage (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998). 
 
Hoetker & Mellewigt (2009) provided an interesting insight into the use of 
alternative governance mechanisms (formal contract and relational) in the alliance 
environment.  They conclude that formal contract and relational governance mechanisms 
are not interchangeable and that they are “highly dependent upon the alliance context”.   
They first demonstrate that alliances with substantial investment in assets perform better 
due to the use of formal governance mechanisms.  They argue that relational governance 
mechanisms perform better for knowledge-based assets, as opposed to formal contract 
governance procedures often due to the difficulty of measurement and enforcement 
(Oxley & Sampson, 2004; Kale et. al., 2000).  This study contains two important 
observations that are informative.  First, this study found that the costs of relational 
governance “may be higher than has previously been appreciated”.  Further, the study 
describes that “they may actually be counterproductive due to high costs and 
oversocialization”.   This may run contrary to the notion put forward by Dyer & Singh, 
1998, that relational mechanisms have lower costs.  Second, the study’s conclusion 
suggests that “when possible, early activities in an alliance between two firms should 
primarily involve property-based assets, amenable to governance via formal 
mechanisms, rather than knowledge-based assets.  As the firms develop trust and social 
identification over time, relational governance mechanisms become more feasible…” 
 
                                                   
53 Dyer and Singh (1998) argue that self enforcing mechanisms are more efficient and lower transaction costs 
through: 1) contracting cost are avoided and replaced by relationships based upon trust, which is argued to be 
more effective against controlling opportunism; 2) lower monitoring costs because enforcement relies upon 
self-monitoring as opposed to external or third party monitoring; 3) lower costs of agreement adaptation and 
adjustments when parties are responding to unforeseen circumstances; 4) reduced cost in “reconstructing”, 
based upon the fact that most contracts have a distinct duration after which the  costs to renegotiate an 
updated contract increase.   
25 
 
more profitable” (Adler, 2001; Granovetter, 1985).  More recently researchers have 
suggested that trust and formal contracts interact more like compliments; working 
together to create increasingly complex contractual arrangements.  Poppo & Zenger 
(2002) found that increases in the level of relational governance were associated to 
increased contract complexity.  In turn, increased contract complexities promoted more 
“cooperative, long-term, trusting exchange relationships”.54
Capabilities are important to a firm as they are an effective means to achieve 
organizational success as well as competitive market success.  The basis of that success 
is that these capabilities are unique or idiosyncratic and path dependant in their 
development therefore making these firm assets unique and non-imitable (Eisenhardt & 
Martin, 2000).  These characteristics are those that contribute to the development of 
competitive advantages (Barney, 1991).  Ianistik and Clark (1994) define capabilities as 
“dynamic” when the organization’s general capabilities have the capacity for 
regeneration.  Eisenhardt and Martin (2000) describe dynamic capabilities that 
manipulate resources to generate new competencies and renew existing capabilities.  
  They argued that “formal 
contracts promote relational governance in exchange settings and relational governance 
enables the refinement of contracts and promotes stability in the interorganizational 
exchanges”.  Zaheer & Venkartaman (1995) demonstrated that the manifestation of both, 
the economic perspective of contract and the sociological perspective of trust, were 
present as “complementary insights” into the governance of interfirm relations. 
 
5.  Dynamic Capabilities: A possible alternative explanation. 
The argument, relative to contract vs. trust, is that trust is complimentary to 
contracts in that trust fills in the gaps of all contracts, based upon the fact that they are 
practical incomplete.  Trust takes over when the contract does not address the issue.  
Assuming Williamson (1993) is correct and trust has no commercial application, 
learning and the development of dynamic capabilities could fill in the portions of the 
contract that are not economically feasible to have to cover in detail.  For example, 
parties to a contract a contract may leave portions of the contract unaddressed and open 
to interpretation with the expectation that the parties will add more detail as they learn 
more and develop more interfirm capabilities relative to the partner.  Parties to the 
contract, under the transaction cost economic logic, suffer from bounded rationality 
(Williamson, 1985).  Understanding their limitations, contracting parties solve the 
contractual problems as they learn more about their distinct responsibilities in the 
relationship, the specific investments that will be required, and the ability they have to 
coordinate with their new partners.   Dynamic capabilities develop relative to external 
relationship would have to be develop in order to build up “shared norms and 
familiarity”, which have been identified as sources of trust (Adler, 2001).  As a possible 
alternative explanation, it is the expected return and the expectation to learn and develop 
new capabilities that drive contracting partners to enter incomplete contractual 
relationships and make specific investments; not necessarily trust.  
 
                                                   
54 The results of this study demonstrated that “managers tend to employ greater levels of relational norms as 
their contracts become increasingly customized, and to employ greater contractual complexity as they develop 
greater levels of relational governance”. (Poppo & Zenger, 2002) 
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The act of collaborating with other firms extends each firm’s competencies (McEvily et. 
al., 2004) 
 
While the dynamic capabilities approach has primarily focused upon internal 
resources, it has also extended to those capabilities to manage resources and 
relationships outside the firm (Eisenhardt & Martin, 2000).  These abilities are “related 
to the development and exploitation of imitable collaborative interfirm relationships that 
confer access to resources and capabilities from differentially endowed firms (Doving & 
Gooderham, 2008).  The essential dynamic capabilities of the cooperative partner 
include joint problem solving and service development with complementary business 
service providers (Jones, et. al. 1998; McEvily & Marcus, 2005). 
 
 One set of dynamic capabilities that has been identified is “legal astuteness” 
(Bagley, 2008).  Bagley(2008) states that “legal astuteness” is imperative to 
management in that managers are better able to “exercise informed judgment”.  “We 
should find that legally astute management teams realize more value from their 
contractual relationships than teams” lacking such capabilities (Bagley, 2008).  Mayer & 
Argyres (2004) suggest that managers, working within cooperative relationships, have 
the capacity to learn to craft better and more meaningful contracts.  Zollo at al. (2002) 
suggests prior ties improve partner’s interactions and help coordinate their alliance.  
Research has found that firms have often entered into alliances with partners from 
previous cooperative efforts (Dyer & Chu, 2003).  “…relational governance alone is 
often insufficient to prevent reneging, making more expensive institutional arrangements 
necessary… A properly constructed long-term contract, for example, can reduce the 
instability that might result when dependent upon a single critical buyer or seller (Pfeffer  
& Salancik, 2003).   
 
Research has suggested another set of dynamic capabilities relative to alliances 
which often lead to the development of inter-organizational routines, independent of 
trust (Zollo et. al. 2002).  These routines can conduct “monitoring and coordination” 
procedures without enormous investments into contractual detail (Reuer and Arino, 
2007).  This repetitive momentum55 would suggest that firms develop capabilities to 
work with other firms, which encourages the development of future cooperative 
arrangements (Goerzen, 2007).56
                                                   
55 “Repetitive momentum” makes reference to the notion that firms that have engaged in cooperative 
behaviors with other firms are more likely to repeat this effort in the future (Goerzen, 2007). 
56 Goerzen (2007) suggests that the justification for repeated cooperative efforts is due to increased trust and 
reduced cost associated to trust.  However, the study admittedly does not rule out alternative explanations for 
repeat cooperative efforts.  Goerzen (2007) points to “managerial efficiency” or managerial learning that 
results from repetitious activities.  In fact this research notes that these repeat cooperative efforts “appear to 
derive diminishing economic benefits if their interorganizational network is more redundant…” suggesting the 
development of trust has its limits relative to increasing the performance of the alliance, if it truly has an effect 
at all.  
  Dyer and Singh (1998) described how “relation-
specific” knowledge develops from “frequent and intense partner interactions” and 
serves to increase the efficiency of the alliance efforts.  This increased mutual 
understanding and learning can “help firms mitigate ex post coordination, conflict 
resolution, or information-gathering problems that formal contractual provisions can 
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otherwise attempt to address” (Reuer and Arino, 2007).  Scott (2003) observed that 
“whether reciprocal fairness is a learned behavior that derives from the benefits of 
cooperation in repeated interactions or an intrinsic motivation remains an open 
question”. 
 
As previously discussed, research regarding governance mechanisms often place 
contracts and trust as substitutes.  Where contracts are incomplete with regard to the 
relationship, trust provides a rich context from which to negotiate solutions between the 
partners.  Faems et. al. (2008) provides an interesting case study regarding two 
consecutive contracts, both representing efforts to develop new technologies.  The first 
contract contained various deficiencies with regard to the allocation of responsibilities.  
The contract soon failed to produce the desired result.  A few years later, the two 
partners again contracted to develop a new technology.  New personnel were involved in 
the second agreement suggesting trust was not a factor, since trust often takes time to 
develop.  The later contract was noticed to have more detail regarding the allocation of 
work responsibilities.  The second contracting experience was successful.  Another 
explanation (trust excluded) for the success of this cooperative effort was the 
development of capabilities by each of the firms to successfully conduct contractual 
relationships.  Additional research regarding capabilities within cooperative 
relationships needs to be employed to develop this notion further.   
 
6.  Formal Contracts. 
Poppo & Zenger (2002) concluded their study by urging researcher s to “develop 
more precise measures of contractual clauses”.  “Firms use formal contracts to protect 
against exchange hazards, such as opportunism and reneging, which is often associated 
with uncertainty, specialized asset investments, and difficult performance measurement 
(Williamson, 1985, 1996).  The purpose of this admonition was to increase our 
understanding concerning the changes that occur within contracts as cooperative firms 
dealt with the unexpected “disturbances” of the market.  These disturbances have a 
tendency to put considerable strain on the exchange relationship (Williamson, 1991).  
Typically, the management and strategy literatures have treated contract as generally 
homogeneous with little if any discussion relative to the vast differences in the clauses 
that makeup the contract.  Reuer & Arino (2007) explained that in spite of the interest of 
Poppo & Zenger (2002) in contractual clauses for interfirm cooperative contract, the 
study of interfirm contracts has received little attention.  This lack of academic interest 
has been persistent even though the “efficiency of individual alliances also hinges upon 
the particular contractual provisions that firms put into their collaborative agreements” 
(Reuer & Arino, 2007).  
 
In an effort to introduce contract complexity57
                                                   
57 Contract complexity has been described as the partner’s attempt to develop “complete” contracts.  Contract 
complexity has been measured in very broad, global terms.  Joskow (1988) measured contracts based upon 
their length.  Macneil (1978) measured contracts based upon the degree to which the parties designed 
provisions that attempted to anticipate contingencies.  Reuer & Arino (2007) also outline other more specific 
measures of contract provisions.  Muellar & Geithman (1991) measured for provisions that dealt with 
 as a multidimensional construct, 
Reuer & Arino (2007) introduce two dimensions of contractual clauses.  The first 
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dimension described was the “enforcement provisions”, of which captured contingencies 
within the contractual relationship which deal with issue such as property, breaches of 
contract and the agreed consequences and third-party adjudication.  The second 
dimension was described as “coordination provisions”, of which capture agreements 
upon the activities within the alliance.  In other words, the coordinative provisions 
describe partner responsibilities and means to coordinate, in short, these provisions 
describe the activities that are the reason the alliance was created in the first place.   
Reuer & Arino (2007) stated that “coordination provisions are the weaker, informational 
provisions concerning the monitoring and adaptation of the alliance”.58
More recent studies have shown similar results.   Hagedoorn & Hesen (2007) 
tested for the existence of several contractual provisions within cooperative business 
contracts.  The study measured for the existence of provisions that covered revision, 
economic hardship and impossibility, damage measures, warranties, and dispute 
resolution mechanisms.  While these provisions were all found to varying degrees, this 
particular research was “surprised” to see provisions regarding “project plans, explicit 
task and responsibility description, and association agreements” (Hagedoorn & Hesen, 
2007).
  This research 
did note a strong positive correlation between the “complexity” of the contract and the 
investment in specific assets. 
 
59
                                                                                                                                                      
territorial restraints in licensing agreements.  Lafontaine (1992) dealt with up-front fees and royalty rates in 
franchise agreements.  Joskow (1987) measured contract duration.  
58 The differences between the enforcement and coordinative appear very slight.  In effect, it appears as if 
both categories of provisions deal exclusively with contractual contingencies.  It may be necessary to take a 
more expansive view of coordinative clauses and better define the dimension.  Contracts in this context have 
avoided certain aspects of contracts that describe the division of labor between partners and provide 
procedures for the integration of activities, simplify decision making, and prevent disputes on how to achieve 
tasks objectives (Faems et. al. 2005). 
59 Hagedorn & Hesen (2007) investigated the existence of five basic contract provisions: revision, economic 
hardship and impossibility, damage measures, warranties, and dispute resolution mechanisms.  They were 
surprised to find the existence of provisions containing “elaborate appendices with project plans, explicit task 
and responsibility description, and association agreements”.  These provisions would fit under the category, 
presented by Rueur & Arino (2007), known as “coordinative clauses”.  In fact, these provisions described by 
Hagedorn & Hesen would provide a better fit under the description than clauses actually used in the model 
under Reuer & Arino.  This may be evidence that management and strategy researchers typically regard 
contracts as monitoring and enforcement mechanisms and often fail to consider contractual clauses that 
provide “coordinative” guidance to partners. 
  This may be evidence that the Management and Strategy research often 
overlooks the “coordinative” benefits of contracts.  Faems et. al. (2008) also identified 
two governance mechanisms: safeguarding devices and coordination mechanisms.  
Safeguarding devices with contracts mitigate the risk of opportunistic behavior and 
describe penalties for the commission of violating behaviors (Faems et. al., 2008).  One 
interesting note concerning the Faems et. al. study is that it was recognized that the 
development of “trust” played no beneficial role to the successful conclusion of the 
second contract.  The researcher noted that the increased level of detail regarding the 
coordinative activities played the most important role.  Coordinative mechanisms within 
contracts specify “precise division of labor between partners” and provide “procedures 
for integration of dispersed activities” and attempt to provide guidance to simplify 
“decision making and prevent disputed on how to achieve task”. 
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The research contribution of a legal perspective to the business community has 
been and will continue to be vast and insightful.
D.  A Legal Perspective in the Use of Contracts. 
 
60  While extremely important, the study 
of contracts is only a part of the entire contribution.  Two distinct assertions are made 
that should help to understand the use of contracts in interfirm relationships.  First, the 
legal system of contracts has many examples of implied obligations of which can be 
altered and enforced through explicit agreement.  These explicit agreements must meet 
general requirements of definiteness to be enforced.61
Contract law has moved away from these stricter notions in an effort to more 
effectively judge contracting relationships.  This modern legal approach is known as the 
“realist” perspective (Schlegel, 1995).  Realists place emphasis upon the outcome of the 
contractual relationship and attempt to adjudicate based upon the social interests served.  
Carl Lewellyn, principle drafter of the Uniform Commercial Code, was an advocate of 
this perspective, arguing for principles such as “good faith” and “unconsciounability”.  
The contract legal regime has made definitive efforts to accommodate the fact that 
contracts will be incomplete, which in turn will necessitate a system flexible enough to 
 Therefore, agreements to 
cooperate must be developed with a certain level of definiteness with an additional 
concern of the costs to the parties relative to the implied contractual obligations.  The 
issues concerning implied obligations and requisite legal definiteness pose serious 
problems for those dedicated to the use of relational governance mechanisms.  Second, 
the study of contracts has developed certain categories of clauses that when compared to 
those created in the management literature, may be helpful to understand contract 
development and contract change.  Both of these issues will be addressed. 
 
1.  Contract Law. 
From a legal research standpoint, the law of contracts has evolved into a very 
pragmatic approach to business application.  Early in its development, the law had been 
able to assume the ability of parties to develop “complete” contracts.  Every party would 
be responsible for the elements of the agreement as well as those elements left out of the 
formal agreement.  The courts did little to fill in potential breaks in contract clarity and 
understanding.   This approach is known as the “formalist” perspective (Atiyah & 
Summers, 1987).  Formalists look to the validity of the agreement and then to the 
agreement itself to make judicial decisions.  The concept of “definiteness” emerged from 
the formalist perspective as an important responsibility of the parties expecting their 
contracts to be enforced.  Definiteness places the burden of responsibility on to the 
contracting parties to create provisions that are comprehensive and clear.    For example, 
contracts that are left incomplete “will not be enforced as a contract if it is uncertain and 
indefinite in its material terms…” (Scott, 2003).   
 
                                                   
60 In this study, the term “law” or any reference to a legal regime is strictly intended to refer to the laws of the 
United States and state constitutions, although many of the arguments are applicable to legal regimes outside 
the United States.   
61  The contractual requirement of “definiteness” insists that contracts must meet a reasonable standard of 
defining the terms of the agreement.  An agreement will not be enforced as a contract if it is uncertain and 
indefinite in its material terms. 
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make interpretations and determinations of private agreements, using often crude 
expressions of the agreement.   
 
Schwartz (1992) states that modern courts now have “three strategies when 
deciding contract cases:  they protect the process values, interpret language, and supply 
terms when the parties’ contract fails to provide for the dispute that divides them”.  This 
effort to “supply terms” is known as “gap filling”.  Schwartz continues by stating that 
“the court fills the gap with a rule specifying how to resolve the dispute at issue”.  
However, Macneil (1980) extends these “gap filling” activities even further to include 
the use of contract principles that attempt to overtly “preserve” the cooperative 
relationship, in favor of “good faith and fair dealing” (Barnett, 1992).  As a 
manifestation of this inclination, Hadfield (1990) examined franchise contractual 
disputes and interpreted that the prevailing tendency of the courts is to fill in the gaps of 
an incomplete contract in order to preserve the relationship.  Scott (2003) noted that 
“conventional wisdom holds that courts should (and do) strive whenever possible to fill 
contractual gaps with general standards of reasonableness and good faith”. 
 
Courts are also known to apply extrinsic evidence to contracts in order to define 
the meaning of terms in addition to filling in the gaps of the contract.  For example, in 
Nanakuli Paving v. Shell Oil, the court noted that under the Uniform Commercial Code, 
“an agreement goes beyond the written words on a piece of paper”62
However, more recent research has concluded that the courts might be less 
willing to fill contractual gaps in favor of requiring more definitiveness in agreements.  
Scott (2003) notes in his research of court decisions concerning contractual obligations 
that “courts continue to adhere to the indefiniteness doctrine …”  Courts are “declining 
to enforce contracts where the parties have intentionally declined to condition 
performance on verifiable measures that could have been specified in the agreement at 
relatively low cost”(Scott, 2003).  Relational mechanisms profess to rely upon non-
contractual means to govern inter-firm relationships.  Under the Macneil perspective, the 
court would make efforts to preserve the cooperative relationship.  The research 
completed by Scott (2003) would suggest courts are less willing to accommodate 
relational mechanisms.  Failure to contemplate explicit contractual agreements would 
increase the risk that the parties would be subject to implied obligations perceived by a 
.  The court goes on 
to state that in an effort to understand the agreement, courts must investigate, “other 
circumstances including course of dealing or usage of trade or course of performance…”  
Section 2-208 of the Uniform Commercial Code provides that while the explicit terms of 
the contract typically control, “course of performance, as well as any course of dealing 
and usage of trade, shall be construed whenever reasonable…”  In addition to industry 
standards, the court in Nanakuli also issued an obligation of good faith, relative to 
business dealings and, more specific to this case, price.  The court ruled that a “price to 
be fixed by the seller or by the buyer means a price for him to fix in good faith…” and 
that “good faith means the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair 
dealing in the trade.”  Therefore, the courts have been willing to apply obligations to the 
contracting parties that go beyond the explicit agreement. 
 
                                                   
62 Nanakuli Paving & Rock Company v. Shell Oil Company 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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third party or increase the likelihood that agreements would be dismissed by the court 
for incompleteness. 
 
2.  Implied Obligations. 
All the governance structures that accommodate transactions along the hierarchy 
v. market dichotomy create implied obligations for the parties involved.  These implied 
obligations can be altered by explicit contractual agreements or changes in the corporate 
agreement, called the corporate charter.  Williamson (1991), while describing the three 
generic types of governing mechanism (market, hybrid, hierarchy), argued that “each 
generic form is supported and defined by a distinctive type of contract law”.63
Contract law as it applies to the internal workings of the firm is especially 
appealing if one accepts the description of the firm as a “nexus of contracts” (Alchian & 
Demetz, 1972; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Fama, 1980). When describing the notion of 
the law of forebearence, Williamson described this situation when, “…access to the 
courts is denied, the parties must resolve their differences internally.  Accordingly, 
hierarchy is its own court of ultimate appeal.”
  This 
contract law defines obligation though explicit and implicit mechanisms.  Williamson 
(2005) stated that: “The contract law of simple market exchange is that of legal rules… 
courts award money damages in the event of a dispute, there being no interest in 
continuity for such transactions.  The hybrid mode is supported by contract as 
framework, which is a more elastic concept of contract and (within limits) promotes 
cooperative adaptation… the implicit contract law of internal organization is that of 
forebearance…”   
 
64
                                                   
63Williamson (1991) goes even further and suggests that not only to alternative forms of governance enact 
differing forms of contract law, but that “… alternative modes of governance are realized, in part, with the 
support of complementary contract regimes.”  
64 Williamson (1991, 2005) argues that the traditional notions of contract law apply to hierarchies, especially in 
terms of viewing the firm as a “nexus of contracts”.  However, the disruptions that occur within these 
contracts as the firm attempts to adapt to changes are decided by internal decision makers, avoiding the risk of 
third-party adjudication. “Bilateral adaptation effected through fiat is the distinguishing feature of internal 
organization.”(Williamson, 1991)  “Fiat has its origins in the employment contract” 
 
  The hierarchy method of governance 
reduces the risk of implied obligations by reducing the ability of third parties to make 
binding decisions upon the firm. 
 
While contract law may not allow third party adjudication within the hierarchy, 
Williamson’s analysis may have been incomplete.  Other bodies of law do exist that 
create implied, almost contractual obligations for decision makers within the hierarchy 
as well as allow third party adjudication for conflicts.  Most all commercial relationships 
create implied obligations of the parties of which can be altered by the introduction of 
explicit contracts, charter, etc.  Both the law of corporations and employment law 
provide examples in which implied obligations are created and, if unaltered by explicit 
agreement, offer the opportunity for third-parties to adjudicate disputes within a 
hierarchical governance structure. 
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The corporation can be viewed as a complex set of explicit and implicit contracts 
and “enabling the participants to select the optimal arrangement for the many different 
set of risks and opportunities” (Macey, 2004).  Corporate directors and officers are under 
three generally implied legal duties: the duty to act carefully, the duty to act loyalty, and 
the duty to act lawfully (Eisenberg, 1990).65  These act as implied obligations and do not 
necessitate a formal statement to be enforceable.  For example, in Meinhard v. Salmon66
Although the “duty of care” and the “duty of loyalty” have long been described 
as non-waivable, explicit agreements can be made to alter the extent of these obligations 
(Macey, 2004).  Macey (2004) states that these “fiduciary duties only operate in the 
shadow of the expressed contractual arrangements”.  Eisenberg (1989) made the 
observation that virtually all state statutes, which permit corporations to limit or 
eliminate personal liability of directors for simple duty of care violations, can allow 
provisions that explicitly exclude duty of loyalty violations by either directors or 
officers.  For example, Union Trust v. Carter
, 
it was determined that even though the two parties had ended their joint venture, their 
relationship was such to create an implied obligation of loyalty on the part of Salmon to 
at least inform his prior partner, Meinhard, of other opportunities he had been working 
on.   The court ruled that the partnership created an obligation to at least inform 
Meinhard of other opportunities to invest.  An explicit agreement between Salmon and 
Meinhard could easily have severed any obligations of Salmon toward Meinhard outside 
of their partnership.   
 
67
Employment law also creates implied obligations that can be altered by explicit 
contract.  Employment at will has often been referred to as the default rule.
 is a famous case in which the court 
approved a charter that deprived shareholder voting rights for the first six years of the 
corporation’s life.  This denial of one of the most basic shareholder rights can be altered 
by explicit agreement, in this case, the corporate charter. 
 
68  
Employment at will means that employer and employees are free to terminate the 
employment relationship for any reason, or no reason.69   Employers and employees are 
able to alter this relationship through contract, whether they be expressed or implied.  
Implied contract modifications can be the result employer communication, oral 
statements and even the party’s behavior.70 For example, Pugh v. See’s Candies is a 
seminal case creating just-cause employment contract71
                                                   
65 Unocal Corp v. Mesa Petroleum 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985), which provided two general standards of review of 
management conduct: business judgment rule, applicable to claims that management violated its duty of care; 
and the intrinsic fairness test, applicable to claims that management violated it duty of loyalty. 
66 Meinhard v. Salmon 164N.E. 545 (N.Y. 1928).   
67 Union Trust Co. of Maryland v. Carter 139F. 717 (W. Va. 1905). 
68 Mers v. Dispatch Printing Co., 483 N.E.2d 150, 153 (1985). 
69 Greene v. Oliver Realty, Inc. 526 A.2d 1192, 1196 (1987). 
70 Pugh v. See’s Candies 171 Cal. Rptr. 917 (1981). 
71 A just-cause employment contract limits the employer’s ability to severe the employment relationship for no 
reason.  Often these contracts require the use of explicit reasons to severe the relationship. 
, merely based upon the 
continued actions of the parties.  This decision suggested that employers could create 
implied obligations to their employees based upon their “continued actions”.   
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While the courts have since backed away from this very expansive view of 
implied employment contracts, many of its influences are still intact.  For example, 
Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil decided that a just-cause contract was created on the basis of 
oral statements made by the employer when the employee was hired.72  While the 
employer has limited implied obligations to employees, the employee does retain the 
implied duty of loyalty by the employee.  For example, Jet Courier v. Mulei determined 
that an employee could not solicit the employer’s customers for purposes other than the 
benefit of the employer.73  In Platinum Mgmt. v. Dahms, it was determined that an 
employee, deliberately delayed making appointments with various clients until he started 
new job, had violated his duty of loyalty to the employer.74  Again, most all commercial 
relationships create implied obligations of the parties, of which can be altered by the 
introduction of explicit contracts, charter, etc.  
 
3.  Explicit Contractual Clauses. 
Legal research regarding contracts has also identified categories of contractual 
provisions.  Working from a lawyer’s perspective, Macaulay (1963) distinguished two 
contractual “elements”.  The first element facilitates “rational planning for as many 
future contingencies as can be foreseen”.  The second element provides “actual or 
potential legal sanctions to induce performance of the exchange or to compensate for 
non-performance”.  Macaulay suggests that these two elements are present to varying 
degrees in all types of cooperative relations, which in turn promises to provide insights 
into how those relationships are chosen and structured. 
 
 Also from a lawyer’s perspective, Fox (2002) divides contract provisions into 
two categories: “operative provisions” and “risk allocation”.  The former largely 
conforms to the rational planning element identified by Macaulay.  Operative provisions 
include “the description of assets or actions, calculations of value and payment methods 
and mechanism to transfer assets, if necessary”.  Fox’s risk allocation category 
corresponds with Macaulay’s second element emphasizing legal sanctions.  Examples of 
these clauses include representations and warranties, covenants, conditions precedent, 
remedial provisions and explicit definitions. 
 
Once economists shifted their focus from exclusive price mechanisms to 
transactions, the importance of contracts became apparent.  Contracts allow for the time 
lag that inevitably occurs with large transactions.  Contracts guide the parties as to their 
responsibilities and obligations.  Most relative to this study, contracts allow business 
organizations to specialize their skills with the expectation of coordinating with 
partnering firms to create economic value.  While a diverse approach to the study of 
contracts creates higher levels of understanding through the influence of multiple 
perspectives, it also has the potential to create misunderstandings and problematic 
definitions.  There has been a recent movement within the strategy literature to revive 
E.  Summary – Putting it All Together. 
 
                                                   
72 Kestenbaum v. Pennzoil Co. 766 P2d at 286. 
73 Jet Courier Service, Inc v.Mulei 771 P.2d 486 (Colo. 1989). 
74 Platinum Mgmt, Inc. v. Dahms 666 A.2d 1028 (1995). 
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the study of contracts and develop insights as to the elements that make up these 
agreements.  This interest has created a need to investigate the various contributing 
literatures in order to keep this investigation into contracts tractable.   
 
A legal perspective would suggest that regardless of the nature of the commercial 
transaction, contractual obligations are always present.  In other words, contracts are 
omnipresent in every hybrid transaction.  The party’s obligations to these arrangements 
are defined by the expressed and implied terms of the agreement.  The implied terms of 
agreement can be ascertained by evidence of past dealings, industry standards or general 
customs, such as good faith75
Various researchers have concluded that cooperative business relationships are 
heavily motivated to encourage transaction specific investments in order to secure 
economic benefits from the relationship.  Parties will govern those relationships through 
explicit contracts and attempt to reduce the risk associated with implied obligations.  In 
order to understand the nature of these explicit contracts, the transaction cost and 
strategy literatures have traditionally relied very heavily on the concept of contractual 
complexity
.  The expressed terms of agreement are found within the 
explicit contract and any explicit additions subsequently made to modify the agreement.  
Typically, the explicit clauses of the contract control the agreement between the parties 
and reliance upon implied terms is deemed necessary only when there are gaps in the 
explicit contract.  In only very specific instances do the implied terms control over 
explicit terms.   
 
As economists have demonstrated, all contracts are by their very nature 
incomplete.  Therefore, all parties to contracts will be affected by implied obligations.  
The extent of this influence will depend upon the parties’ ability to articulate, as much as 
possible, the important elements of the agreement.  Reliance upon detailed explicit 
contracts to govern transactions will reduce the influence of implied obligations.  
Reliance upon trust, that serves to replace explicit contracts as a governance mechanism, 
expands the influence of implied obligations.  In addition, this exposes the parties to 
risks and obligations possibly not considered when deciding to structure an agreement 
based upon trust.  It is expected that parties, attempting to encourage specific investment 
into the cooperative relationship, will try to avoid risks associated to implied obligations 
and are forced to make detailed, explicit agreements.  Therefore, trust should typically 
have little direct role within the agreement or governance of the transactions. 
 
76
                                                   
75 See supra, on page 29 in the text in which the implied obligations of industry standards and general customs 
are discussed.   
76 See supra, page 27 concerning formal contracts including the footnotes regarding contract complexity. 
.  The concept serves as a proxy in the few empirical studies completed in 
the research of contracts; but the notion of complexity offers little or no insights into the 
content of individual contracts.  An important contribution of this study is the effort to 
operationalize categories of expressed contractual terms in an effort to distinguish 
important differences in contracts and observe unique modifications.  These categories 
become operational as long as we can observe consistent contractual reactions to 
environmental conditions.  This information becomes important to researchers and 
practitioners, who attempt to alter contracts in response to environmental changes.  
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III. METHODS 
 
The purpose of this study is to build a better understanding of the contracts that 
act as governance mechanisms for cooperative business relationships.  In addition, an 
attempt will be made to define and operationalize types of contract provisions in an 
effort to investigate how contracts change under different conditions.  Researchers have 
consistently described a distinction between contractual provisions77
Cooperative business agreements offer an important opportunity to see contracts 
evolve as the circumstances between the partners change.  This transaction environment 
is distinguished from discrete transactions,
, but no research has 
attempted to operationalize these provision categories in an effort to see whether these 
distinctions resonate with the attorneys that facilitate the creation and modification of 
formal agreements.   
 
78 where contract provisions typically do not 
vary.  Discrete transactions fixate upon performance, which is typically well defined due 
to the proximity of time between the agreement and the completion of the transaction. 
Contracts for cooperative agreements offer unique challenges in that there is often a 
great length of time between the initial agreement and actual performance by the 
parties79
The methods portion of this study is divided into two general techniques.  The 
first technique is designed to use inductive reasoning in order to build a clearer 
understanding of alliance governance mechanisms and contracts.  Inductive reasoning 
attempts to use specific instances and observations in an effort to create 
generalizations.
.  The governance of this extended time period becomes critical when the 
“continuity of the relationship is a source of value” (Williamson, 2005).  This often 
extended time lag offers the opportunity for the parties to make adjustments in formal 
contractual agreements.  These changes are often a direct result of conditions external to 
the agreement.  Assessing these external considerations and the resulting alterations 
within formal agreements, this study offers the prospect of increased understanding of 
contracts in the business environment. 
 
80
                                                   
77 Supra… section on contract provisions in the literature review, page #. 
78 Based upon Economics research, the discrete transaction is characterized by a one-time intersection 
between the parties that seek to conduct a single transaction.  The parties do not develop any type of 
relationship to exist outside of the single transaction.   
79 It appears as if the greater time distance creates fundamental problems when attempting to align the early 
contract objectives with the actual performance.  Contracting parties often refocus their attention away from 
performance toward problems related to breach or default. 
80 Inductive reasoning attempts to use specific observations, analyze and classify those observations, and infer 
generalizations from those limited observations. 
  This method is especially useful in instance where little theory exists.  
Currently, there is no specific theoretical understanding of contractual governance 
structures thereby necessitating the continued use of inductive assessments.  This section 
employs a case study to gather information regarding contracts and cooperative 
agreements.   
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The case study is a form of inductive evaluation.  It is a research strategy that is 
designed to develop theory through an assessment of unique dynamics present in a 
single situation that can potentially lead to wide spread generalizations (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  Case studies have regularly been used in the business environment, although 
relatively few have been developed pertaining to the governance mechanisms of 
cooperative business relationships (Faems et. al., 2008).  The particular case presented in 
this study offers insights into the negotiations, development of contracts, development of 
initial governance structures, and the expansion of several other contracts.  This 
particular case study is especially helpful in understanding contractual arrangements 
because of the two-pronged approach of the master agreement and the sub-agreements, 
which will be explained later. 
 
The second technique is designed to use deductive reasoning with regards to 
contracts.81  If we can create generalizations through case studies, then these 
generalizations can be tested.  The preliminary interviews required for the case study 
were designed to provide the necessary tools to later build a survey to be administered to 
attorneys, having a certain expertise in contracts.  A survey is created that is intended to 
test attorneys’ tendencies to consistently favor certain contract provisions, given specific 
conditions known to exist at some stage in cooperative business arrangements.  The 
survey has two important steps.  First, certain categories of contract provisions are 
developed and defined.  These provisions are reviewed by a panel of experts, attorneys 
who have extensive experience with contracts.  Once a set of contract clauses have been 
reliably identified under specific categories, the survey can be created and administered 
to attorneys having some level of experience with contracts.  The results are expected to 
demonstrate that contractual provisions are selected in response to certain conditions. 
 
Four sets of interviews were organized in order to gather and verify data for the 
case study.  Initial research questions included: 1) How are cooperative contracts 
negotiated and designed?  2) Do the conclusions from the Macaulay (1963) study still 
hold and how does trust play a role?  3) Are there distinct differences in contract 
provisions and are there general characteristics which would allow us to distinguish 
between them?  While these research questions were by no means a comprehensive list, 
they did guide the discussions and scripted questions used in the interviews (Eisenhardt, 
1989)
A.  Case Study. 
 
82
At the initial meetings, two attempts were made to record the discussions.  It 
appeared as if those conversations were much more reserved.  The second participant 
eventually asked to have the recorder turned off.  Non-recorded discussions seemed 
more enthusiastic in terms of providing further anecdotal information.  The method to 
record conversations was reduced to note taking.  Specific notes were taken during the 
.   
 
                                                   
81 Deductive reasoning takes generalizations and tests those assertions using identified members of a class. 
82 Eisenhardt (1989) argued for an initial set of “tentatively” defined research questions “making a priori 
specification of the contracts” with a “clean theoretical slate”.  The research questions are used to develop 
structure regarding the data received and to identify important topics to investigate. 
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conversations.  I took special interest in insightful quotes.  I re-wrote the notes and 
added impressions of my own within an hour of leaving the meeting.  Each interview 
provided on average four pages of notes, which included quotes and my own 
impressions of the information.83
Table #1 
   
 
Preliminary 
Interviews 
Structured 
Interviews 
Clarification 
Interviews 
Closing 
Interviews 
7 Attorneys 2 Attorneys 1 Attorney  
3 Executives 2 Executives 1 Executive 1 Executive 
Open-ended 
Discussions 
Focused 
Discussions 
Follow-up Discussions Feedback 
Interview 
Introductions and 
informal 
conversations 
Scripted questions Scripted questions of 
specific events  
Case study 
results 
 
Next, a second set of increasingly structured interviews was conducted.  The 
primary informants, expected to be the most helpful, were identified in the initial 
meetings.  This led to the selection of a smaller group from which more structured 
interviews were scheduled.  The questions presented were scripted and attempted to 
focus the attention on specific events.  Meetings with the attorneys involved became 
impossible and the interviews were reduced to phone conversations.   
 
The last set of interviews was designed to answer specific questions regarding 
the case.  Both of these interviews were phone conversations limited to twenty minutes 
each.  These conversations were designed merely to clarify a set of questions I had while 
beginning to write the case study. A final feedback interview was conducted to help 
correct any misconstrued information.  It also served to allow the participant to see the 
final write-up and some of the theoretical conclusions derived from the events.  This last 
interview was an effort to test the internal validity of the case findings and ensure the 
conclusions were not too distant from the facts (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 
Like most case studies, certain efforts should be made to increase the validity of 
retrospective data derived from respondents.  First, I made an effort to triangulate the 
data84
                                                   
83 Eisenhardt (1989) writes concerning the importance of taking not only notes of discussion questions, but 
also to “write down whatever impressions occur”.   Listing impressions not only “gives the researcher a head 
start in analysis”, but it also allows a level of “flexibility” important in these studies. 
84 Triangulation of the data requires that the researcher look to distinctly separate sources of information that 
independently verify the same event or facts (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
 (Eisenhardt, 1989).  In this case, two separate sources were used to verify the 
data; interviews, as previously discussed, and internal documents.  I was able to obtain 
copies of 49 pages of contracts and internal documents.  These documents were 
compared to the interview notes in order to verify the findings.   Second, multiple 
informants were used and the data was verified between informants (Miller, et. al. 1997).  
By the third round of interviews, the data had been checked through multiple informants, 
sometimes multiple times.  Third, Miller et. al. (1997) also suggested to have informants 
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focus on “facts and concrete events” in order to reduce “cognitive bias and impression 
management”.  All informants were responding with regards to a specific contractual 
arrangement.  The specificity of the event and the fact that most of these events occurred 
within the last year would have lessened the effect of any cognitive bias. 
 
Two helpful tools were derived from the case analysis.  First, I was able to obtain 
and review the contracts that were put into place between the two parties.  These 
contracts provided a set of clauses that would later be used to develop the survey.  Two, 
through the interview process, I was able to informally assess attorney opinions 
regarding the theoretical categories for contract provisions that had been presented in the 
past literature.  The overall opinion fell in favor of Vlaar’s (2008) categories of 
“outcome” and “process” provisions.  
 
It was suggested that that the categories present by Vlaar (2008) were the most 
helpful and intuitive.  This level of “intuitiveness” became especially important when 
these categories were presented to a panel of attorneys who became essential in the 
process of developing the survey instrument. 
 
 
B.  Survey Panel. 
As previous demonstrated, researchers are consistently beginning to recognize 
distinct differences between contract provisions.  However, these distinctions have not 
had the benefit of clear and consistent definitions in order to develop testable constructs.  
The issue of construct validity begins early in the testing process.  Proper “fitting to the 
constructs of interest is best achieved (1) by the careful pre-experimental explication of 
constructs so that definitions are clear… and (2) by data analysis” (Cook & Campbell, 
1979).  In order for these constructs to be developed properly for later testing, they must 
be well defined and tested for construct validity. 
 
In spite of the fact that prior researchers have developed several terms to describe 
contract provision classes, this study will propose two categories of contract provisions 
known as “outcome provisions” and “process provisions”.  Efforts have been made to 
explicate these constructs “so that definitions are clear and in conformity with public 
Table #2 
Contract Provision Structures: Research Authors: 
Rational Planning Legal Sanctions Macaulay (1963) 
Operative Provisions Risk Allocation 
Provisions 
Fox (2002) 
Coordinative 
Provisions 
Enforcement 
Provisions 
Reuer & Arino (2007) 
Performance 
Provisions 
Juridical Provisions Faems, Janssens, Madhok & Looy 
(2008) 
Processes/Behavioral 
Provisions 
Inputs/Outcome 
Provisions 
Vlaar, (2008) 
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understanding of the words used” (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  These constructs are 
defined as follows. 
 
1.  Outcome Determinant Provisions. 
Outcome provisions are those formalized clauses that describe “conditions” 
existing as a direct result of the contractual agreement or those wished to be represented 
in the contract.   These conditions can be characterized as those expected under current 
assumptions about the cooperative relationship or those expected under certain 
contingency assumptions (in response to what-if scenarios).  These conditions act as 
standards, concerning agreed upon events and circumstances.  They represent an accord 
regarding the expected state of affairs and objectives.  To give a few examples, outcome 
provisions within a contract detail the particular: legal standards, product or service 
standards, confidentiality standards, representation and warranty standards, and property 
standards.  Developing a list of the characteristics of expected conditions answers the 
simple question of “what we want” as a result of the agreement (Stevenson, 1998).  
Specific examples are as follows: 
 
Contracts do have the capacity to outline the legal system or applicable law 
under which the contract will be evaluated.  Within the United States alone, certain 
states have differences regarding how specific provisions are applied.  For example, the 
concept of what constitutes effective “notice” may have a particular set of requirements 
in one state and a more liberal definition in another.  States may also have differences 
regarding their statute of limitations, being the time period within which a party must 
file suit.  An example of this clause can read: “The terms and elements of this contract 
will be guided and directed under the state laws of ___.”  These differences become 
even more apparent when comparing the legal systems of different countries.  In 
addition to the applicable law, contracts can also have the capacity to choose a specific 
venue, or location, in which the case would be heard and decided. 
 
Most business cooperative agreements are designed to organize the development 
of a product or service.  Agreed upon standards are set to facilitate coordinated 
understandings of what is expected regarding the relative “output” of the arrangement.  
Performance is often difficult to gauge in long-term contracts and typically references 
are made to a set of pre-existing standards or expectations.  These standards often result 
in a number of reports geared towards giving parties important information regarding 
performance.  An example of a provision regarding output can read: “The equipment 
and software installation will conform to published requirements throughout the term of 
an order.” 
 
Controlling industry secrets and information concerning unique firm capabilities 
is almost always an issue within cooperative agreements.  Measures are taken to protect 
information from third parties in an effort to secure property and market advantages 
currently existing within individual parties as well as to protect property and advantages 
created as a result of the cooperative arrangement.  Provisions regarding confidentiality 
create a legal liability or responsibility to maintain control over acquired information 
regarding a partner’s secrets.  An example of this can read: “Each party will make 
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reasonable efforts not to disclose the other party’s confidential information to any third 
party.” 
 
Most cooperative agreements make an effort to outline specific material 
representations put forth by each of the parties.  Stated representations provide a general 
understanding of a partner’s assets and capabilities they are willing to contribute to the 
cooperative effort as well as provide conditions for breach.85
                                                   
85 This form of breach is often referred to as “adverse selection”.  Adverse selection occurs when a 
contracting partner makes a representation relative to the assets they intend to bring to the cooperative effort, 
but in reality, they do not current possess or control said assets (Barney & Hesterly, 2008).  Due process 
activities, typically done by attorneys and accountants, are efforts to minimize the possibility of adverse 
selection by verifying the existence of certain assets.  The due process procedures become increasingly 
complicated when attempting to verify the existence of certain capabilities, as opposed to tangible assets, 
possessed by the firm.  Representations may also describe promises to allocate resources to the partnership 
that the firm does in fact possess.  A breach occurs when the partner, although possessing the resource, 
chooses not to allocate the resource for the benefit of the cooperative relationship, or chooses to allocate a 
resource of lesser value than was promised.  This type of breach is referred to as “moral hazard” (Barney & 
Hesterly, 2008).  Further definition of these terms can be found in Barney, J. B. & Ouchi, W. G. 1986. 
Organizational economics. San Francisco: Josey-Bass. 
  If cooperative parties do 
not possess the requisite or stated assets and capabilities understood to exist during 
contract negotiations, the formalized representation provides a condition of breach in 
that the “non-breaching party” would then have the unilateral right to terminate the 
agreement.   A representation is generally a statement of conditions prior to the 
agreement.  An example of a contractual representation could read: “Each party asserts 
that all current financial information is true and accurate and provides a good 
representation of their financial position.” 
 
Most contractual agreements also make efforts to include warranties put forth by 
each of the parties.  Warranties represent obligated responses by each of the parties to 
stated contingencies.  Contracts often carefully describe the conditions or contingencies 
which obligate any of the parties to contractually respond.  The lack of response by any 
of the contracting parties set up conditions of breach and the potential for more 
substantial liabilities.  An example of a contractual warranty could read: “If a 
contracting party is not satisfied with any delivered equipment, party A will provide a 
replacement, with the identical equipment, at no additional charge.” 
 
Contractual agreements typically make assertions concerning the ownership of 
tangible and intangible assets contributed and created within the cooperative 
arrangement.  Coordinated activities often pull in assets which, over time, are difficult to 
separate and define, in terms of title and ownership.  Similar to representations, 
declarations of ownership state conditions at any point during the contractual agreement.  
Outcome provisions can clarify conditions by identifying the asset and the party who 
maintains title.  Outcome provisions can also clarify agreements, between partnering 
firms, regarding the title of assets created as a direct result of the contractual 
arrangement.  An example of this can read: “Party A assigns, grants, conveys and 
transfers all rights to any output of services, as a result of this agreement, for any 
applicable order.” 
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2.  Process Determinant Provisions. 
Process provisions are those formalized clauses that describe joint or 
complimentary “operational activities” existing as a direct result of the contractual 
agreement.  These provisions include those expected under current assumptions and 
those expected under contingency assumptions (in response to “what if” scenarios).  
Process provisions codify activities and behaviors through which parties achieve 
contract objectives.  Basically, these provisions outline “how” outcome conditions are 
realized.   To give a few examples, process provisions within a contractual agreement 
detail: resource accessibility, work schedules, transaction orders, pricing mechanisms, 
payment, and necessary confidentiality disclosures.  
 
Process clauses are mostly overlooked by researchers attempting to understand 
the characteristics and components of contracts.  These clauses are unique to the 
circumstances in which they are written.  In other words, because these provisions are so 
specific to the business activities they are designed to describe, it becomes difficult to 
create categories to generally portray them.  In other words, making generalities 
concerning the collaborative activities of one contract are difficult to use when 
attempting to assess the collaborative activities of another contract. 
 
Complementary activities between cooperative business partners often require 
accessibility to assets owned by the other partner.  This is not an issue of title and 
therefore not an outcome provision.  If possible, contracts often specifically designate 
the asset(s) requiring accessibility.  An example of this type of provision may read: 
“Parties will permit each other and their agents to use or access, all hardware, software 
and workspace.” 
 
Process provisions can also articulate the designated work schedules or work 
parameters.  Often, this provision is an attempt to coordinate complementary activities 
throughout the partnership.  This can also work to specify precise divisions of labor, 
responsibilities and information flows, especially when considering larger projects.  An 
example of this type of provision can read: “Maintenance services will be provided 
during standard working hours.” 
 
Transaction orders are specific descriptions of identified transactions.  While 
cooperative agreements can cover large periods of time, orders discuss individual 
transactions at any point in time.  The individual order is distinguished from the 
collaborative agreement in that performance of the order may discharge any liability 
created by the order, this same performance does not however discharge the 
responsibilities each party has to the contractual agreement.  Process provisions may 
discuss details related to the activities surrounding orders, such as: time limits, notice, 
receipt and formalities (such as required signatories).  A process provision that describe 
transaction orders could read: “Orders may be submitted via hard copy or electronic 
means.” 
 
Pricing information can often be described as a predetermined process.  Pricing 
and the ascertainment of pricing can be described in great detail.  Typically for inter-
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firm transactions, pricing is determined through some form of agreed upon calculation.  
A process provision involving pricing may read as: “Pricing will be set forth in each 
order”. 
 
Often complementing price information is a detailed understanding of payment 
schedules.  Payment schedules dictate the rules of payment, the time between delivery 
and final payment, and the terms for late payment.  Late payment schedule are 
considered process provisions up to the point of default.  After default or breach of 
contract, the agreed remedies are no longer considered process.  An example of this type 
of provision can read: “For any payment not received within 30 days of the due date, the 
parties agree to pay a late charge of 5% of the amount due.” 
 
While the provisions that protect confidential information are similar to asset title 
issues, a provision concerning the receipt of confidential information is similar to 
acquiring access of assets.  Provisions are often placed into contracts to insure that the 
parties will have access to confidential information possessed by their partners.  
Outcome provisions are also used to insure that the parties protect confidential 
information from third parties.  A process provision regarding access to confidential 
information may read as: “Each party will disclose to the other certain business 
information identified as confidential”. 
 
3.  Provision Clarifications 
A few sets of provisions have need for further clarification to determine whether 
the clause is an outcome provision or a process provision.  These clarifications are the 
result of a pre-test completed with the help of two attorneys, before the panel was 
selected.  A pattern begins to emerge with each explanation.  If a general sense of 
control (of the processes, decisions or property) remains within the partnership, the 
provision is most likely a process provision.  If control is relinquished to a third party 
(competitors, mediators or courts), the provision is most likely an outcome provision.  
This distinction is similar to the “juridical clause”, discussed by Faems et. al. (2008), in 
which these provisions attempt to define conditions with respect to third-parties.  The 
following explanations attempted to clarify those subtle distinctions between provisions 
that were more difficult to classify: 
 
Dispute provisions. 
Dispute provisions are not intended to produce an entirely new set or category of 
contract clauses.  These provisions provide a prescribed description of intended 
responses to contingencies; contingencies which occur as a direct result of disputes 
regarding the contractual agreement.  The division between those dispute provisions 
considered “process” and those provisions considered “outcome” depends upon the level 
of control over the final decision.  If the parties abdicate control of the dispute outcome 
to a third party as, for example, parties do in the courts and within binding arbitration, 
the provision is considered “outcome”.  If the parties do not abdicate control of the 
dispute outcome to a third party, as for example, non-binding arbitration or committees, 
the provision is considered “process”. 
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   Process         Outcome 
 
  Committees Non-binding  Binding  Courts  
    Arbitration  Arbitration 
 
 <  Cooperative decision-making  Third-party decision-making >  
 
 
 
Penalties and Remedies. 
Performance of the contract is the primary method in which the parties fulfill 
their obligations and terminate their liabilities to a contractual agreement.  Longer-term 
contracts are unique in that performance is often difficult to define, making fulfillment 
of contractual obligations difficult to judge.  Therefore, parties to longer-term contracts 
often turn their attention from performance and instead emphasize contractual default.  
Contractual penalties incentivize parties to make payment, but keep the parties from 
contractual default and are consider “process” provisions.  Contractual penalties allow 
the offending party the opportunity to avoid contractual default and provide the “means” 
to come back into full compliance.  Based upon this reasoning, agreed upon penalties are 
“process” provisions as long as they are not a direct result of contractual default.  
 
Contractual default occurs when one or more of the contracting parties are 
unable or/and unwilling to perform.  For example, liquidated damages are sometimes 
calculated in order to define the penalty obligation as a direct result of contractual 
default.  These damages are expected to compensate the non-defaulting party for any 
negative consequences of the contract default.  These damages are also theorized to 
coerce parties to comply with their agreements and encourage performance.  However, 
once default occurs, the pre-determined damages are assess and a direct outcome of the 
default.  Based upon this, damages assessed as a result of contractual default are 
considered outcome provisions.  Remedies are often assessed after the parties experience 
contractual default and therefore are labeled “outcome” provisions. 
 
 
             Default 
 
Process        Outcome 
   Penalties  Damage Remedies 
 
 
 
Access and Title. 
As previous discussed, firms often have to add provisions that protect firm 
property rights and provisions that allow access to property within the cooperative effort.  
Property includes those assets both tangible and intangible.  The protection of property 
rights include provisions that appear to fall under three categories:  those provisions that 
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define existing property rights, provisions that define property right of assets created as a 
direct result of the partnership and those provisions that create protections for intangible 
property such as goodwill and trade secrets.  Other provisions are designed merely to 
allow access by the partnering firms.  Access may be granted to tangible assets such as 
equipment or records, or intangible assets such as internal capabilities and trade secrets. 
 
   Property (tangible and intangible) 
 
Process        Outcome 
   Access   Title 
 
 
 
 
4.  Construct Validity. 
A panel of experts was designed to test the convergent and discriminate validity 
of the constructs.  Once clear definitions of the constructs have been completed, the 
construct should be tested.  “…assessing construct validity depends on two processes: 
first, testing for convergence across different measures or manipulations of the same 
thing and, second, testing for a divergence between measures and manipulations of 
related but conceptually distinct things” (Cook & Campbell, 1979).  Convergent validity 
assesses “the tendency for different measurement operations to converge on the same 
underlying trait” (Loehlin, 1998).  Divergent validity assesses “the ability to 
discriminate among different traits (Loehlin, 1998).   
 
With definitions of the two contract provision constructs formulated in the 
previous section, a panel of experts was organized to designate example contract clauses 
as either outcome provisions or process provisions.  The case study provided several 
contracts from which to extract contract provisions.  An attempt was made to find 
provisions that covered as many topics as possible.  When completed, the list of 
provisions included fifty contract clauses that seemed to represent almost all aspects of 
the contractual agreement.  Admittedly, I attempted to provide as many contract clauses 
representing each category although no attempt was made to divide the list in half 
between what I perceived to be outcome provisions and process provisions.  Each clause 
is described in a single sentence even though the contract provisions, from which they 
came, were often described in paragraph.  The purpose of this was to reduce the 
complexity of each provision in order to allow the panel experts to cover more ground 
and increase the number of decisions they made concerning the classification of each 
provision.  A one-page explanation of the definitions was given to the panel participants.  
Each participant was asked to classify all fifty contract clauses as: outcome (O), process 
(P), or left blank in that they did not fit into either category.  (See Appendix #1) 
 
The expert panel was selected based upon their experience with contracts.  The 
entire panel consisted of eight attorneys.  This group make-up consisted of three 
attorneys acting as corporate general counsels, three attorneys specializing in property 
and energy contracts, and two attorneys working as independent counsels in commercial 
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and property law, both having served in political office.  The assessments of the clauses 
were done independently, eliminating any conversations that would alter the attorney’s 
first impressions.  The feedback was collected and organized relative to the grouping, 
whether outcome or process, and assessed regarding the strength of the classification.  
Many of the provisions received unanimous votes regarding their classification.  This 
process served to test both convergent validity (fifty items were categorized) and 
discriminate validity (most of the items consistently fell within one of the two 
categories).  The contract provisions that were “most consistently” classified under one 
of the two definitions were selected to represent the constructs in the survey instrument.   
 
 
C.  Survey Instrument. 
The survey instrument seeks to extract information regarding an attorney’s 
tendency regarding the selection of contract provisions within a governance structure.  
The targeted participants for the survey are attorneys.  The logic of the survey is that 
environmental conditions (independent variables) should have a direct effect on the 
selection of contract provisions (dependent variables).  The results of this survey should 
further validate the constructs representing the contract provisions.  The dependent 
variables are the previously discussed constructs: outcome provisions and process 
provisions.  The environmental conditions that should effect the selection of the contract 
provisions are taken from the analysis of transaction cost economics, as describe by 
Williamson and other researchers.  First, the independent variables portraying the 
environmental conditions should be discussed.  Second, the organization of the survey 
instrument is specified.  
 
Williamson (1991) expressed that transaction cost economics is really an effort 
to “align transactions, which differ in their attributes, with governance structures, which 
differ in their costs and competencies, in a discriminating way”.  Differences that exist 
in contracts, acting as governance structures, are merely reflections of the unique 
circumstances in which the parties find themselves.  Taking cues from the Shelanski & 
Klien (1999) discussion of transaction cost economics, necessary changes in the 
governance of transactions depends upon: 1) the “frequency” with which the 
transactions occur with a particular trading partner, 2) the degree of “relationship 
specific assets”, 2) the “amount of uncertainty about the future”, 3) the “complexity of 
the trading arrangement”, and 4).  Accepting this logic, I have attempted to use these 
differing environmental circumstances as independent variables and test whether their 
existence will created differences relative to the types of contract provisions that 
attorneys have a tendency to select.  
 
Past experience with trading partners has been shown to have an effect on the 
party’s willingness and ability to develop contractual relationships (Dyer and Singh, 
1998; Bagley, 2008).  Experience is determined by the “frequency” of the transactions, 
which has been shown to have an effect on the governance structures employed (Dyer & 
Singh, 1998).  Prior experience increases the possibility that the partnering firms have 
developed important routines and expectations of each other.  More specifically, the 
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level of experience the partners have in conducting transactions should alter the 
selection of contract provisions governing the relationship.  
 
The investment in asset specific investments has been the most studied factor 
when considering the nature of the governance structure within the transaction cost 
arguments (Chiles & McMackin, 1996).  Asset specificity refers to the extent in which 
that value of the asset is dependent upon the existence of the transaction relationship 
(Williamson, 1985).  These assets are specialized to such an extent that they can only be 
used at a much lower value in alternative applications.  The degree to which the 
partnership must invest in such assets should have an effect on the selection of contract 
provisions governing the relationship.   
 
Performance measures are often difficult to understand, even within a 
partnership.  This misunderstanding is not only created by a limited perspective, as 
described through bounded rationality, but also compounded by the asymmetric 
conditions of information.  Williamson (1985) describes performance measures as “the 
ways by which better to assure a closer correspondence between deeds and awards”.  
The degree to which the individual parties of a partnership can understand performance 
as it is measured and reported should have an effect on the selection of contract 
provisions.  
 
Williamson (1985) describes uncertainty as a condition in the market place 
“associated with unique events”.  “The occasion to make successive adaptations arises 
because of the impossibility (or costliness) of enumerating all possible contingencies 
and/or stipulating appropriate adaptations to them in advance.” (Williamson, 1985)86
The organization of the survey instrument attempts to capture each of the 
independent variables in contrasting conditions. (table #3)  For example, the independent 
variable that describes the “past experience with contracting partner” is presented twice; 
once indicating extensive past experience and a second time indicating no past 
experience.  The expectation is that the contract provision decisions will change when 
faced with contrasting conditions.  Attorneys may have tendency to select an outcome 
provision or process provision when faced with “extensive past experience” and select 
the opposing provision when faced with “no past experience”.  To the degree that 
respondents do differentiate between the contrasting contract provisions when faced 
with contrasting conditions, the survey will increase the validity of the construct and the 
  
Williamson describes uncertainty as an “exogenous disturbance”, which is affected by 
both behavioral and environmental conditions.  The effects of bounded rationality limit 
the party’s ability to predict future conditions.  The ability or inability to predict general 
market conditions should have an effect on the selection of contract provisions that 
govern the cooperative relationship. 
 
                                                   
86 Williamson (1985) also included the nature of “behavioral uncertainty” which would include the intentions 
of any partners to behave opportunistically, similar to what is assumed within open marketplace conditions.  
Williamson states that, “Uncertainty of a strategic kind is attributable to opportunism and will be referred to as 
behavioral uncertainty.” However, the behavioral attributes of uncertainty are not specifically included in this 
model in favor of considering the general market conditions only. 
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internal validity of the survey model.  More importantly, the success of the survey will 
make a contribution to our understanding of contracts and operationalize constructs for 
further study. 
 
Table #3 
 
 Independent 
Variable 
Circumstance Descriptions 
Past Experience with 
Contracting Partner 
+ Extensive past experience with partnering firm. 
- No past experience contracting with this firm. 
Specific Capital 
Investments 
+ Extensive investments in equipment. 
- Not require new investments of capital or time. 
Performance 
Measures 
+ Readily transparent and progress easy to assess. 
- Difficult to measure performance of partner. 
Market Conditions + Stable conditions, easy to predict. 
- Unstable market conditions, difficult to predict. 
 
 
 
IV. CASE STUDY 
 
 
The case study I have selected for observation concerns a strategic alliance 
between two large firms, both incorporated and conducting business primarily in the 
United States, but both having extensive activities abroad.  This particular alliance is 
between a large North American based Retailer (RETAILER) and a large technology 
firm (ITSUPPLIER), which supplies advanced equipment and software, especially 
designed for business application.  The selection of this answered specific calls to 
research case studies regarding different sorts of alliances.  The current need is “to study 
other forms of contracting, in particular inter-firm partnerships where technology is not 
of primary importance (eg. marketing partnerships, customer-supplier relationships, 
outsourcing, co-production contracts)”87
I selected this alliance intended for this study for practical as well as academic 
reasons.  First, and the most practical of all reasons, I was offered access to both the 
contracts and the personnel involved with initiating the relationship, developing the 
contracts, modifying the relationship with further contracts and implementing the 
business activities.  Second, the contractual arrangement is relatively new suggesting the 
alliance relationship has evolved relatively quickly since the beginning negotiations.  
Participants have been able to witness relationships build quickly, sometimes out of pure 
 (Hagedorn & Hesen, 2007).  This particular 
partnership, while starting out resembling a customer-supplier relationship, edged closer 
to a marketing partnership as time went on. 
 
                                                   
87 A few examples of the resent research: The primary source of data regarding inter-firm contractual 
relationships has been the case study.  Hagedoorn & Hesen (2007) reviewed four technology based case 
studies.  Faems et. al. (2008) used two case studies, both with the same two alliance partners, under two sets of 
contracts regarding the development of a new technology.   
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necessity. Recollection of events would be relatively “fresh”.  Third, this particular 
alliance has been structured and formalized through a series of contracts which tie and 
make reference to one another.  Larger organizations, such as these, have been linked to 
higher levels of formalization (Zeffane, 1989).  Fourth, unlike other studies, with the 
possible exception being Macaulay (1963), both executives and attorneys from both 
companies are involved in the interviews.  This gives a unique perspective on the 
interactions between executives and attorneys within the context of developing and 
executing contracts in an alliance.   
 
The purpose of this case study is to inductively develop a more in-depth 
understanding of alliance governance.  Seventeen interviews were conducted of varying 
length of time.  Interviews began as relatively unstructured conversations concerning the 
alliance relationship.  Attempts were made to record conversations, however, the 
informants communicated their dislike of being recorded and the practice was 
abandoned.  Written notes were taken and transcribed into progressively more organized 
facts.  Both face-to-face and phone interviews were conducted.  Subsequent interviews 
were held to clarify facts and further make clear some of the quotes.  A final interview 
was conducted with an executive to go over the case as written to make sure the 
injections of theoretical reasoning did not alter the facts relative to the case study.  All 
information concerning the events, people and documents was expected to be 
maintained confidential.  As promised, the case study was sent to all the participants.  
 
 
A.  Case Study. 
This particular alliance emerged out of necessity.  RETAILER made a strategic 
choice to offer a specialized mix of business services.  RETAILER committed to create 
“business centers” as a new retail outlet.  These business centers would be specifically 
designed to cater to small business needs regarding storage, copying, printing and 
technology interfaces.  RETAILER made several inquiries concerning the expected level 
of competition within this specialized market.  Relative to the needed equipment and the 
service skills, RETAILER realized they had little to no expertise in this area and opted 
to search for a partner to provide the capabilities to develop these business centers.  
 
In the analysis conducted by RETAILER, ITSUPPLIER emerged as one of the 
few firms that could offer the level of expertise, hardware and software, and service 
necessary to implement this new service to business customers.   
“We have some of the best equipment in the marketplace today.  Some of 
the equipment is so sophisticated that it requires specialized service.  Since 
we consider ourselves to be a service firm that offers equipment and not 
an equipment firm that offers some service, we were especially suited for 
the project.” (ITSUPPLIER Executive) 
ITSUPPLIER possessed a unique combination of qualified personnel and high tech 
equipment.  In addition to the capability requirements, RETAILER was also constrained 
by a self-imposed time constraint.  ITSUPPLIER was further distinguished in that it was 
one of the few firms with the capabilities to perform within the accepted time frame. 
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“We had set our completion dates relative to a new store that was opening.  
We did not want our new store to open without the business center 
completed.  The completion date was extremely important to us.” 
(RETAILER Executive) 
 
ITSUPPLIER, on the other hand, had made previous attempts to develop a 
business relationship with RETAILER.  RETAILER’s enormous size and organizational 
complexity made it a prime candidate for ITSUPPLIER’s equipment and services. 
“We had up to this point little to no significant working relationship with 
RETAILER.  We had tried for years to find way to get their business, but 
they had had a relationship with an IT equipment provider for several 
years and it did not look as if that was going to change soon.” 
(ITSUPPLIER Executive)   
RETAILER had historically maintained strong, long-term, supplier-customer 
relationships with other technology firms making ITSUPPLIER’s chances of engaging 
in a business relationship to this point minimal.  The “business centers” were recognized 
as a prime opportunity for ITSUPPLIER to develop an initial working relationship with 
the hope of a longer-term cooperative business relationship.  What ITSUPPLIER had 
originally perceived as a relatively simple supplier-customer, almost discrete transaction, 
relationship turned into a longer-term contractual alliance resulting in several contracts 
and operational opportunities. 
 
Within the initial negotiations, RETAILER and ITSUPPLIER conducted what 
was referred to as a “knowledge exchange workshop” (KEW).88
                                                   
88 The “Knowledge Exchange Workshop” is a systematic approach, developed by IT SUPPLIER, to develop 
a detailed understanding of customers, as well as, business partners.  It is portrayed as representing the 
DEFINE stage of the Six Sigma Methodology.  This approach helps to breakdown and analyzes business 
issues and concerns deemed important by either of the partners.  It also attempts to include in the analysis any 
“compelling events” and their expected effects.  Ultimately, this approach is expected to develop a set of 
“initial solutions” that are acceptable to all parties involved.  ITSUPPLIER considered this approach to be an 
industry standard and both parties appeared to be acquainted with the terminologies. This stage of the process 
develops a detailed report of the initial objectives with a list of details necessary to implement the process. 
(ITSUPPLIER Internal documentation) 
  This particular 
workshop was an initial attempt to make agreements as to the final make-up of the 
business centers.  For the most part, these workshops were opportunities for RETAILER 
to define “exactly what they wanted to have happen”.   RETAILER was particularly 
concerned with the dates of completion and wanted to make sure that, although they 
were interested in providing the best service for their customers, the dates designated for 
completion were met.  ITSUPPLIER quickly provided the specifications for the 
necessary equipment and the project was able to begin, even without a completed final 
contract. 
RETAILER was so focused on completing the business center on time that 
a lot of time in the KEW was spent giving them the specs on the 
equipment… so that they would have the information to build.” 
(ITSUPPLIER Executive) 
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The initial attempt to formalize an agreement was focused on creating a “master 
agreement”89
Attempts to complete the master agreement within the time constraint failed.  
The delays in the contract negotiations were centered around three issues.  The first issue 
of concern was the jurisdiction of the agreement.  The corporate offices of the parties 
.  This master agreement would detail all representations and warranties of 
both parties.  Early in the process, it was expected that after the master agreement was 
completed, all other agreements would be effectively attached to the master agreement 
through reference.  In other words, any other transactions conducted between 
ITSUPPLIER and RETAILER would be guided by the terms and conditions of the 
master agreement.  The details of the transaction would be considered addendums to the 
master agreement.  This bifurcation of the contracts is an effort to reduce the cost of 
contracting for each individual transaction.  Once the master was completed, 
ITSUPPLIER would then have the “inside track” to not only this particular project, but 
to any others that might be organized. 
“The real costs of contracting are in making this initial agreement.  If we 
can complete this, all other agreements just reference the master 
agreement and it cuts down on the time and money of further agreements” 
(ITSUPPLIER Attorney) 
 
The master agreement contained provisions that dealt with various issues related 
to representations, jurisdiction, warranties, indemnifications, assignment to third parties, 
remedies, payment, and a few provisions relating to equipment capacity and title.  There 
were no references to the business centers or any other specific transaction.  A majority 
of these provisions dealt with conditions based upon a specified set of contingencies 
raised by both parties. 
“The work of the attorney, and the sign of a good attorney, is the ability to 
include as many contingencies as necessary.  If there is some possible 
outcome, you want to have a response…” (ITSUPPLIER Attorney) 
 
Another attorney observed that “when it comes to contract negotiations, 
the attorneys negotiate primarily over contingencies, and try to affect the 
consequences of any of these possibilities.  That’s where the real battle 
is…” (ITSUPPLIER Attorney) 
 
                                                   
89 The master agreement is also referred to as a “master service agreement”.  This agreement is especially 
designed for business relationships expected to be maintained over longer periods of time.  This contracting 
approach bifurcates the formal contractual agreement.  The master contract is designed to govern general 
terms and conditions between the parties.  The subsequent agreements, or sub-agreements, representing the 
actual transactions between the parties are referred to as “orders”.  Orders describe transactions and make 
reference to the master agreement as a controlling document.  The parties also have “addendums” which are 
designed to make changes to the master agreement or make additions or exceptions only for the individual 
orders.  The system is designed to reduce the time it takes for a firm’s legal experts to negotiate transactions 
between business partners.   Attorneys have only to review the order and compare it to the master agreement 
in order to give approval.  It is generally expected that the master agreements come under review to update 
every two to four years.  Attorneys often mention that master agreements, often lying in the background, go 
unnoticed for long periods of time by the business executives.  Updating these master agreements appeared to 
be a point of conflict between lawyers, trying to keep these agreements current, and executives who rarely 
review these larger, more detailed agreements. 
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were in separate states.  Corporate attorneys typically have their expertise in the laws of 
specific states.  If the jurisdiction was decided to exist outside of the state, the foreign 
corporation may incur the costs of hiring attorneys outside of their state.  Typically, the 
laws between the states are relatively standard, with few exceptions.  Had the contract 
just centered on relatively discrete transactions of goods, the Uniform Commercial 
Code, which has been ratified at least in part by every state within the United States, 
would have prevailed and the rules would have been relatively standard across the states.  
If the contracts deal with transactions that occur within relationships such as alliances, 
many UCC established standards may not directly apply and the state differences may 
have been more profound. 
 
The last two concerns dealt with contingencies regarding property.  
ITSUPPLIER wanted RETAILER to indemnify them of any liability relative to the 
equipment.  RETAILER wanted to increase the specified liabilities to their building, also 
related to the equipment.  In addition, RETAILER wanted to increase the indemnity 
amounts for any liability created by an injury to a customer.  While these issues were not 
insurmountable, they did place delays on the completion of the master agreement.  
Another solution for this first project had to found. 
 
The two parties quickly overcame this failure90
These solutions seemed to overcome both parties’ initial objections and allowed 
the project to continue on time.  The trial agreement was designed to cover “60 days”, 
which allowed for the master agreement to be completed.  Once completed, the trial 
agreement was augmented with two addendums which effectively transferred the title of 
the equipment to RETAILER, increased indemnification limits for ITSUPPLIER on 
, or at least delay, by developing a 
short-term agreement that solved the immediate concerns of the parties and allowed 
more time for the master agreement to be completed.  Attorneys for both parties 
developed what was later referred to as the “trial agreement”.  First, the parties agreed 
that the agreement would be subject to the law of New York, which solved the question 
of jurisdiction.  The question of liability was also address in the trial agreement.  The 
trial contract stated that even though the equipment was installed and placed into 
operation, the: 
“Equipment shall remain personal property, and you will not attach any of 
it as a fixture to any real estate or make any permanent alterations to any 
of it”. (Trial Agreement) 
The effect of this provision was to maintain the parties’ liabilities to the extent of their 
investments into the project.  ITSUPPLIER would be assured the equipment would not 
be altered and, since title would not pass upon installation, they held all liabilities for 
their own equipment.  RETAILER would not take actual title of the equipment which 
limited their own liability for its usage.  In effect, the equipment would be installed and 
maintained on a limited “trial bases”.  No payment would be required until the master 
agreement was completed. 
 
                                                   
90 When I started to gather information regarding this initial project, the inability to timely develop a master 
agreement placed the entire project in jeopardy.  To the executives related to the project, this constituted a 
failure at the time.  The attorneys involved developed a short-term solution that overcame these problems. 
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RETAILER’s behalf, and made the entire agreement for this specific transaction subject 
to the master agreement. 
 
The effects of this master agreement were almost immediate.  By the time the 
master agreement was completed, ITSUPPLIER had three other smaller projects with 
RETAILER, not related to this initial venture.  The first set of addendums was designed 
to attach all the existing contracts to the master agreement. 
“The intent of the master agreement was to make an investment in our 
future relationship.  Once the master agreement was completed, all other 
“sub-contracts” would make reference to the master making it easier for 
legal to review the new projects.” (ITSUPPLIER Executive)  
The master agreement appears to have been important to the development and 
implementation of several other contracts, often referred to as “sub-agreements” or 
“addendums”91.   By the end of the interview process pertaining to this study, seven 
other contracts had been developed applying the recently developed master agreement as 
a controlling document (ITSUPPLIER Contract Chart). 
 
The contracting practice of using a series of short-term contracts has been 
studied for some time (Crawford, 1988).  The argument was that contractual 
relationships typically exist longer than the contracts they use to govern their 
relationships.  Longer-term contracts are inflexible and notoriously incomplete.  Short-
term contracts are typically based upon more accessible information making them more 
complete and efficient.  However, Crawford (1988) points out that short-term contract 
may not be the supportive mechanisms to encourage further investment in “relationship 
specific investments”.  Therefore, it has been theorized that while the short-term contract 
B.  Case Study Observations. 
 
While the business aspect of this particular cooperative agreement was still being 
played out by the end of the interview process, it appeared as if the contractual format 
had been successfully established.  A few general observations should be covered 
concerning the case study data.  First, the academic literature within economics has 
extensively studied the rational for long-term and/or short-term contracts.  Existing 
research has compared the rigid application of a single contract as opposed to the 
application of multiple, smaller contracts.  It appeared as if the arrangement between 
RETAILER and ITSUPPLIER was attempting to reap the benefits of both, long and 
short-term contract practices.  Second, the case provided an opportunity to reflect on 
whether the same conditions between business managers and the use of contracts, as was 
observed by Macaulay (1963), were still applicable.  Third, a simple observation of the 
contractual agreements demonstrated that each contract, master and sub-agreement, 
tended to emphasize a distinct set of provisions.  This distinction may reinforce the 
proposed constructs of outcome provisions and process provisions. 
 
                                                   
91 While addendums have a specific legal meaning, the business executives interviewed often referred to the 
sub-contracts (orders referencing and applying the provisions of the master agreement) as addendums.  From 
the attorney’s perspective, addendums are used to either change the master agreement or used in an order to 
create exceptions or additions to that specific transaction. 
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does encourage rational planning because of the added information of relevant events, it 
tends not to promote incentives for long-term investment.    Short-term contracts have 
also been associated to inefficiencies due to opportunistic market behavior such as price 
gouging (Farrell & Shapiro, 1989).   
 
It would appear that the bifurcated agreements attempt to provide the benefits of 
both long-term and short-term contractual agreements.  The master agreement tends to 
design governance mechanisms for the long-term business relationship.  It attempts to 
provide predetermine outcomes or conditions for a multitude of contingencies and 
makes representations that are the result of significant due diligence efforts.  These 
contracts are expensive to develop and, in turn, increase the switching cost to the parties 
involved.92
“Tend to reduce the cost of contracting.  I receive an order that gives me 
enough information to understand the transaction.  I only have to compare 
the order to the master agreement to insure no material conflicts.  This 
saves money and time”. (RETAILER Attorney)
 These high switching costs motivate parties to maintain their existing 
contractual relationships, possibly to the point where other relationship-specific 
investments can be justified by the parties.  Therefore, it appears as if the master 
agreement is “long-term oriented” enough to encourage long-term, specific investments 
and discourages the opportunistic behavior concerns of the market place. 
 
The sub-agreements, or orders, tend to increase the specifics of the individual 
transactions.  The time horizon tends to be shorter and easier to predict.  The set of 
contingencies that need consideration are minimal.  The sub-agreement “attaches” itself 
to the master agreement by merely constructing a clause that states that “all the 
provisions of the master agreement apply”.  The sub-agreement has the protection of the 
master agreement and all the flexibility to make relevant contractual agreements at a 
fraction of the cost.  An attorney mentioned that parties who use this system: 
93
                                                   
92 Much of the economic analysis of contracts tends to analyze short-term and long-term contracts under the 
assumption of zero costs for contract design and formation.  Management literatures have taken note of the 
cost of contract formation and argued the benefits of non-contractual governance mechanisms.  Business 
attorneys and executives seem to be very sensitive to the costs associated to the formation of contracts.  
Depending upon the detail, contracts can be very expensive to create.  The high costs of these contracts 
appear to have created a significant justification to maintain existing relationships.  
93 This particular attorney mentioned this practice as an industry standard.  Even older contracts were being 
reviewed to see if they could be converted to this bifurcated system.  Instances where a completely new, 
complex contract had to be developed for every transaction were considered extremely rare. 
 
 
 
  As discussed previously, the study conducted by Macaulay in 1963 asserted that 
transactions conducted by collaborating business partners were governed by other 
mechanisms than the exclusive use of contracts.  Macaulay pointed to various instances 
in which contractual agreements where avoided in an effort to evade the cost of formal 
agreements. The present case study offered an opportunity to explore whether the 
Macaulay conclusions still hold or should we view the Macaulay conclusion as merely 
an artifact of practices that have long changed.    
 
54 
 
The dealings between ITSUPPLIER and RETAILER suggest that opinions 
relative to contracts have changed to some extent.  When asked whether the project 
could have gone forward without contracts, the reply from executives from both 
companies was “absolutely not!”  Their primary concern revolved around the “risk of 
being sued”.  They were, however, willing to work together with the understanding that 
a contract was eminent.  ITSUPPLIER was also highly motivated to create a working 
relationship with RETAILER and would have exercised enormous patience regarding 
the completion of a contract.  This is in line with research that asserts that it would not 
be uncommon for a less powerful party to engage and commit to a relationship with a 
more powerful party as long as the long as the potential pay-off is higher than the 
potential costs associated with any opportunistic behavior (Zajac & Olsen, 1993).   
Based upon the brief discussions within this case study, the current state of business 
practices may suggest changes are needed regarding our understanding of contracts. 
 
However, four important issues may serve to explain the differences between the 
Macaulay conclusions and the current case study.  First, when questioned whether larger 
firms require more formalization with regard to contracts, the response by executives 
was “Yes, without question!” (ITSUPPLIER Executives).  The practice observed by 
Macaulay may have been by smaller firms requiring less formality in their transactions.  
This would be consistent with research regarding the formality requirements of larger 
organizations (Zeffane, 1989).  
 
Second, the use of modern information systems and different contracting 
practices may have combined to increased efficiencies with regard to contract reviews.  
It is likely that the “red tape” experienced by business people observed by Macaulay 
does not exist to the same extent.  The reduced cost of contract reviews may be more 
acceptable given the modern risk of lawsuits.  In addition, the Macaulay description of 
the lawyers and businessmen typically finds them in conflict regarding the business 
transaction.  Businessmen are frustrated by the “red tape” created by attorneys.  Lawyers 
become frustrated over risky, unstructured business practices.  The attorneys and 
executive in this case were typically perceived as “professional and helpful” on both 
sides.  To a large degree, the attorneys saved the deal regarding the first business center 
by quickly developing the trial agreement, while the master agreement was still being 
negotiated.  This is in stark contrast to the Macaulay observations.   
 
Third, lawyers for both ITSUPPLIER and RETAILER had great concerns over 
implied obligations relative to their firm activities and industry practices.  One attorney 
observed that: 
“We have spent a lot of time planning and talking to one another (making 
reference to the KEW experience) and we do not need unintended 
liabilities, just because we neglect to complete a formal agreement”. 
(RETAILER Attorney)  
The cost of these liabilities, given over forty five years of legal experience since 
Macaulay, may have motivated parties to formalize their agreements to avoid 
unintended consequences.   
 
55 
 
Lastly, a final element may also distinguish modern contract practices portrayed 
in this case from the conclusions of Macaulay and more recent management literature.  
This regards the use of trust as a governance mechanism for cooperative business 
relationships.  RETAILER and ITSUPPLIER did in fact display an element of trust with 
regards to the initial negotiations.  One attorney observed that: 
“Trust is great, especially when the parties start to negotiate their deal.  
For example, the due diligence process absolutely relies upon trust 
between the parties.  You have to trust that the other firm is giving you the 
right information”. (ITSUPPLIER Attorney) 
When encouraged to talk further about trust within a collaborative relationship, this 
same attorney also observed that: 
 “But trust has a problem… It has no successor of interest” 
This viewpoint is in line with past research that has suggested that moving key 
personnel, involved in collaborative projects, is detrimental to the project (de Rond & 
Bouchikhi, 2004; Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Doz 1988)94
This response may be a product of working for a larger firm whose personnel have been 
conditioned to expect more formalized structures.  It may be difficult to generalize these 
statements to smaller firms which may not require this level of formalization.  However, 
this finding is in line with a recent research case study by Faem et. al. (2008), in which 
the study did not find that the emergence of “trust dynamics reduced the importance of 
contracts as governance mechanisms”.  This study went on to state that “Although 
previous studies have suggested that, as positive trust dynamics emerge in alliances, 
formal contracts are pushed to the background and norms of fairness, honesty, and 
.   Current research has 
ignored recognizing this serious deficiency of trust relationships, when emphasizing 
relational governance structures.  
 
Based upon this limitation and others, most attorneys recognized that trust has 
limited benefits for long-term business relationships.  But this is a conclusion that would 
be expected coming from attorneys that typically favor contracts.  However, the 
executives involved in this case were also asked about “trust” and their response very 
similar if not more forceful.  An executive stated: 
“I do not trust anyone… I do learn about people and how their businesses 
work, but I don’t trust them and I expect that they don’t trust me… that’s 
why we have contracts”. (ITSUPPLIER Executive) 
                                                   
94 Faems et. al. (2008) suggested that changing personal “hugely contributed to the positive trust dynamics”.  
However, this particular study focused on two consecutive contractual interactions between the same partners 
from which the first interaction failed and the second succeeded.  It was observed that a change in the 
personnel changed the contract, which changed the relational interactions, which changed the outcome from 
negative to positive.  Taking a failed interaction between the contracting parties and changing the personnel 
resulting in a positive outcome is at best weak evidence that mobility of key persons during collaborative 
projects contributes to positive trust dynamics.  It is possible that the skills sets of the new personnel involved 
were merely more compatible to the increased relational interactions that were later apparent and which added 
to the success of the second contract.  This also potentially undermines the researcher’s argument that a 
change in the contracting practices changed the outcome of the interaction.  However, an argument regarding 
the benefits of changing personnel in a collaborative project is going to have to be made in order to justify 
relational structures governing long-term relationships.  Nothing less than this will overcome the simple 
observation that, “trust… has no successor of interest”.  It is a simple fact that long-term contractual 
relationships typically outlast the people initially involved. 
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reciprocity take on a powerful role in governing the alliances, our data showed that the 
contract remained an important safeguarding and coordinating device, even after 
positive trust dynamics emerged in the … alliance.” (Faems et. al., 2008) 
 
Based upon observations of the contracts, distinctions between the provisions in 
the master agreement and those contained in the sub-agreements, or orders, are apparent.  
This bifurcated system of contracts creates documents that have a tendency to emphasize 
certain provisions over others.  The master agreement contains provisions that cover 
topics such as representations, general warranties, title of property, notices, payment, 
arbitration, indemnification, access to property and confidentiality.  The master 
agreement covers issues especially related to contingencies.  Based upon the definitions 
presented in this study, it can easily be argued that the master agreement contained a 
majority of “outcome” provisions, for both expected and contingent conditions. 
 
One the other hand, the sub-agreements are based upon shorter time horizons.  
Very few contingencies are written into the agreement.  Provisions are included into the 
agreement that make reference to the master agreement as a controlling agreement.  The 
sub-agreements agree to all the provisions put forth in the master agreement, unless 
there is added an addendum to the order.  A few of the sub-agreements contained 
provisions that exempted certain provisions found in the master agreement relative to the 
transaction they covered.  The sub-agreements contains provisions that generally cover 
topics such as reports, timetables, resource accessibility, payment schedules and 
penalties for non-payment and a detailed description of the object or service covered in 
the transaction.  Based upon the definitions presented in this study, it can also be easily 
argued that sub-agreements, or orders, contain a majority of “process” provisions, 
primarily for expected conditions with little coverage of contingencies. 
 
The case study regarding the alliance activities of RETAILER and ITSUPPLIER 
provided insights into a cooperative business relationship that was created to exploit a 
specific market opportunity.  The manner in which the contracts were set up appeared to 
give the partnership the benefits of both long-term and short-term contracts.  Efficiencies 
in contracting might suggest the argument between contracts of different time horizons 
to be mute.  These findings may also suggest that the observations described by 
Macaulay (1963) do not appear to apply.  This case study, in addition to another recent 
research study, appears to agree that the existence of trust does not come forward to 
replace the use of contracts within alliance activities, as is suggested by other research in 
management.  The observations of the contracts within this study also demonstrate that 
there exist distinctions between contract provisions, depending upon what is the 
intended purpose of the contractual agreement.  This is in line with several research 
studies that have observed similar distinctions among contract provisions. 
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V. SURVEY 
 
The purpose of this survey is to introduce deductive reasoning to the study of 
contracts and their design.  Much of the research regarding inter-firm contracts has 
focused on distinctions between relational (trust) and structural (contracts) mechanisms.  
However, researchers have made several attempts to design and define categories for 
contract provisions.  Their attempts have been helpful, but not definitive enough to 
develop “provision constructs” from which to study contracts and their specific clauses.  
The purpose of the survey instrument is to develop and test the validity of provision 
constructs with regard to independent variables. 
 
This particular survey was developed through three primary stages.  First, a case 
study was conducted which contributed the actual contracts (and contract provisions) 
and an understanding of how these contracts were used.  Second, actual contracts were 
dissected and divided into distinct provisions.  Assisted by existing research, specific 
definitions regarding provision types were constructed.  These definitions allowed a 
panel to classify each provision.  Third, the selected provisions were used as contractual 
responses to described circumstances.  The “circumstances” or scenarios described 
attempted to portray conditions developed under that transaction cost analysis. 
 
 
A.  Building the Survey. 
As previously explained, the case study provided the contracts and additional 
information concerning how these contracts are used.  Unlike most prior research 
regarding contractual business relationships, a case study involving the development of 
new technologies was not used.  Instead, this case study focused on a partnership that is 
better described as a customer-supplier relationship, if not a marketing partnership.  The 
most probable difference between these contracts and the contracts guiding technology 
development is the increased definiteness with regard to the contract detail.  The 
partnership was developed for a well specified purpose which in turn allowed those 
developing the contracts to have more details to include in the agreement.  But this effort 
did not dissuade attorneys from including provisions that would protect rights regarding 
the development of new technologies.  For example, in an effort to protect each partner, 
the contract had a provision that allowed each partner to retain a “50% ownership 
interest in the development of software resulting as a direct result of this agreement”. 
 
Another distinction presented by this case study was the contractual bifurcation 
or the manner in which these contracts were organized.  Upon inspection of the master 
contract and the sub-agreements, I observed differences in the focus of each contract.  
The parties, within the case study, generally regarded the sub-agreements as extensions 
of the master agreement and considered the two documents as “one” contract.  However, 
distinct purpose of each of these agreements amplified the differences between the 
documents.  For example, the master agreement was designed to put forth a general 
understanding of the two parties’ relationship.  Given the definitions put forth in this 
paper, I could see that the master agreement generally consisted of outcome provisions, 
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provision that attempted to describe conditions, whether expected or those agreed upon 
in direct response to contingencies. 
 
I used the master agreement and one of the sub-agreements from which to extract 
contract provisions.  I sought to include as many topics as possible into the selection of 
contract provisions.  One of the concerns was that most contractual provisions do not fit 
the entire intent of the provision in a single contractual clause.  In fact, most provisions 
include several clauses incorporating increased detail into the agreement.  However, 
shortening the length of each provision in order that I could increase the frequency that 
attorneys made observation relative to the provisions became the top priority.  
Therefore, each provision presented to the panel was reduced to one sentence.  This 
effort was to allow the panel member to make more decisions regarding the provisions.  
The selection of the provision topics are as follows: 
 
 
 
Each member of the panel was given a one-page definition of outcome and 
process provisions.  As previously discussed, each member of the panel was asked to 
categorize each provision as “outcome”, “process” or neither. (See Appendix #1)   Each 
member of the panel categorized the provisions individually, without consultation of 
other panel members.  Ideally, the provisions accepted to be included in the survey were 
those most consistently selected to represent either a process provision or an outcome 
provision.  The results of the panel were as follows: 
 
Table #5 
 
8 – 0  Response 14 
7 – 1  Response 19 
6 – 2  Response 3 
5 – 3  Response 6 
4 – 4  Response 8 
TOTAL  50 
 
The results of the panel demonstrated that 36 out of the initial 50 provisions were 
in the same way classified by 75% or more of the panel members.  This would indicate 
that the panel was able to determine and agree on a large majority of the provisions 
Table #4 
 
Transaction Orders 2 Indemnification 3 Performance  1 
Representations 3 Dispute Committee 1 Force Majeure 1 
Warranties 6 Arbitration 2 Prohibition to Hire 1 
Confidentiality 2 Reports & Notices 2 Definitions 3 
Property Access 2 Default 2 Payment & Pricing 5 
Property Ownership 5 Jurisdiction 1 Assignment 2 
Service & 
Maintenance 
3 Contract Term & 
Termination 
3 TOTAL 50 
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independently presented.  This demonstrates both convergent and divergent validity of 
the newly defined constructs.  I decided to discard all those provisions that received less 
than a “7-1 response” from the survey. (See Appendix #2)  A pool of 33 provisions 
made up the list of potential contractual clauses intended to be included in the survey.   
 
The next step was to create pairs of provisions to represent the choices between 
the outcome provision and the process provision.  The final survey design was intended 
to present a specific circumstance and ask the participant to choose between one of two 
contract provisions, one representing process and the other outcome.  I attempted to 
locate those pairs that did not bias any one clause over the other.  In other words, certain 
clauses may be deemed too important to any contract regardless of the provision with 
which they are compared, thereby biasing the attorney’s preference regardless of 
whether it represented the appropriate response based upon the circumstances.  For 
example, a “prohibition to hire” provision was included to discourage the practice of 
offering positions to personnel of the other firm within the partnership.  Firms often 
come into contact with multiple personnel, with valuable skills, working for the other 
firm in a partnership requiring the need for this type of contractual limitation.  The panel 
overwhelmingly selected this clause as an outcome provision.  It was not selected to be 
presented in the final survey based upon the reasoning that attorneys might select this 
provision regardless of the environmental conditions that might exist for the firms.  I 
also attempted to create pairs where the relative importance of a clause did not overly 
outweigh the other, again attempting to avoid a certain bias.  In the end, 10 provisions 
were selected to represent process provisions and 13 provisions were selected to 
represent outcome provisions.95
Table #6 
 
  The selection of provision topics was reduced to the 
following: 
 
Transaction Orders 2 Property Ownership 3 Reports & Notices 2 
Representations 1 Service & Maintenance 2 Default 1 
Warranties 1 Indemnification 1 Jurisdiction 1 
Confidentiality 2 Dispute Committee 1 Performance 1 
Property Access 2 Arbitration 1 Payment & Pricing 2 
 TOTAL 23 
 
After developing the pairs of contractual provisions to represent the dependant 
variables in the survey, the portrayal of the circumstances intended to represent the 
independent variables became necessary.  As previously discussed, the independent 
variables will subscribe to the arguments developed by Shelanski & Klien (1999).  
Changes in the governance system between cooperating partners depend upon: 1) 
frequency of transactions96, 2) relationship-specific investments97
                                                   
95 Each contrasting scenario was assigned the same pairs of contract provisions.  Most of the provisions 
selected for the survey were used at least twice in the survey.  The same pairs were used for contrasting 
scenarios in order to reduce any variance explained by the differing clauses. 
, 3) market 
96 Shelanski & Klien (1999) describes the frequency of the relationship transactions to have an impact on the 
governance structure of the partnership.  I have decided to capture this variable by describing a set of 
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uncertainty98, and 4) the complexity of arrangements99.  These independent variables 
will be presented in contrasting conditions.  For example, the independent variable 
representing specific investment will be presented as both “extensive specific 
investments” and “minimal specific investments”.   
 
Each condition will be presented in a brief scenario followed by opportunities for 
the respondent to select outcome provisions or process provisions as the appropriate 
overtly contractual response.  No definitions will be given to the respondents; therefore 
the selection will be solely based upon their impression of the provision.  Eight brief 
scenarios will be presented to the respondent.  Each scenario will have a contrast.  Five 
pairs of contract provisions will follow each scenario which attempts to assess the 
respondent’s preference towards process provisions or outcome provisions given the 
scenario circumstances.  Each set of scenarios depicting the independent variables and 
the expected responses with regard to the dependent variables will now be described 
briefly. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
contrasting circumstances.  For example, the participant is asked to consider changes in the contract when 
dealing with a partner in which, 1) no prior transaction have been conducted representing a “zero-frequency”, 
and 2) many transactions have been conducted, representing “high frequency”.  
1.  Propositions. 
Transaction cost economics has heavily contributed to the study of governance 
mechanism between collaborating business partners.  Several independent variables 
have been applied in order to observe the resulting changes in the governance system 
between partnering firms.  For example, studies within transaction cost economics has 
often focused upon the level of transaction specific investments made between 
partnering firms and then observed how this has affected changes in the governance 
system.  Each of the independent variables utilized in this study will be briefly described 
with a brief explanation of the expected result of the survey completed by attorneys.  
Propositions will be given for each independent variable presented. 
 
97 Williamson (1985) describes these “specific investments” as the most important component of the 
collaborative experience.  Shelanski & Klien (1999) recognizes these investments as the most studied topic 
under the transaction cost analysis.  I decided to capture this variable by describing contrasting circumstances.  
The participant is asked to consider changes in the contract when 1) extensive investments are made in 
relationship specific equipment, and 2) minimal investments are made in time and non-specific assets, which 
can be reallocated easily. 
98 Shelanski & Klien (1999) defines the level of uncertainty as the “uncertainty about the future and about 
other parties’ actions”.  I decided to focus my definition of uncertainty to include market conditions only and 
to explicitly avoid including the opportunistic behavior described under “under parties’ actions”.  Again, in 
contrasting circumstances, the participant is asked to consider changes in the contract when facing 1) an 
unstable general economic environment which are difficult to predict, and 2) a generally stable market 
condition with extensive barriers to new competition.  
99 Shelanski & Klien (1999) suggests the “complexity of the arrangement” will have an impact on the 
governance structure.  The increased complexity involved in the transactions between the partners results in 
difficulties assessing performance.  This complexity loosens the connection between “deeds and awards” 
(Williamson, 1985).  Attempting to represent this complexity, the participant is asked to consider changes 
when the 1) activities of the partner are readily transparent, and 2) the performance measures are difficult to 
assess. 
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Past experience between partners has been shown to have an effect on the 
governance of the partnership (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  It is expected that these 
distinctions in the governance system will manifest themselves in the provisions 
emphasized in the contracts.  More experienced partners, having conducted numerous 
transactions, would imply that the parties have agreed upon the “conditions” of their 
relationship as being sufficient to protect each party’s interest.  With these safeguards in 
place, emphasis would then focus toward developing information regarding the details 
of the next set of collaborative “activities” or transactions.  Therefore, those that have 
had numerous transactions in the past should attempt to emphasize process provisions.   
 
Partners that have had little to no experience regarding transaction with a specific 
partner have little to no agreement relative to those conditions being sufficient to protect 
each party’s interest.  Therefore, it is expected that those partnerships having no past 
experiences would tend to emphasize outcome provisions, or those provisions that 
clarify desired conditions between the parties.  Partnerships with experience are looking 
for increased information regarding the details of their collaboration.  The expectations 
of the survey results are as follows: 
 
Independent Variable: Process 
Provision 
Outcome 
Provision 
Past 
Experience 
with Partner 
+ Extensive past experience P-1  
- No past experience  P-2 
 
Proposition #1 
Collaborative business partnerships between partners having extensive 
prior experience organizing transactions will tend to emphasize the 
addition of process provisions to the contract. 
 
Proposition #2 
Collaborative business partners between partners having no prior 
experience organizing transactions will tend to emphasize the addition of 
outcome provisions to the contract. 
 
 
Within the transactional cost analysis, the factor that has been the center of a 
majority of the research regarding governance mechanisms has been relationship-
specific investments (Shelanski & Klien, 1999; Williamson, 1991).  These investments 
are unique in that the positive value of the asset(s) is dependent upon the continued 
existence of the partnership.  These particular assets are difficult to redeploy to other 
activities and partnerships.  Therefore, the parties possessing such assets are exposed to 
the possibilities of opportunistic behavior by partners.  The opportunistic behavior that 
attempts to alter contractual conditions after investments have been made is referred to 
as “hold-up”100
                                                   
100 Supra, page on hold-up and any important references, economics. 
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Partners that have extensive investment in specific assets will structure their 
agreements to protect their investments and create resistance to any attempt to engage in 
hold-up activities.  The formal contractual agreement would most likely contain 
numerous provisions establishing agreement concerning acceptable “conditions”.  
Therefore, partnerships that require extensive investment in specific assets will 
emphasize the use of outcome provisions.    
 
Partners that do not have extensive investment in specific assets will attempt to 
create value through collaborating activities.  Based on this, partners would emphasize 
increased detail relative to collaborative, value creating activities.  This effort will tend 
to emphasize interest in developing formal contract with a focus on process provisions.  
The expectations of the survey results are as follows:    
 
Independent Variable: Process 
Provision 
Outcome 
Provision 
Specific 
Capital 
Investments 
+ Extensive specific investments  P-3 
- Minimal investments P-4  
 
Proposition #3 
Collaborative business partners having extensive investments in 
transaction specific assets will tend to emphasize the addition of outcome 
provisions to the contract. 
 
Proposition #4 
Collaborative business partners having minimal investment in transaction 
specific assets will tend to emphasize the addition of outcome provisions 
to the contract. 
 
 
Performance measures are an important component of the overall governance 
effort of the collaborative relationship.  While the main concerns of the governance 
structure under transaction cost economics is to “facilitate efficient adaptations” to the 
transactions, the development of performance measures are “the ways by which better to 
assure a closer correspondence between deeds and awards” (Williamson, 1985).  
Collaborative activities between firms often create information asymmetries that would 
not necessarily exist if all activities were to be conducted within a single firm.  Often 
because of the joint interlocking efforts of the partnering firms, the contributions of each 
partner are difficult if not impossible to recognize.  A similar effect occurs when 
“teams” within an organization coordinate their work activities (Alchian & Demsetz, 
1972).  
 
The nature of the activities covered in the agreement will have a great impact 
upon the agreement itself.  For example, if partners develop a contract to produce a new 
product or technology, performance by each of the partners might be difficult to 
recognize.  If partners develop a contract to market existing products, then performance 
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of activities should be easier to identify.  Therefore, those partnerships that develop 
contracts that cover activities in which performance is relatively easy to identify and 
understand will tend to emphasize contract provisions that emphasize general conditions 
as opposed to specific activities.  Outcome provisions will be emphasized in contracts 
where performance is relatively easy to identify. 
 
On the contrary, contracts developed to govern partnerships that are, for 
example, attempting to develop new technologies or products, often have difficulty 
defining the scope of performance making collaboration increasingly difficult.  In the 
study conducted by Faems et. al. (2008), researchers found that a second contract was 
more effective at governing a cooperative business relationship attempting to develop 
new printer technology because the contract was increasingly specific regarding the 
inter-firm activities.101
Independent Variable: 
  Therefore, contracting parties that have difficulties defining 
performance will tend to emphasize process provisions in order to generate greater 
detail. 
 
Process 
Provision 
Outcome 
Provision 
Performance 
Measurement 
+ Transparent performance  P-5 
- Performance difficult to measure P-6  
 
Proposition #5 
Collaborative business partners contracting within activities that are 
relatively transparent regarding performance will tend to emphasize the 
addition of outcome provisions to the contract. 
 
Proposition #6 
Collaborative business partners contracting within activities that are 
relatively difficult to measure regarding performance will tend to 
emphasize the addition of process provisions to the contract. 
 
 
Uncertainty often increases the transaction costs and is often considered an 
independent variable in transaction cost literature.  Uncertainty creates an “adaptive, 
sequential decision problem.” (Williamson, 1985).  Williamson (1985) argues that the 
sensitivity to uncertainty tends to increase as the level of specific investments increase.  
Uncertainty about future events often requires extensive costs for due diligence studies 
and the use of protective mechanisms.  These mechanisms often attempt to protect 
existing investments in capital in a specific market.  Uncertainty can be affected by 
issues such as general economic conditions, market specific competitive conditions, and 
simple variances in sales. Uncertainty is created when the ability to predict future market 
                                                   
101 Faems et. al. (2008) studied a collaborative effort by two partners to develop components in printing 
technology.  The first contractual effort failed to produce the desired technology. A second contractual effort 
was designed with more specifics regarding the collaborative activities and responsibilities of each firm.  The 
second contract resulted in a successful venture and the added detail of the contract was no doubt the result 
of what the parties learned from their first effort. 
64 
 
conditions becomes cloudy and distorted to the point of representing a real risk to 
existing capital investments.  
 
As the level of uncertainty was to increase, the expectation would be that the 
parties would mold the contract to protect “conditions”, especially those that may be 
threatened.  Provisions that present agreed conditions would be emphasized in an 
environment characterized by “unstable conditions”.  Therefore, parties faced with 
uncertainty are most likely to focus on outcome provisions. 
 
Reductions in the level of uncertainty will most likely have the opposite effect.  
The ability to generally predict future conditions, stable conditions, allows the parties to 
focus on interfirm activities.  Therefore, stable market conditions should motivate 
attorneys to increase their focus on interfirm activities and emphasize process 
provisions. 
 
Independent Variable: Process 
Provision 
Outcome 
Provision 
Market 
Uncertainty 
+ Stable conditions P-7  
- Unstable market conditions  P-8 
 
Proposition #7 
Collaborative business partners contracting within activities that are 
relatively transparent regarding performance will tend to emphasize the 
addition of outcome provisions to the contract. 
 
Proposition #8 
Collaborative business partners contracting within activities that are 
relatively difficult to measure regarding performance will tend to 
emphasize the addition of process provisions to the contract. 
 
2. Survey Omissions. 
The survey does present several challenges that need to be addressed.  First, 
rarely is a contract provision described through one clause.  Provisions often have 
several clauses that give important detail to the agreement.  The provisions selected for 
the panel and eventually included in the survey are all described with one clause (See 
Appendix 1 & 3).  Second, the eight scenarios described in the survey are illustrated 
with only a few sentences. (See Appendix 3)  An enormous amount of potentially 
important detail is omitted.  An attempt was also made to present the independent 
variables as isolated in terms of their effect.  However, these variables are rarely found 
in isolation.  For example, Alchian (1984) finds that the investment is specific assets and 
the information asymmetries described as performance measure difficulties are “often 
inseparable”.  
 
  The omission of detail in both the scenarios and the contract provisions was 
based upon a calculated decision concerning an apparent trade-off.  The addition of 
added detail in both the scenarios and the contract provisions would increase the reading 
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and time required from the respondent to complete the survey.  Attorneys appear to have 
a general dislike of surveys and asking for more of their time would have made the 
effort to enlist participants more difficult.  Reducing the verbiage also produced more 
opportunities for the participants to make decisions, resulting in more data points.   For 
these reasons, omissions were made relative to the detail of both the contract provisions 
and the scenarios representing the independent variables.  
 
 
B.  Administering the Survey. 
Once the survey had been completed, it consisted of general instructions, eight 
scenarios and five pairs of contract clauses listed after each scenario. (See Appendix #3)  
No definitions were given relative to the provisions.  Attorneys would have to choose 
between two contract provisions, five times for each of the eight scenarios presented.  
The survey did not provide any means for respondents to explain their responses in a 
“qualitative” manner.  The respondent was forced to make a selection for all five pairs of 
contract provisions before the survey would allow the respondent to go to the next 
scenario.   
 
Before the survey was released, a pretest of the survey was conducted.  Two of 
the attorneys on the panel were selected to take the survey and provide feedback 
regarding its content.  This was the first time any members of the panel had seen the 
eight scenarios.  Several recommendations were made to clarify the facts communicated 
within each scenario.  Changes were made until both members of the panel were 
satisfied that the content within each scenario communicated its intended message. 
 
The survey was designed to be administered through an online medium.  
“SurveyMonkey.com” provides support for online surveys.  Participants were sent an e-
mail containing an active link from the email directly to the survey.  The online survey 
provider collected all the responses and provided limited analysis of the data. 
 
Attorneys tend to be very difficult to access for interviews or survey information.  
Attorneys that specialize in contracts tend to work for large companies as general 
councils, or they tend to work for larger law firms.  General Counsels are very difficult 
to access since rarely is their contact information public.  Access to most of those 
attorneys that work as general council was attained through contacts with business 
professionals.   Attorneys, specializing in contracts, working at larger law firms are not 
much more accessible.  It is understandable why researchers have so little information 
from attorneys which, in turn, have such an important impact on business.  Access is 
very limited and, as a group, they tend not to want to answer questions regarding their 
work.  I was generally able to use personal contacts to gain access to those attorneys 
represented in this study.  These personal contacts became advocates that were able to 
forward the website link to other attorneys they deemed qualified to participate in the 
survey.  This is often referred to as a “snowball” effect. 
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VI. RESULTS 
 
 
 
A.  Findings of the Survey. 
The survey information was collected by surveymonkey.com for later analysis.  
By completion of the study, 58 contract attorneys had responded to the survey.  Each 
survey contained 40 responses to questions containing a choice between one of two 
contract provisions.  Eight scenarios (four contrasting scenarios) were introduced to 
respondents, who were then presented with five pairs (one provision each representing 
either process or outcome) of contract provisions.  The contrasting scenarios were 
followed by the same set of pairs of provisions, although the order of the questions was 
changed.  Out of 58 responses, 82.5% of the surveys were entirely completed.  The raw 
data indicated the following results: (table #7) 
 
Table #7 
 
Independent Variables: Dependent Variables: 
(Provisions) 
Process Outcome 
No Past Experience as Partners 185 75 
Extensive Past Experience as Partners 33 202 
   
Clear Performance Measures 88 172 
Vague Performance Measures 107 128 
   
Extensive Specific Capital Investments 46 199 
Minimal Capital Investments 177 58 
   
Stable Market Conditions 179 56 
Unstable Market Conditions 73 172 
 
 
The survey information was then coded for analysis.  Each question with a 
response indicating a “process” clause was coded as “1”.  Each question with a response 
indicating an “outcome” clause was selected coded as “0”.  Each scenario presented to 
the respondent was followed by five questions regarding the appropriate provision to be 
included in the contract.  If the respondent answered with all “process” provisions for a 
specific scenario, the resulting score would be 5.  If the respondent answered the 
questions with all “outcome” provisions for a specific scenario, the resulting score 
would be 0.  The following descriptive statistics are a result of this coding: (table #8) 
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Table #8 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 N Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation 
No Prior Experience 53 0 5 3.49 1.527 
Prior Experience 48 0 3 .71 .944 
Clear Performance Measures 53 1 5 2.49 1.339 
Vague Performance Measure 48 0 4 1.94 1.549 
Extensive Capital Investments 50 0 4 .96 1.428 
Minimal Capital Investments 48 0 5 3.75 1.246 
Stable Environment 48 2 5 3.81 .960 
Unstable Environment 50 0 4 1.50 1.055 
 
 
The statistical test used to test the expected effects is known as the Cochran-
Mentel-Haenszel test.  This test is designed for data that is represented in a series of two 
by two tables.102
Table #9      C-M-H Statistical Test  (Prior Experience) 
  In addition, the Cochran-Mentel-Haenszel test analyzes the data with 
fewer assumptions regarding the population and weights the responses appropriately 
across individual measurements.  This analysis provides an opportunity to adjust for 
potential confounding effects without having to estimate the parameters.  The 
contrasting scenarios will act as a treatment from which to observe the effects.  For 
example, those questions under the scenario describing partners having extensive prior 
experience together are compared to the scenario in which is a partnership is described 
as having no prior experience together.  The data collected from each of the contrasting 
scenarios was then compared and tested for differences.  If significance is found, the 
interpretation is that changes in one variable are associated with changes in the other.  
These changes, if significant, are greater than what would be expected by chance of 
random sampling.  Each of the four independent variables will be reviewed. 
 
1.  Prior Experience. 
It was expected that prior experience between the collaborating business partners 
would motivate attorneys, while developing formal cooperative agreements, to place a 
higher emphasis upon the use of “process” provisions.  It was also expected that a lack 
of experience between the collaborating business partners would motivate attorneys to 
emphasize “outcome” provisions.   
 
Odds Ratio Value 95% Confidence Limits Chi-Square DF Sign. 
 10.6575 6.8998 16.4617 106.534 46 <.0001 
 
 
                                                   
102 For each two by two tale, the adjusted log-odds ratio and the weight are calculated.  After calculating these 
values, 0.5 is added to each frequency as a correction.  The weighted mean of the log-odds ratio is calculated. 
Then the weighted squared deviations are calculated and the summed.  This weighted sum of the squared 
deviations is chi squared distributed and the degrees of freedom equals the number of two by two tables 
minus one. 
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The results of the test (table #9) demonstrate that this test was extremely significant 
which supports the argument underlying the proposition and demonstrates that there is a 
strong divergence between when process provisions are recommended by attorneys and 
when outcome provisions are recommended.  It can be inferred from the test that 
attorneys faced with a partnership between partners that have extensive collaborative 
experience would tend to emphasize process provisions when making additions to a 
contract.   
 
2.  Performance Measures. 
It was expected that the existence of ambiguous performance measures between 
the collaborating business partners would motivate attorneys, while developing formal 
agreements, to place a higher emphasis upon the use of “process” provisions.  The 
addition of process provisions would increase information important to allocate 
responsibilities regarding activities and harmonize complementary expertise.  It was also 
expected that clear performance measures between the collaborating business partners 
would motivate attorneys to emphasize “outcome” provisions. 
 
Table #10      C-M-H Statistical Test  (Performance Measurement) 
Odds Ratio Value 95% Confidence Limits Chi-Square DF Sign. 
 .6269 .4425 .8881 113.2142 46 <.0001 
   
The results of the test (table #10) demonstrate that the test was extremely  
significant which supports the argument underlying the propositions concerning 
performance measures and demonstrates that there is a divergence between when 
process provisions are recommended by attorneys and when outcome provisions are 
recommended.  It can be inferred from the test that attorneys faced with a partnership 
with vague performance measures tend to emphasize process provisions when making 
additions to a contract.   
 
3.  Relationship Specific Capital Investments. 
It was expected that partnerships that do not require extensive investment in 
relationship specific assets would motivate attorneys, while developing formal 
cooperative agreements, to place a higher emphasis upon the use of “process” 
provisions.  These firms attempt to create value through their activities and take an 
interest in coordinating their actions.  It was also expected that extensive investment in 
relationship specific assets, that retain their value due to the continued existence of the 
partnership, would motivate attorneys to emphasize “outcome” provisions.   
 
Table #11      C-M-H Statistical Test  (Specific Investment) 
Odds Ratio Value 95% Confidence Limits Chi-Square DF Sign. 
 8.1429 5.3353 12.4277 130.7461 45 <.0001 
 
 
The results of this particular t test (table #11) demonstrate that this test was 
extremely significant which supports the argument underlying the propositions 
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concerning specific investments and demonstrates that there is a difference between 
when process provisions are recommended by attorneys and when outcome provisions 
are recommended.  It can be inferred from the statistical test that attorneys faced with a 
partnership that requires minimal investment in relationship specific assets would tend to 
emphasize process provisions when making additions to a contract.   
 
4.  Market Uncertainty. 
It was expected that collaborating business partners that exist in stable market 
environments would motivate attorneys, while developing formal cooperative 
agreements, to place a higher emphasis upon the use of “process” provisions.  It was also 
expected that collaborative business partners that exist in unstable or less certain markets 
would motivate attorneys to emphasize “outcome” provisions.   
 
Table #12      C-M-H Statistical Test  (Capital Investment) 
Odds Ratio Value 95% Confidence Limits Chi-Square DF Sign. 
 8.1429 5.3353 12.4277 130.7461 45 <.0001 
 
The results of the t test (table #12) demonstrate that the test was extremely 
significant which supports the argument underlying the hypothesis and further 
demonstrates that there is a difference between when process provisions are 
recommended by attorneys and when outcome provisions are recommended.  It can be 
inferred from the statistical test that attorneys faced with stable market conditions would 
tend to emphasize process provisions when making additions to the contract.   
 
 
 
B.  Implications for Theory. 
The contribution of this study has little to do with the notion that the four 
independent variables selected in this study have an impact on the governance of the 
relationship.  Prior research has already demonstrated that prior relationships, 
performance measures, specific-investments and general market uncertainty do impact 
governance systems between partners conducting numerous transactions.  If anything, 
this study has assumed the existence of these effects to be accurate.  The question in this 
study turns to whether those independent variables can have an impact on the 
characteristics of formal contractual agreements developed to govern cooperative 
business relationships. 
 
The several corporate and contract attorneys that were interviewed over the 
entirety of this study all strongly agreed that contracts, designed to govern inter-firm 
cooperative activities, are unique.  These agreements tend to have distinct characteristics 
and do not typically succumb to the use of “boiler plate” contracts.  Business leaders and 
their attorneys can have enormous impact on the unique characteristics of their formal 
agreements.  In spite of all this, contracts have been generally treated as relatively 
homogenous governance mechanisms by researchers.  Past researchers have rarely 
moved beyond making reference to a contract’s complexity, which sometimes does little 
more than count the number of clauses in the formal agreement. 
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In order to enable researchers to understand fundamental differences in contract 
characteristics, there is a need for tools or constructs that help to dissect and categorizes 
contract components.  As previously discussed, numerous references have been made to 
contract provisions in an effort to develop insightful categories.  While these have been 
helpful, they have come short of developing constructs to be used in statistical tests.  
This study of contracts would be otherwise included as one of several research studies 
that have developed categories for contract provisions if not for one aspect; an attempt to 
operationalize those categories and develop discriminate and convergent validity relative 
to the constructs.  The development of these constructs will help researchers move 
beyond the case studies that have generally dominated the research of governance 
mechanism relative to longer-term cooperative relationships. 
 
After the constructs describing contract provisions are developed, they can then 
be used to test contracts.  This will not only allow researchers the ability to generate 
insights into the make-up of these agreements, but also allow researchers the ability to 
understand the surrounding circumstances that help create these agreements.  For 
example as was shown in this study, extensive investment in specific assets to a 
partnership does affect the type of provisions preferred in a partnership.  Future 
classifications of the construct do not have to reflect the “outcome” and “process” 
provision developed in this study.  Future categories may even be more numerous.  Once 
these constructs are developed and tested over a larger set of contracts, theory relative to 
contracts as governance mechanisms can begin to develop.  
 
 
VII. CONCLUSION 
 
The purpose of this study was to: 1) review existing research regarding the 
governance mechanisms developed for cooperative business relationships and add a 
legal perspective with the intent to glean new insights, 2) conduct a case study regarding 
a contractual arrangement, and 3) develop constructs that represent distinct categories of 
contract provisions and test them relative to external conditions to verify whether the 
these conditions have an effect on the contractual make-up.  Each of these should be 
reviewed briefly.  
 
Contracts have become an indispensible part of the business landscape.  
Contractual obligations are present in almost every set of organized transactions, with or 
without the benefits of a formal contractual agreement.  A review of legal research and 
relevant case decisions has demonstrated that implied obligations and responsibilities 
not addressed by contract are routinely applied to parties by the courts.  The evolution 
and acceptance of the Uniform Commercial Code demonstrates a general willingness to 
accommodate private governance systems in the midst of incomplete contracts.  In 
addition, courts have taken opportunities to “fill in” apparent gaps found within 
agreements.  However, while it may appear as if the legal system is willing to 
accommodate most any agreement, recent research (Scott, 2003) has also demonstrated 
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the court’s persistence in the application of traditional contract law and insisting upon 
legal requirements such as “definiteness”. 
 
Governance systems based upon trust appear deficient in three ways.  First, with 
the application of traditional contract theories developed under a “formalist” perspective, 
a contract purposely left incomplete runs the risk of violating rules such as definiteness 
allowing the partnership to possess a contract that has no hope of being enforced. 
Second, incomplete contracts risk the application of implied obligations of the party’s 
past performance and industry standards.  Third, purposely incomplete contracts risk 
allowing courts to “fill-in” terms and obligating the parties to responsibilities not 
intended.  All these potential “costs” should be considered within research discussing 
relational governance systems based upon trust. 
 
In addition to providing documents and information rich interviews, the case 
study allowed the opportunity to verify whether the conclusions of the Macaulay study 
can be generally applied to current cooperative business relationships.  The general 
consensus of the interviews conducted in the case analysis is that the conclusions 
generated by Macaulay (1963) do not hold, or at least may not be applicable in a more 
formalized economy.  Economic actors, both business executives and attorneys facing 
the reality of transactions with costs (Coase, 1992), seem openly concerned with the 
development of appropriate contractual relationships, as opposed to arrangements 
organized around trust.  The followers of the Macaulay perspective assume the 
implications of the logic of transaction costs economics.  Participants of transactions will 
seek to economize or reduce the costs associated to those transactions.  The Macaulay 
perspective demonstrates that those involved in transactions would attempt to economize 
their interactions and replace expensive contracts with governance structures based upon 
trust. 
 
Regarding this topic, the case study makes two important points.  First, while 
trust is an important component early in a collaborative relationship, its importance 
fades quickly.  Executives are keenly aware of the costs associated with business 
relationships that involve incomplete contracts.  They seem to be mindful of the costs of 
lawsuits, interrupted business transactions due to confusion in contract language, 
inefficiencies due to redundancies created by a lack of clarity within contracts, and 
damages due to implied obligations within their industries.  In other words, in the minds 
of many executives, a governance structure based upon trust would serve only to 
increase potential transaction costs to such an extent that these structures appear to be 
largely unacceptable.  While economizing the cost of transactions, the governance 
structures based upon trust does not appear to represent lower costs. 
 
Second, research regarding contracts has not accounted for changes in “contract 
technology”, or perhaps “legal astuteness” (Bagley, 2008).   Those involved in 
contractual agreements are also aware of their responsibilities to economize the cost of 
transactions.  The case study makes note of the bifurcation of the contractual agreement.  
The master agreement is developed to address more general representations and 
responsibilities.  The sub-agreements, or orders, cover specific transactions and 
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activities.  These orders simply make reference to the controlling master agreement.  
This arrangement allows for quick review of the orders, greatly reducing the costs of the 
transaction.  Executives appeared aware of the interaction between the master agreement 
and order as evidenced by their constant reference to orders as “addendums”.  The 
perception was that each order was merely an extension of the overall contractual 
agreement between the parties.  The long-term relationship is protected under the master 
agreement and the orders provide the efficiency needed to reduce transaction costs. 
 
The survey process presented within this study represented an early attempt to 
operationalize constructs representing differing contract provisions.  However, the 
success of the statistical tests to find differences between the categories of provisions 
selected provides hope for future efforts.  Further study and testing will be required 
before any set of constructs can begin to generate theories regarding contracts governing 
cooperative business relationships.  Certain limitations of the survey instrument were 
discussed previously.  However, the survey instrument seemed to verify what several 
researchers have concluded over the years. The nature of those provisions used in the 
contract can give researchers information regarding the circumstances and the intent of 
the parties when the agreement was drafted.  The development of “provision constructs” 
will help to develop an understanding of interactions between environmental conditions 
and the internal characteristics of the observed contracts. 
 
If contract characteristics can be defined using constructs representing 
provisions, then unique differences between contracts can be detected in a wide variety 
of circumstances.  The independent variables or circumstances presented in the survey 
are largely a reflection of those conditions presented in transaction cost economics.  
However, transaction cost economics “usually abstracts away from issues of market 
power, resource dependence…” (Shelanski & Klien, 1999).  Future studies, armed with 
tools to assess differences in contractual agreements, can evaluate the effects of 
relationships representing asymmetric power between trading partners or those 
relationships structured around resource dependencies.  Investigations into contracts 
over a broader set of circumstances will greatly contribute to the eventual develop of 
theory. 
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Appendix #1 
Contract Provisions (Contracts for Longer-Term Cooperative Business Relationships) 
 
“Process provisions” are those formalized clauses that describe joint or complimentary 
operational activities existing as a direct result of the contractual agreement.  These 
provisions include those expected under current assumptions and those expected under 
contingency assumptions (in response to “what if” scenarios).  Process provisions codify 
and describe the “means” to which parties achieve contract objectives and outline “how” 
outcome conditions are realized.   These descriptions outline operational and post-
formation activities.  To give a few examples, process provisions within a contract 
detail: resource accessibility, work schedules, time tables, transaction orders, pricing 
mechanisms, reports, pre-determined damages or fees, and necessary confidentiality 
disclosures.  
 
“Outcome provisions” are those formalized clauses that describe conditions existing as 
a direct result of the contractual agreement.   These provisions include those expected 
under current assumptions and those expected under contingency assumptions (in 
response to “what if” scenarios).  Outcome provisions codify an understanding of 
“what” to achieve under the contract objectives.  These conditions act as standards, 
concerning agreed upon events and circumstances.  To give a few examples, outcome 
provisions within a contract can detail the particular: legal standards, product or service 
standards, confidentiality standards, representation and warranty standards, property 
standards and representations.  Outcome provisions include both those representations of 
conditions prior and those conditions subsequent to the activities of the agreement. 
 
Dispute provisions. 
Dispute provisions are not intended to produce an entirely new set or category of 
contract clauses.  These provisions provide a prescribed description of intended 
responses to contingencies; contingencies which occur as a direct result of disputes 
regarding the contractual agreement.  The division between those dispute provisions 
considered “process” and those provisions considered “outcome” depends upon the level 
of control over the final decision.  If the parties abdicate control of the dispute outcome 
to a third party as, for example, parties do in the courts and within binding arbitration, 
the provision is considered “outcome”.  If the parties do not abdicate control of the 
dispute outcome to a third party, as for example, non-binding arbitration or committees, 
the provision is considered “process”. 
 
Process         Outcome 
 
 Committees Non-binding  Binding  Courts  
   Arbitration  Arbitration 
 
 <  Cooperative decision-making Third-party decision-making  > 
   (internal)    (external) 
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Penalties vs. Remedy. 
Performance of the contract is the primary method in which the parties fulfill their 
obligations and terminate their liabilities to a contractual agreement.  Longer-term 
contracts are unique in that performance is often difficult to define, making fulfillment 
of contractual obligations difficult to judge.  Therefore, parties to longer-term contracts 
often turn their attention from performance and instead emphasize contractual default.  
Contractual penalties incentivize parties to make payment, but keep the parties from 
contractual default and are consider “process” provisions.  Remedies are often assessed 
after the parties experience contractual default and therefore are labeled “outcome” 
provisions. 
 
         Default 
 
Process         Outcome 
 
   Penalties   Damage Remedies 
 
 
 
Mark the following contract provisions as either (O) outcome provision or (P) process 
provision.  Leave blank any provisions that do not fit into either category. 
 
 
_____ Hazardous waste (Party A agrees to remove all hazardous waste);  
 
_____ Notices (All notices issued hereunder must be in writing and will be deemed 
given five days after mailing.); 
 
_____ Default (Party will be in default if payment is not received within 15 days after 
date it is due.); 
 
_____ Property (Party A reserves the right to revoke any assignment, grant, conveyance 
or transfer due to non-payment.); 
 
_____ Force Majeure (Party A shall not be liable if performance is delayed or prevented 
by a circumstance beyond its control.); 
 
_____ Ownership of assets (Title to equipment acquired throughout this agreement will 
remain with party A…);  
 
_____ Service level Guarantee (Party A will provide the service standards set forth in 
each order);  
 
_____ Representations (Each party asserts that all current financial information is true 
and accurate and provides a good representation of their financial position.); 
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_____ Maintenance (Maintenance service will be provided during standard working 
hours.); 
 
_____ Assignment (Party A may assign their interests in this agreement if approved by 
all parties.) 
and /or workspace owned, leased rented, licensed and/or controlled);  
 
_____ Warranty (Party A agrees to comply with internal policies of safety and 
security…); 
 
_____ Prohibition to hire (Parties agree that neither party shall directly or indirectly, 
actively solicit the employment of members of the other party’s staff.);  
 
_____ Definitions (The term “equipment” is meant to include both hardware and 
software.);  
 
_____ Pricing (Pricing shall be set forth in each order);  
 
_____ Warranty (In no event will Party A be responsible for failures to perform based 
upon limited access to equipment.); 
 
_____ Definitions (The term “deliverables” include, but are not limited to…); 
 
_____ Pricing (Pricing set forth in an order is based upon shared information, believed 
to be complete and accurate.);  
 
_____ Definitions (Staffing and management services and products are referred to 
collectively as “offerings”.); 
 
_____ Contract Term (This agreement shall commence on the date it is accepted by 
both parties…);  
 
_____ Warranty of Third party product (If third party products are not in conformance, 
the exclusive remedy is the refund of any fees.);  
 
_____ Voided Warranty (Party A will not warrant services and/or equipment in which 
Party A does not have proper access or information);  
 
_____ Warranty (If a contracting party is not satisfied with any delivered equipment, 
party A will make replacement with the identical equipment at no additional charge.); 
 
_____ Termination (With 90 days notice, each party may terminate any services 
without incurring early termination charges.); 
 
_____ Arbitration (The parties agree to abide by the decision made under arbitration…); 
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_____ Pricing (Parties will negotiate in good faith to make appropriate adjustments to 
the order.);  
 
_____ Payment (Invoices are payable upon receipt and all sums are due no later than 30 
days.);  
 
_____ Indemnification (Party A is not responsible for litigation expenses or settlements 
unless approved in writing.); 
 
_____ Repairs (Party A will make all equipment repairs and adjustments necessary.); 
 
_____ Resource Accessibility (Parties will permit each other and their agents to use or 
access, all hardware, software); 
 
_____ Orders (Each offering and deliverables will be mutually agreed upon and signed 
by authorized signatories of both parties.); 
 
_____ Arbitration (Substantive contractual disagreements will seek mediation through 
non-binding arbitration…); 
 
_____ Default (The sole remedy of a party shall be to require the defaulting party to 
make payment, as liquidated damages and not as penalty…); 
 
_____ Property (Party A agrees that, except as set forth expressly in this agreement, no 
other rights or licenses are granted.); 
 
_____ Indemnification (Each party will defend the other from all claims of personal 
injury or tangible property damage.); 
 
_____ Confidentiality (Each party will disclose to the other certain business information 
identified as confidential); 
 
_____ Warranty (Party A represents and warrants that any services provided will be 
performed in a skillful and workmanlike manner.); 
 
_____ Committee (All disputes are to be addressed first by the Committee…); 
 
_____ Jurisdiction (The terms and elements of this contract will be guided and directed 
under the state laws of ___.); 
 
_____ Term (The term of each offering shall commence on the installation of each 
product or beginning of service.); 
 
_____ Orders (Orders may be submitted via hard copy or electronic means.); 
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_____ Confidentiality (Each party will make reasonable efforts not to disclose the other 
party’s confidential information to any third party.); 
 
_____ Property (Party A assigns, grants, conveys and transfers all rights to any output 
of services for an applicable order.); 
 
_____ Payment (For any payment not received within 10 days of the due date, Parties 
agree to pay a late charge of 5% of the amount due); 
 
_____ Indemnification (Excluded from Party A’s obligation to defend and pay any 
settlement for products or services not provided by Party A, if such forms the basis of 
the claim.); 
 
_____ Performance (Party A will continue to provide products under specifications 
outlined within this agreement.); 
 
_____ Representations (Party A does in fact possess all the needed financing to 
purchase the necessary assets.); 
 
_____ Representations (Party A certifies that all facts and reports presented during 
negotiations are true and valid and are a proper depiction of the firm.); 
 
_____ Ownership (Party A retains ownership of all equipment, used and not used, 
relative to its resale and collection of residual proceeds.); 
 
_____ Ownership (Party A retains 50% ownership interest in the development of 
software resulting as a direct result of this agreement.); 
 
_____ Reports (Party A may collect from equipment certain data related to billing, 
supplies, support and service of designated equipment.); 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
88 
 
 
Appendix #2 
 
Contract Provision Results 
 
 
P O 
OUTCOME 
 
0 8 Party A retains 50% ownership interest in the development of software 
resulting as a direct result of this agreement. 
 
0 8 Excluded from Party A’s obligation to defend and pay any settlement for 
products or services not provided by Party A, if such forms the basis of the claim. 
 
0 8 Party A represents and warrants that any services provided will be 
performed in a skillful and workmanlike manner. 
 
0 8 Party A agrees that, except as set forth expressly in this agreement, no 
other rights or licenses are granted. 
 
0 8 The parties agree to abide by the decision made under arbitration… 
 
0 8 In no event will Party A be responsible for failures to perform based upon 
limited access to equipment.. 
 
1 7 Title to equipment acquired throughout this agreement will remain with 
party A… 
 
1 7 Party A shall not be liable if performance is delayed or prevented by a 
circumstance beyond its control. 
 
1 7 Party A reserves the right to revoke any assignment, grant, conveyance or 
transfer due to non-payment. 
 
1 7 Party A is not responsible for litigation expenses or settlements unless 
approved in writing. 
 
1 7 Party A does in fact possess all the needed financing to purchase the 
necessary assets. 
 
1 7 Party A certifies that all facts and reports presented during negotiations 
are true and valid and are a proper depiction of the firm. 
 
1 7 Ownership (Party A retains ownership of all equipment, used and not 
used, relative to its resale and collection of residual proceeds. 
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1 7 The terms and elements of this contract will be guided and directed under 
the state laws of ___.) 
 
1 7 Each party will defend the other from all claims of personal injury or 
tangible property damage. 
 
1 7 If a contracting party is not satisfied with any delivered equipment, party 
A will make replacement with the identical equipment at no additional charge. 
 
1 7 Party A will not warrant services and/or equipment in which Party A does 
not have proper access or information. 
 
1 7 If third party products are not in conformance, the exclusive remedy is 
the refund of any fees. 
 
1 7 Parties agree that neither party shall directly or indirectly, actively solicit 
the employment of members of the other party’s staff. 
1 7 Party A agrees to comply with internal policies of safety and security… 
 
1 7 Each party asserts that all current financial information is true and 
accurate and provides a good representation of their financial position. 
 
1 7 Party A agrees to remove all hazardous waste. 
 
2 6 Party will be in default if payment is not received within 15 days after 
date it is due. 
 
2 6 Party A assigns, grants, conveys and transfers all rights to any output of 
services for an applicable order. 
 
3 5 Staffing and management services and products are referred to 
collectively as “offerings”. 
 
3 5 Party A may assign their interests in this agreement if approved by all 
parties.) 
and /or workspace owned, leased rented, licensed and/or controlled. 
 
 
PROCESS 
 
8 0 Party A may collect from equipment certain data related to billing, 
supplies, support and service of designated equipment. 
 
8 0 Orders may be submitted via hard copy or electronic means. 
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8 0 All disputes are to be addressed first by the Committee… 
 
8 0 Substantive contractual disagreements will seek mediation through non-
binding arbitration… 
 
8 0 Each offering and deliverables will be mutually agreed upon and signed 
by authorized signatories of both parties. 
 
8 0 All notices issued hereunder must be in writing and will be deemed given 
five days after mailing. 
 
8 0 Parties will permit each other and their agents to use or access, all 
hardware, software. 
 
8 0 Pricing shall be set forth in each order. 
 
7 1 Each party will disclose to the other certain business information 
identified as confidential. 
 
7 1 Parties will negotiate in good faith to make appropriate adjustments to the 
order. 
 
7 1 Maintenance service will be provided during standard working hours. 
 
6 2 This agreement shall commence on the date it is accepted by both 
parties… 
 
5 3 For any payment not received within 10 days of the due date, Parties 
agree to pay a late charge of 5% of the amount due. 
 
5 3 Party A will provide the service standards set forth in each order. 
 
5 3 Each party will make reasonable efforts not to disclose the other party’s 
confidential information to any third party. 
 
5 3 Pricing set forth in an order is based upon shared information, believed to 
be complete and accurate. 
 
 
NEITHER 
 
4 4 Party A will continue to provide products under specifications outlined 
within this agreement. 
 
4 4 The term of each offering shall commence on the installation of each 
product or beginning of service. 
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4 4 The sole remedy of a party shall be to require the defaulting party to 
make payment, as liquidated damages and not as penalty… 
 
4 4 Party A will make all equipment repairs and adjustments necessary. 
 
4 4 Invoices are payable upon receipt and all sums are due no later than 30 
days. 
 
4 4 With 90 days notice, each party may terminate any services without 
incurring early termination charges. 
 
4 4 The term “deliverables” include, but are not limited to… 
 
4 4 The term “equipment” is meant to include both hardware and software. 
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Appendix #3 
 
Survey  
Instructions. 
This particular research is interested in the development and modification of contracts 
between cooperating business partners. Cooperating business partners are distinct from 
discrete transactions in that the partners are expecting to maintain a longer-term 
relationship with multiple sets of transactions. When choosing provisions for the 
contract, keep in mind that the purpose of the agreement is to maintain a positive, 
longer-term business relationship. 
 
The conditions created for each set of questions are designed to portray conditions that 
may affect the partnership in different ways. Keep in mind the corresponding set of 
conditions as you choose the contractual provisions that would be most appropriate. 
 
Survey Question #1. 
Suppose that your firm, or the one you represent, must develop a contractual agreement 
with another firm.  Your firm has had extensive experience contracting with this 
partnering firm in the past.  This new effort will require a modification to any existing 
agreements.  In order to encourage the best hope for a successful cooperative 
relationship between the firms, choose the contractual provision below you would most 
prefer to emphasize.  It is understood that both provisions may be important, however, 
you are only required to designate the most important additions to the agreement given 
the circumstances: 
 
A. Each Party represents that any services provided will be performed in a skillful 
and workmanlike manner. 
B. Each Order may be submitted via hard copy or electronic means. 
 
A. Each Party will retain 50% ownership interest in any software developed as a 
resulting of this agreement. 
B. Each Party will disclose to the other certain business information identified as 
confidential. 
 
A. All disputes are first reviewed by the Operations Committee. 
B. The terms and elements of this contract will be guided and directed under the 
state laws of ___. 
 
A. Parties will negotiate in good faith to make appropriate price adjustments to any 
orders. 
B. The Parties agree to abide by the final decision rendered under arbitration. 
 
A. Each party will defend the other from all claims of personal injury or property 
damage. 
B. Maintenance service will be provided during standard working hours. 
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Survey Question #2. 
Suppose your firm, or the one you represent, must partner with another firm in order to 
coordinate your marketing activities.  This new marketing effort will NOT require 
new investments of capital or time.  Any minimal investments made could easily be 
re-allocated to other activities if the partnership were to dissolve.  This new effort 
will require a modification to any existing agreements.  In order to encourage the best 
hope for a successful cooperative relationship between the firms, choose the contractual 
provision below you would most like to emphasize.  It is understood that both provisions 
may be important, however, you are only required to designate the most important 
additions to the agreement given the circumstances: 
 
A. The Parties agree to abide by the decisions made within arbitration proceedings. 
B. All disputes are first reviewed by the Operations Committee. 
 
A. Each Party may collect certain data related to supplies, support and service of 
designated equipment. 
B. Title to equipment acquired throughout this agreement will remain with Party 
“X”. 
 
A. No Party will be responsible for failure to perform based upon limited access to 
equipment. 
B. Parties will permit each other and their agents to use and access to all hardware 
and software. 
 
A. Maintenance service will be provided during standard working hours. 
B. Party “X” retains ownership of all equipment, used and not used, relative to its 
resale and collection of proceeds. 
 
A. Each Party will retain 50% ownership interest in any innovations developed as a 
resulting of this agreement. 
B. All notices issued must be in writing and will be deemed given five days after 
mailing. 
 
 
 
Survey Question #3. 
Suppose that your firm, or the one you represent, must partner with another firm to 
market an existing product.  The activities of these partnering firms are readily 
transparent and progress is relatively easy to assess.  A series of reports are generated 
which outline the activities of both partners.  This new effort will require a modification 
to any existing agreements.  In order to encourage the best hope for a successful 
cooperative relationship between the firms, choose the contractual provision below you 
would most prefer to emphasize.  It is understood that both provisions may be important, 
however, you are only required to designate the most important additions to the 
agreement given the circumstances: 
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A. All notices issued hereunder must be in writing and will be deemed given five 
days after mailing. 
B. Each Party certifies that all facts and reports presented are true and valid. 
 
A. Pricing will be set forth in each order. 
B. Each party will replace defective equipment with identical equipment at no 
additional charge. 
 
A. Each Party agrees to comply with each other’s internal policies of safety and 
security. 
B. Maintenance service will be provided during standard working hours. 
 
A. Each party will make reasonable efforts not to disclose the other party’s 
confidential information to any third party. 
B. Each offering will be mutually agreed upon and signed by authorized signatories 
of both parties. 
 
A. Each Party may collect certain data related to billing, supplies, support and 
service of designated equipment. 
B. Title to equipment acquired throughout this agreement will remain with Party 
“X”. 
 
 
Survey Question #4. 
Suppose your firm, or the one you represent, must partner with another firm on order to 
coordinate activities.  The general environment of the market in which you compete 
is relatively stable.  Market variables are easy to predict, even in the distant future.  
Extensive barriers exist to discourage new competition.  This new effort will require 
a modification to any existing agreements.  In order to encourage the best hope for a 
successful cooperative relationship between the firms, choose the contractual provision 
below you would most like to emphasize.  It is understood that both provisions may be 
important, however, you are only required to designate the most important additions to 
the agreement given the circumstances: 
 
A. Each party will continue to provide products under specifications outlined within 
this agreement. 
B. Parties will negotiate in good faith to make appropriate adjustments to the order. 
 
A. All disputes are first reviewed by the Operations Committee. 
B. The terms and elements of this contract will be guided and directed under the 
state laws of ___. 
 
A. Parties will permit each other and their agents to use or access all hardware and 
software. 
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B. Each party will make reasonable efforts not to disclose the other party’s 
confidential information to any third party. 
 
A. For any payment not received within 10 days of the due date, Parties agree to pay 
a late charge of 5% of the amount due. 
B. Each party will defend the other from all claims of personal injury or tangible 
property damage. 
 
A. Party “X” retains ownership of all equipment, used and not used, relative to its 
resale and collection of proceeds. 
B. Each Party may collect certain data related to billing, supplies, support and 
service of designated equipment. 
 
 
Survey Question #5. 
Suppose that your firm, or the one you represent, must partner with another firm to 
develop new and improved software.  This particular effort will require the 
development of new knowledge and it will be difficult to measure the performance 
of the partner.  This new effort will require a modification to any existing agreements.  
In order to encourage the best hope for a successful cooperative relationship between the 
firms, choose the contractual provision below you would most prefer to emphasize.  It is 
understood that both provisions may be important, however, you are only required to 
designate the most important additions to the agreement given the circumstances: 
 
A. All notices issued hereunder must be in writing and will be deemed given five 
days after mailing. 
B. Each Party certifies that all facts and reports presented are true and valid. 
 
A. Pricing will be set forth in each order. 
B. Each party will replace defective equipment with identical equipment at no 
additional charge. 
 
A. Each Party agrees to comply with each other’s internal policies of safety and 
security. 
B. Maintenance service will be provided during standard working hours. 
 
A. Each party will make reasonable efforts not to disclose the other party’s 
confidential information to any third party. 
B. Each offering will be mutually agreed upon and signed by authorized signatories 
of both parties. 
 
A. Each Party may collect certain data related to billing, supplies, support and 
service of designated equipment. 
B. Title to equipment acquired throughout this agreement will remain with Party 
“X”. 
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Survey Question #6. 
Suppose that your firm, or the one you represent, must develop a contractual agreement 
with another firm.  Your firm has had NO past experience contracting with this 
firm.  In fact, there has been no working relationship between your firm and the new 
prospective partner.  This contract is the first time your firm has cooperatively worked 
with this particular partner.  In order to encourage the best hope for a successful 
cooperative relationship between the firms, choose the contractual provision below you 
would most prefer to emphasize.  It is understood that both provisions may be important, 
however, you are only required to designate the most important additions to the 
agreement given the circumstances: 
 
A. Each Party represents that any services provided will be performed in a skillful 
and workmanlike manner. 
B. Each Order may be submitted via hard copy or electronic means. 
 
A. Each Party will retain 50% ownership interest in any software developed as a 
resulting of this agreement. 
B. Each Party will disclose to the other certain business information identified as 
confidential. 
 
A. All disputes are first reviewed by the Operations Committee. 
B. The terms and elements of this contract will be guided and directed under the 
state laws of ___. 
 
A. Parties will negotiate in good faith to make appropriate price adjustments to any 
orders. 
B. The Parties agree to abide by the final decision rendered under arbitration. 
 
A. Each party will defend the other from all claims of personal injury or property 
damage. 
B. Maintenance service will be provided during standard working hours. 
 
 
Survey Question #7. 
Suppose that your firm, or the one you represent, must partner with another firm in order 
to work on a large, capital intensive project.  Both partners will be required to make 
extensive investments in equipment.  These investments will be made in equipment 
that will only retain its value if deployed within the partnership.  It is doubtful this 
equipment could be sold for anything close to its costs if the partnership were to 
dissolve.  This new effort will require a modification to any existing agreements.  In 
order to encourage the best hope for a successful cooperative relationship between the 
firms, choose the contractual provision below you would most like to emphasize.  It is 
understood that both provisions may be important, however, you are only required to 
designate the most important additions to the agreement given the circumstances: 
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A. The Parties agree to abide by the decisions made within arbitration proceedings. 
B. All disputes are first reviewed by the Operations Committee. 
 
A. Each Party may collect certain data related to supplies, support and service of 
designated equipment. 
B. Title to equipment acquired throughout this agreement will remain with Party 
“X”. 
 
A. No Party will be responsible for failure to perform based upon limited access to 
equipment. 
B. Parties will permit each other and their agents to use and access to all hardware 
and software. 
 
A. Maintenance service will be provided during standard working hours. 
B. Party “X” retains ownership of all equipment, used and not used, relative to its 
resale and collection of proceeds. 
 
A. Each Party will retain 50% ownership interest in any innovations developed as a 
resulting of this agreement. 
B. All notices issued must be in writing and will be deemed given five days after 
mailing. 
 
 
Survey Question #8. 
Suppose your firm, or the one you represent, must partner with another firm in order to 
coordinate activities.  The general environment of the market in which your firm 
competes is such that it is difficult to predict market conditions, even in the near 
future.  Innovations are currently being developed and new competitors are entering the 
market making conditions appear very unstable.  This new effort will require a 
modification to any existing agreements.  In order to encourage the best hope for a 
successful cooperative relationship between the firms, choose the contractual provision 
below you would most like to emphasize.  It is understood that both provisions may be 
important, however, you are only required to designate the most important additions to 
the agreement given the circumstances: 
 
A. Each party will continue to provide products under specifications outlined within 
this agreement. 
B. Parties will negotiate in good faith to make appropriate adjustments to the order. 
 
A. All disputes are first reviewed by the Operations Committee. 
B. The terms and elements of this contract will be guided and directed under the 
state laws of ___. 
 
A. Parties will permit each other and their agents to use or access all hardware and 
software. 
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B. Each party will make reasonable efforts not to disclose the other party’s 
confidential information to any third party. 
 
A. For any payment not received within 10 days of the due date, Parties agree to pay 
a late charge of 5% of the amount due. 
B. Each party will defend the other from all claims of personal injury or tangible 
property damage. 
 
A. Party “X” retains ownership of all equipment, used and not used, relative to its 
resale and collection of proceeds. 
B. Each Party may collect certain data related to billing, supplies, support and 
service of designated equipment. 
 
